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xv
Following a long dormancy, structural issues are again ascendant in develop-
ment economics. After enjoying prominence in the aftermath of the Second 
World War, structural economics was largely banished from the Washington 
Consensus that emerged in the 1980s. Now, however, a new development 
thought is arising that takes a more nuanced view. It acknowledges the impor-
tant role of markets yet maintains the need for tailored approaches to develop-
ment that allow a more active role for the state, and that are more refl ective of 
economic realities—what I referred to as New Structural Economics.
Structural Transformation and Rural Change Revisited—Challenges for Late 
Developing Countries in a Globalizing World is an extremely thorough and 
important contribution to this renewal of structural economics. It signifi cantly 
improves our understanding of rural economies and structural transformation, 
and it could not be more timely.
The book is based on the results of the RuralStruc program, implemented 
through a strong collaborative framework in seven countries and coordinated 
by Bruno Losch. Launched in 2006 at a time when the international dialogue 
on agricultural policy had become trapped in trade issues, and was therefore 
missing the broader perspective of rural change, the program foresaw the need 
to reinvest in structural issues. Its results add value to the World Development 
Report 2008, which served as a fi rst reminder of agriculture’s role for develop-
ment. They revive an old paradigm to offer a new perspective, one that chal-
lenges much current thinking on rural development, notably for countries at 
the fi rst stages of their structural transformation.
Relying on a methodology that articulated microdata collection with a 
macro structural perspective, the program conducted extensive fi eldwork to 
investigate livelihood strategies of rural households, and married the results 
with a thorough understanding of structural change. The book highlights 
 recurring patterns of diversifi cation and specialization along the process of 
structural transformation. Further, reconnecting with a broader vision, it 
Foreword
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emphasizes the diffi culties faced by late developers, whose economies offer 
few alternatives for households to diversify. This is particularly the case for 
 Sub-Saharan Africa, where a still incipient economic transition and the on going 
demographic transition result in a quickly growing labor force, leading to dra-
matic challenges for the youth of the continent.
Based on their assessment, the authors draw a series of policy lessons. They 
rightly point out the importance of states rebuilding their internal capacities 
to design comprehensive development strategies. These capacities are critical 
to addressing major constraints, defi ning priorities, and ensuring adequate 
sequencing. Above all, they show that for Sub-Saharan Africa, in the com-
ing two decades, a strong reinvestment in agriculture (in addition to seizing 
opportunities for the development of manufacturing and services) will be the 
major policy tool for progressively raising income, mitigating risks, and foster-
ing innovation and rural demand, which constitutes the main engine for rural 
diversifi cation—a major step for structural transformation. The authors also 
stress the role of the state in provisioning public goods, in adequately and care-
fully designing incentives, and in using the leverage offered by the development 
of small towns as a critical mechanism for rural change. These are all sensible 
and useful reminders for the donor community, governments, and local stake-
holders, and represent an important contribution to the role of agriculture for 
development. 
Justin Yifu Lin 
Senior Vice President and Chief Economist 
 The World Bank
xvii
Acknowledgments
This book is dedicated to the memory of Jacques Faye (1946–2010), 
rural sociologist and founding member of IPAR (Initiative Prospective 
Agricole et Rurale, Sénégal)
This book is one of the many outputs of the World Bank’s Program on the 
“Structural Dimensions of Liberalization on Agriculture and Rural Develop-
ment” (RuralStruc). During the four-year implementation of RuralStruc’s two 
phases, and a fi fth year dedicated to producing a synthesis document and begin-
ning to disseminate results, the program collaborated closely with numerous 
experts and researchers in its seven participating countries.
RuralStruc’s activities were implemented under the guidance of Bruno Losch 
(TTL, World Bank, and CIRAD). The fi eldwork was developed with the sup-
port of a coordination team that included Bruno Losch, as well as Sandrine 
 Fréguin-Gresh and Thierry Giordano (French Ministry of Foreign and European 
Affairs), respectively based at the University of Pretoria (Postgraduate School of 
Agriculture and Rural Development) and the Development Bank of Southern 
Africa.
The program was initiated with the full support of John McIntire, sector 
director of ESSD Africa. The peer reviewers of the program’s objectives and 
design were Louise Cord and Robert Schneider (World Bank) and Camilla Toul-
min (IIED). The program’s development was enhanced by guidance from Karen 
Brooks, sector manager (AFTAR), and Stephen Mink, senior adviser (AFTSN), 
who was involved in every step of the process. Shanta Devarajan, chief economist 
for the Africa region, and Justin Yifu Lin, Senior Vice President and Chief Econo-
mist, provided strong support to the dissemination of results.
The fi nal report of the program on which this book is based was prepared 
by Bruno Losch, Sandrine Fréguin-Gresh, and Eric Thomas White (World 
Bank), with substantial contributions from Thierry Giordano and Jean-François 
xvii i  ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Bélières (CIRAD). It was peer-reviewed by Derek Byerlee and Don Larson (World 
Bank), and André Pouillès-Duplaix (AFD).
The results presented in this book draw extensively on two sets of seven 
 country reports and data work developed by the country teams during the two 
phases of the RuralStruc program. The authors and contributors to the national 
reports are as follows:
Kenya: Lilian Kirimi, Mary Mathengue, John Olwande, and Betty Kibaara 
(Tegemeo Institute); Paul Gamba, Sam Onyuma, and Job Lagat (Egerton 
University).
Madagascar: Alain Pierre-Bernard, Rivo Ramboarison, Lalaina Randrianari- 
son, Nicole Andrianirina, and Lydia Rondro-Harisoa (APB Consulting).
Mali: Amadou Samake, Bino Teme, Ousmane Sanogo, Manda Sadio Keita, 
and Aly Ahamadou (IER); Jean-François Bélières, Pierre-Marie Bosc, Chris- 
tian Corniaux, Jacques Marzin, Denis Gautier, and Kako Nubukpo (CIRAD); 
Nango Dembele, John Staatz, and Valerie Kelly (Michigan State University); 
the late El Hadji Oumar Tall, and Bakary Sékou Coulibaly (CEPIA).
Mexico: Fernando Saavedra, Fernando Rello, Hector Robles, Christian 
Muñoz, and Claudio Gonzalez (FLACSO); Virginie Brun (IRD/CEMCA); 
Eric Leonard (IRD); Rafael Palma Grayeb (Universidad Veracruzana).
Morocco: Najib Akesbi and Driss Benatya (Institut Agronomique et Vétéri- 
naire Hassan II), and Noureddine El Aoufi  (Université Mohammed V) for 
Phase 1; Icon2e for Phase 2.
Nicaragua: Arturo H. Grigsby Vado, Francisco J. Perez, Ligia I. Gómez, 
Edna S. García, Miguel A. Alemán, and Yuri L. Marín (Universidad Centro-
americana, Instituto Nitlapán).
Senegal: Cheikh Oumar Ba, the late Jacques Faye, Ibrahima Hathie, Pape 
Nouhine Dièye, Bocar Diagana, Adama Faye, Madické Niang, and Mamadou 
Dansoko (IPAR and ASPRODEB).
Jean Coussy (Ceri-Sciences Po) and Jean-Jacques Gabas (Université Paris X–
Orsay and CIRAD) participated in the program’s preparation and in its launch-
ing workshop in Senegal (April 2006), as well as several dissemination events. 
Jean-Jacques Gabas also led two Sciences Po Paris student workshops (2006 
and 2007) and was involved in preparing several of the program’s policy briefs. 
Eric Léonard (IRD) provided specifi c support on Mexico. 
Additional contributions were received from Emmanuelle Benicourt (con-
sultant) and Véronique Meuriot (CIRAD). Emilie Losch designed the program’s 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS  xix
logo and Erin O’Brien took charge of editing the national reports as well as draft 
versions of the fi nal report.
World Bank staff who contributed to the overall RuralStruc program included 
Bruno Losch (TTL), Patrick Labaste and Michael Morris (successive TTLs of 
the RuralStruc multidonor trust fund), Eric Thomas White, Malick Antoine, 
Angela Lisulo, Benjamin Billard, James Keough, Beatriz Prieto-Oramas, and 
Ingrid Mollard. Hawanty Page and Germaine Mafougong-Ethy were in charge 
of the program’s administrative support. Jeff Lecksell and Bruno Bonansea pre-
pared the maps based on information provided by the RuralStruc national teams.
The program benefi ted from the guidance of its Advisory Committee, 
chaired by C. Peter Timmer (Cabot Professor of Development Studies, emeritus, 
Harvard University) and including Kirsten Albrechtsen de Appendini (Colegio 
de México), Pierre-Marie Bosc (CIRAD), Peter Gibbon (Danish Institute for 
International Studies), Catherine Laurent (Institut National de la Recherche 
Agronomique), Jean-Luc Maurer (Institut des Hautes Etudes Interna tionales 
et du Développement), Sandra Polaski (Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace), Marc Raffi not (Université Paris–Dauphine), and Sibiri Jean Zoundi 
(Sahel and West Africa Club, OECD).
The program also benefi ted from careful follow-up by a Steering Committee 
consisting of RuralStruc’s contributing donors (Agence Française de Développe-
ment, French Ministries of Foreign and European Affairs, and of Agriculture 
and Fisheries, Centre de Coopération Internationale en Recherche Agronomique 
pour le Développement, International Fund for Agricultural Development, 
and World Bank), chaired successively by Florence Lasbennes (Ministry of 
 Foreign and European Affairs) and Marie-Cécile Thirion (Agence Française de 
Développement).

xxi
Bruno Losch is a Senior Economist at the World Bank and a Research Director at 
CIRAD (Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour 
le développement). In his current position he has been leading the RuralStruc 
Program, a joint initiative of the World Bank, IFAD, and the French government. 
In Cirad, he was in charge of the Family Agriculture Program and then joined 
the University of California–Berkeley as a visiting scholar. He holds a Master’s in 
political science and in geography and a PhD in economics and has published 
extensively in the fi eld of rural studies, public policies, and the political economy 
of development.
Sandrine Fréguin-Gresh holds a Master’s in Agricultural Sciences and in 
 Geography and PhD in Agricultural Economics. She is research fellow at CIRAD, 
where she has developed research on contract farming and rural transforma-
tion in Africa, Central America, and the Caribbean. After a visiting position at 
the University of Pretoria, South Africa, she was seconded to the Institute for 
Research and Development Studies—Nitlapan—of the Central American Uni-
versity, Managua, Nicaragua, where she is in charge of research projects on the 
labor market, migrations, and agrarian transformation.
Eric Thomas White is a World Bank consultant and a Managing Associate at the 
international development consulting fi rm INTEGRA LLC, where he leads the 
fi rm’s practice in Information and Communications Technology (ICT) for Agri-
culture. His previous consulting assignments have included the African Develop-
ment Bank and the Millennium Challenge Account–Zambia. In a earlier career, 
he served as a Lieutenant in the U.S. Navy. He holds a Master’s in Public Admin-
istration in International Development from the Harvard Kennedy School, and 
a BA in Economics from the University of Virginia.
About the Authors

xxii i
AFD Agence française de développement 
AgEAP share of economically active population engaged in agriculture
AgGDP share of agriculture in GDP
CAADP Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program
CAFTA-DR Central American–Dominican Republic Free Trade Agreement
CIRAD Centre de coopération internationale en recherche 
agronomique pour le développement
DDA Doha Development Agenda
EAP economically active population
EqA equivalent adult
FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FDI foreign direct investment
FTA free trade agreement
FTZ free trade zone
GAFSP Global Agriculture and Food Security Program
 GNP gross national product
H1, etc. Hypothesis 1, etc.
HHi Herfi ndahl-Hirschman index
IAASTD International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science 
and Technology for Development
ICT information and communication technology
IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFOAM International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements
ILC International Land Coalition
ILO International Labour Organization
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
Abbreviations
xxiv  ABBREVIATIONS
kcal kilocalorie
LCU local currency unit
LDCs least developed countries
LSMS Living Standards Measurement Studies
LSMS-ISA LSMS Integrated Surveys on Agriculture
MDGs Millennium Development Goals
MoHS mean of household shares
NAFTA North American Free Trade Agreement
NbEAP number of economically active population
NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PPP purchasing power parity
REC regional economic community
RIGA Rural Income Generating Activities project
RNFE rural nonfarm economy
RuralStruc Program on the Structural Dimensions of Liberalization on 
Agriculture and Rural Development
SoRM share of regional means
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNECA United Nations Economic Commission for Africa
UN-Habitat  United Nations Human Settlements Programme
UNIDO United Nations Industrial Development Organization
UNRISD United Nations Research Institute for Social Development
WDI World Bank’s World Development Indicators
WDR World Bank’s yearly World Development Reports 
WTO World Trade Organization
The last 40 years of world history have witnessed dramatic changes. The popu-
lation of the planet has grown by 3.2 billion people—a near doubling—and 
for the fi rst time more people live in cities than in rural areas. The advent of 
a global open economy, boosted by technological progress and the growing 
importance of emerging economies in the international political landscape, has 
greatly modifi ed the world’s development prospects. 
Over the next 40 years, the world’s population will grow by an additional 2.3 
billion people, and urbanization will come to affect 70 percent of humanity. The 
abrupt nature of this change in demography, occurring over less than a century, 
raises the issue of sustainability. The world’s growth trajectory is simultaneously 
challenged by the depletion of natural resources, the consequences of climate 
change, and the high risks associated with asymmetric economic development 
among the world’s regions. 
A long-standing international debate about the multiple challenges of a 
9-billion-person world (not least regarding how to feed all these people) is now 
growing more intense. However, focusing on overall fi gures tends to divert 
attention from other equally important facts related to the dynamics of popu-
lation growth and distribution. A major shift is the continued marginalization, 
in terms of world population share, of the developed world (or the world of the 
“fi rst developers”). In 2050, North America and Europe combined will account 
for only 15 percent of global population. Asia will remain the world’s most pop-
ulous region, but the relative weights of the populations of Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) and Europe will be reversed compared with 1960 (10 percent for SSA and 
20 percent for Europe in 1960, and the reverse in 2050). This major population 
realignment will exacerbate existing inequalities in access to resources. 
Meanwhile, despite continued urbanization, 2.8 billion people will still live in 
rural areas in 2050. Rural populations will still be massive and will still earn their 
living primarily from agriculture. Regional differences in urban dynamics will 
strongly affect the distribution of rural populations: South Asia and Sub-Saharan 
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Africa will together account for nearly two-thirds of the world’s rural popula-
tion, and uniquely, in SSA the rural population will continue to grow. 
These trends are of major importance because they challenge the prospects 
for development in much of the world. Agriculture is more than just the pro-
duction of food. Because agriculture is the core activity and main source of live-
lihood for billions of rural people, its evolution will shape the process of eco-
nomic, social, and environmental change. The situation is especially challenging 
in SSA, where the lack of economic diversifi cation—refl ected most notably in 
the region’s anemic rate of industrialization—limits options for employment 
outside agriculture and the informal sector. Over the next 15 years, as a conse-
quence of demographic dynamics, 330 million youth (who have already been 
born) will enter the labor market—a fi gure roughly equivalent to the current 
population of the United States. Of these, 195 million will live in rural areas, and 
rural activities will have to provide them with jobs. Otherwise they will migrate 
to cities or to neighboring countries, where they will contribute to the growing 
economic, social, and political diffi culties that result from mega-urbanization 
and mass migration.
Economies characterized by a large rural population and slow industrial-
ization will have to focus on creating rural employment, although economic 
diversifi cation and management of urban growth remain critical objectives. The 
evolution of agricultural and rural development policy in the next two decades 
will be decisive for the continued fi ght against poverty, for economic develop-
ment, and for political stability. 
From the WTO Debate to the Food Price Crisis—A Missing 
Long-Term Vision
The RuralStruc program was initiated in 2005 in the context of an intense inter-
national debate about the liberalization of agricultural markets and the result-
ing consequences for farming in developing countries. RuralStruc’s main goal 
was to provide a renewed perspective on agriculture and its role in develop-
ment. Specifi cally, it aimed to reconnect the issues related to trade liberalization 
with the broader discussion of rural transformation and the evolution of rural 
economies in a rapidly globalizing world. 
The program was carried out over a fi ve-year period (2006–2010) during 
which time the scope of the international debate on agriculture changed dra-
matically. Three main issues affected this debate: (1) growing concerns about 
the consequences of global climate change, which culminated in the 2009 
Copenhagen Summit; (2) the world food price crisis; and (3) the world fi nan-
cial crisis and its impacts on growth. These issues remain high on the agenda 
and continue to focus international attention on agriculture, as evidenced by 
the implementation of an Agricultural G20.
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Amid the evolving international debate, the World Development Report 
2008 on Agriculture for Development (WDR08) offered a strong and well-
argued reminder of the central role of agriculture in the development process 
and its importance as a contributor to poverty alleviation. Although the report’s 
full incorporation into the policy agenda was delayed by the food price crisis 
and the subsequent need to focus on more pressing short-term issues, its con-
tribution to the debate is invaluable.
The originality of the WDR08 was in adopting a regional approach based 
on different stages in the process of structural transformation. It introduced 
the idea of the “three worlds of agriculture,” which correspond to the differ-
ent roles played by agriculture at different stages of a country’s development. 
The fi rst of these worlds consists of countries whose economies rely heavily on 
agriculture for growth and employment (“agriculture-based countries”); this 
world includes most of Sub-Saharan Africa. The second world of agriculture 
corresponds to “transforming countries,” found mainly in South and East Asia, 
where rapidly rising rural-urban disparities and the persistence of extreme rural 
poverty are major sources of social and political tension. The third agricultural 
world refers to “urbanized countries,” including most of Latin America, where 
agriculture can help reduce the remaining rural poverty through better integra-
tion into modern food markets and the development of environmental services.
Although the conceptualization of these three worlds facilitated the design 
of policy recommendations, some of the challenges countries face were over-
looked. These included demographic issues (notably population growth and its 
consequences for employment) and asymmetries in competitiveness that result 
from globalization.
Consideration of these issues calls into question the viability of the histori-
cal pathway of structural transformation, which involves the progressive shift 
from agriculture to industry and then to services. The underlying dynamic 
of this economic transition (a key component of structural transformation) 
is increased productivity in agriculture, which fosters technical change and 
allows labor and capital to fl ow to other economic activities. Simultaneously, 
economies experience a broad geographic restructuring as labor moves from 
scattered activities (agriculture) to more concentrated ones (industry), and 
urbanization processes accelerate. This process of change translates into higher 
incomes, greater wealth, and improved living conditions, which, along with 
medical progress, initiate the demographic transition (the progressive, though 
staggered, reduction of mortality and birth rates). The result is a population 
that grows rapidly at fi rst, then stabilizes.
This evolutionist vision, based on statistical evidence from past transitions, is 
challenged by today’s world, which suggests that it is important to adopt a more 
contextual historical perspective to understand the ongoing process of structural 
change. The “moment in time” matters, because opportunities, constraints, and 
the balance of power evolve continuously throughout world history.
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Three characteristics from previous transitions must be kept in mind. First, 
the Western European and North American transitions that occurred over the 
19th and the better part of the 20th centuries cannot be disconnected from 
European and American political hegemony, which reduced or eliminated com-
petition and created captive markets that were very lucrative. Access to these 
markets strongly facilitated economic specialization and industrialization. 
 Second, the European transition was boosted by a unique outfl ow of inter-
national migrants that smoothed the adjustment of European economies and 
improved their ability to deal with labor surpluses. Between 1850 and 1930, 
nearly 60 million Europeans migrated to the New Worlds, 35 million to the 
United States alone. Third, the Latin American and Asian transitions started 
during a very specifi c period of self-centered national development that char-
acterized the international regime between the 1929 crisis and the current era of 
globalization, which began at the end of the 1970s. This developmental regime 
was characterized by import substitution, protection, and strong state interven-
tion, all of which contributed to economic modernization. In Latin America the 
economic transition started between the two World Wars; in Asia it began in the 
1950s. Additionally, both regions benefi ted from massive assistance programs 
that resulted from the Cold War. 
Today, the situation for developing countries in the early stages of structural 
transformation is drastically different. Sub-Saharan Africa—the last region of 
the world to embark on the structural transformation process—faces the chal-
lenges of an incipient economic transition and an unachieved demographic 
transition in the context of a global open economy and under the constraints 
of climate change. 
Late developers—which include most of the countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa—enjoy certain advantages that their predecessors lacked. They can reap 
the benefi ts of technological progress and past experience, and can take advan-
tage of new opportunities to access global markets. At the same time, they face 
new constraints, such as huge asymmetries in productivity, increased interna-
tional competition (notably from the big emerging countries), and environ-
mental degradation. These contextual challenges, as well as the instability of 
the international environment, drastically constrain their room to maneuver 
in managing structural change, particularly when it comes to improving the 
livelihood prospects of fast-growing populations. 
The Research Program
This challenging contextual background shaped the design of the RuralStruc 
program, which had three specifi c objectives: (1) contribute to the analytical 
knowledge base on structural change and its effects on agriculture and the 
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rural economy in developing countries; (2) feed and improve international and 
national debates by promoting and reconnecting these issues; and (3) provide 
perspectives for policy making. The program’s motto was “Better understanding 
for better policy making.”
The program design was based on three interrelated hypotheses. The fi rst 
hypothesis (H1) is that the global restructuring of agrifood markets and the 
increasing asymmetry of international competition are leading to growing dif-
ferentiation among farm, marketing, processing, and distribution structures. 
The second hypothesis (H2) is that the income sources and activity patterns of 
rural households change to include more off-farm activities in response to these 
more competitive and challenging global markets. The third hypothesis (H3) 
is that marginalization processes in agriculture and the diffi culties rural house-
holds encounter in adapting to this new context (especially in situations char-
acterized by the absence of effective alternatives to farming) sometimes lead to 
impasses within the process of structural transformation. The third hypothesis 
is particularly relevant for the fi rst of the three worlds of agriculture; namely, 
the agriculture-based countries.
The RuralStruc program used a comparative approach to address these 
hypotheses. To draw lessons from the various ways rural economies adapt to 
the global context of change, seven countries at different stages of structural 
transformation and economic integration were selected for study. Kenya, Mali, 
Madagascar, and Senegal are at an early stage of the economic transition, and 
are part of the fi rst of the three worlds of agriculture. Morocco and Nicaragua 
are at an intermediate stage in their transformation process: Although agricul-
ture remains critical in the economies of both countries, its role is declining. 
Mexico, an upper-middle-income economy, is much further ahead in its trans-
formation process, has become deeply integrated with its northern neighbors 
through the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and forms part 
of the World Development Report’s “urbanized world” (WDR08). 
Program activities were implemented through a collaborative process involv-
ing national teams in the seven countries: These teams were deeply involved at 
every stage of program development, including preparation, implementation, 
analysis, dissemination, and discussion of results. Phase 1 of the program was 
dedicated to the production of a series of broad overview documents summariz-
ing what was known in every country about processes of rural change. This exer-
cise exposed the weakness of the empirical knowledge base regarding the char-
acteristics of rural economies, particularly concerning the livelihood structures 
and income-generating activities of households. The only information available 
came in the form of case studies, undertaken with various objectives and using 
various methodologies, which prevented them from being used systematically.
On the basis of this information, program developers decided to engage in 
primary data collection through fi eld surveys. Around 8,000 rural households 
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in 26 regions of the seven participating countries were interviewed in early 
2008 (note that the survey was implemented before the full development of the 
food price crisis). The interviews focused on the activities and incomes of the 
participating households. The resulting data set provided a unique, single-shot 
representation of rural income structures that was comparable across the sur-
veyed regions because it used a common methodology. Since the surveys were 
carried out at a single point in time, dynamic analysis was not possible. How-
ever, because the surveys used the same methodology at the same point in time, 
yet were carried out in different regions at different stages of economic devel-
opment and featuring different levels of integration into the global economy, a 
dynamic interpretation of results at the cross-regional and cross-country levels 
was possible. This interpretation allowed the program to investigate the drivers 
of rural transformation and contribute to the debate on economic transition 
and structural change.
The Persisting Role of Agriculture and the Extent of 
Rural Poverty
The analysis revealed a diverse array of rural situations that nevertheless had 
a number of important characteristics in common. First was the continued 
dominance of agriculture as an economic activity in all the surveyed regions. 
Ninety-fi ve percent of surveyed households were engaged in on-farm activities: 
producing crops, growing livestock, or processing products on the farm. How-
ever, some regions were signifi cantly more diversifi ed: Tequisquiapan (Que-
retaro state) in Mexico, where only 30 percent of households rely on on-farm 
activities, and Souss in Morocco, where no more than 75 percent of households 
are farm households. 
In addition to high levels of involvement in agriculture, the surveyed regions 
were characterized by widespread poverty, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA). Median incomes (which offer a better overview of the rural reality than 
regional averages) were estimated between $0.5 and $2 PPP (purchasing power 
parity) per person per day in the SSA regions (except Nakuru North in Kenya, 
where it is $3). The non-SSA regions had higher incomes (between $1.5 and 
$5.5 PPP). Dealing with averages, 70 percent of SSA surveyed households earn 
less than $2 PPP/person/day, and 40 percent suffer from $1/day poverty. In 
some regions, notably Mali, this fi gure can reach as high as 80 percent.
Examining the poorest 20 percent of households in a given surveyed region, 
rather than looking at the region as a whole, expresses the reality of poverty 
even more dramatically. This bottom quintile suffers from $1/day poverty in 
every region in the survey outside of Mexico, even in regions that were origi-
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nally put in the “winning” group, owing to their good connections to markets 
and strong asset endowments. Further, average incomes in the top quintiles are 
usually pulled up by a very small number of households that are signifi cantly 
better off than the others and that benefi t from very specifi c social and eco-
nomic conditions.
A consequence of high poverty levels is that households face very high levels 
of risk, which limit their investment capacity and their ability to innovate. This 
dire situation is complicated for households that also face food insecurity. When 
earnings are converted from $PPP into kilocalories (kcal) using local prices, a 
substantial share of households in all surveyed regions had diffi culty meeting 
their minimum daily caloric requirements: In 11 of the 19 surveyed zones in 
SSA, the bottom quintile was, on average, unable to provide 2,450 kcal/person/
day. Two regions in Nicaragua exhibited the same situation.
These results concerning the importance of on-farm income and the wide-
spread prevalence of poverty, even in otherwise heterogeneous rural economies, 
colored the investigation of each of the program’s three hypotheses. In the case 
of the SSA countries, the data suggested that, whatever farm differentiation pro-
cesses have been initiated or strengthened by globalization and the subsequent 
increasing integration of world food markets, none have been deep or profound 
enough to have a macro-level effect on rural economies in the surveyed regions. 
The data also suggested that no matter what other activities households may 
have diversifi ed into as a rural nonfarm economy developed, few have been 
able to leave agriculture altogether, and few of the households that stayed in 
rural areas escaped poverty. At the other end of the transition gradient, the case 
of Mexico showed that even when differentiation processes are extensive and 
many households leave agriculture, rural poverty can remain quite substantial. 
In these economies, many households in the lowest quintiles are still poor—
below the $2/day line and sometimes below $1/day. 
Similarly, the differences in income levels and patterns of income distribu-
tion observed among rural areas of the seven countries say something about 
structural transformation. In SSA, the overwhelming majority of rural house-
holds are poor, but inequality among them is limited (Gini indexes built on the 
sample range from 0.35 to 0.45). In Morocco and Nicaragua, which are moving 
more quickly in the transition, average rural incomes are notably higher, but 
inequality is quite severe (Gini indexes between 0.6 and 0.7). In Mexico, which 
had the highest median rural incomes in the sample, Gini indexes are quite low 
(0.4). There, the issue of inequality in rural areas has been displaced by that of 
rural-urban inequality. The concern in Mexico is the increasing marginaliza-
tion of rural areas. Mexican regions had the largest gap in the sample between 
surveyed household incomes and national GDP per capita: The latter is four to 
seven times the former.
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Farm Production, Markets, and Differentiation Processes 
Over the past decade, the agricultural economics literature has brimmed with 
accounts of farmers in developing countries integrating into the market econ-
omy. Case studies abound that describe how producers have forged new connec-
tions with high-value markets, achieved vertical integration through contracts, 
and reaped the benefi ts of the so-called “supermarket revolution.” Although 
these processes are under way in several regions of the developing world, their 
impact can be overstated, especially when it comes to the proportion of farmers 
involved in this new world of agriculture. New opportunities do exist, but they 
are often strongly localized in specifi c regions and, above all, affect a relatively 
limited number of producers. In any given country, while thousands or even 
tens of thousands of farm households may have benefi ted from the develop-
ment of integrated value chains, hundreds of thousands or even millions of 
other households remain embedded in more traditional types of agriculture—a 
situation exemplifi ed by the well-known Kenyan horticulture success story (the 
second-largest commodity export of the country, horticulture exports involve 
less than 50,000 of Kenya’s more than 3.5 million farm households). 
The Importance of Staples and Self-Consumption
Among surveyed households, a commonly observed characteristic of produc-
tion is the importance of staples, usually a cereal: rice in Madagascar, Mali, 
and Senegal, complemented by millet and sorghum in the last two countries; 
wheat in Morocco; and maize in Kenya, Mexico, and Nicaragua. Ninety-eight 
percent of the surveyed households in SSA and 76 percent in non-SSA regions 
are engaged in staple production. In the RuralStruc sample, staples represent on 
average 62 percent of farm output. In SSA, they often constitute as much as 80 
percent. In non-SSA countries, where more products are grown, the situation 
is more varied. Production of staples is around 45 percent in Nicaragua and 
Morocco, although the fi gure was lower in Morocco during the survey year, 
because drought affected the relative share of wheat. Specialization in maize in 
the surveyed regions in Mexico is related to specifi c incentives. 
The pervasive importance of staples refl ects the fact that risk levels, and 
sometimes food insecurity, have led a large proportion of SSA households to 
remain at least partly and signifi cantly engaged in subsistence farming. These 
households do not simply produce staple crops; they consume a large portion 
of their own output. Self-consumption, depending on the region, accounts for 
about half of production. Extremes are found at one end of the spectrum in 
Mali (75 percent in Diéma or Tominian) and at the other end in Mekhé, in 
Senegal (less than 20 percent). Outside Sub-Saharan Africa, the self-consumed 
share of farm output is lower (20 percent to 30 percent), although poorer quin-
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tiles in Nicaragua rely heavily on subsistence farming (up to 60 percent). The 
extremely low level of self-consumption in the Mexican regions is the conse-
quence of a restructuring of the nation’s maize industry following the imple-
mentation of NAFTA.
Generally, the share of self-consumption decreases with rising wealth at both 
the household and regional levels. Surveyed households in Sub-Saharan Africa 
are less advanced in this process, because they are poorer. The prominence of 
self-consumption in the survey refl ects two complementary effects that limit 
smallholder farmers’ participation in markets. The supply effect refers to risk 
management strategies that households employ to retain control over their food 
supply—a direct response to incomplete and imperfect markets. The demand 
effect refers to weak demand for products because of poor access to and integra-
tion with markets, or the fact that production surpluses are too low to attract 
buyers.
Marketing by Traditional Means
These observations express a dual reality. Rural areas—notably in Sub-Saharan 
Africa—continue to engage in subsistence farming, even though improved 
connectivity to markets is an established fact. Households that do not sell any 
products are unusual, and a large majority of them also purchase food products 
produced by others. 
In the surveyed regions in SSA, traditional marketing patterns persist. Most 
private collecting agents rely on informal strategies based on trust to obtain 
output from farmers, and contractualization remains low, even among farms 
that are fi rmly integrated into markets through ongoing relationships with 
wholesalers or agro-industries (this is the case in monopsonistic situations like 
cotton in Mali). However, some local agribusinesses do make use of contracts 
(tomatoes in the Haut Delta, Senegal; milk in Antsirabe and green beans in 
Itasy, Madagascar; sugar cane in Kenya), and modern marketing systems are 
more prevalent in non-SSA countries. Contractualization rarely occurs at the 
producer level and most often occurs downstream, between the wholesaler, col-
lection unit, or producers’ organization and the processing fi rm or procurement 
service (for example, the dairy industry in Nicaragua).
Where on-farm diversifi cation has occurred, it has done so without any 
discernible pattern. The surveys revealed heterogeneous examples of on-farm 
diversifi cation that have developed in response to region-specifi c opportunities. 
These include the legacy of a colonial cash crop (cotton in Mali, groundnut in 
Senegal, coffee in Kenya); a specifi c investment by a foreign fi rm (green beans 
produced by Lecofruit in Madagascar); or local entrepreneurship enabled by 
public investment in infrastructure (booming shallot production in the Offi ce 
du Niger irrigation scheme in Mali).
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With reference to the program’s fi rst hypothesis, the conclusion is that 
households in the RuralStruc surveys participate in rural economies that have 
not been radically reshaped by vertical integration and the supermarket revolu-
tion (the unique situation of the Sotavento region in Mexico is an exception). 
It is not surprising that new agricultural production systems featuring nontra-
ditional connections to markets are rare. Farm differentiation, where it occurs, 
primarily refl ects differences in levels of existing household assets rather than 
new kinds of connections to markets, and likely simply illustrates the charac-
teristics of local agrarian systems. 
The Importance of Household Assets
Additional evidence for this conclusion is provided by econometric work inves-
tigating the determinants of farm income in surveyed households. A strong 
fi nding of this regression work is that household earnings from farming depend 
largely on traditional determinants of income rather than on more modern 
factors. A particularly striking result is the widespread importance of land as 
a top determinant of farm income (signifi cant in 22 of the 30 surveyed zones, 
making it the most commonly signifi cant variable in the survey). This suggests 
that expanding acreage under cultivation is generally more worthwhile than 
using fertilizer or improved seed varieties. 
A large herd and a small number of family members were found to be the 
next largest contributors to per capita household income, while market inte-
gration and the use of modern farm inputs (seeds and fertilizer) did not seem 
to matter as much. Although the survey did not collect detailed information 
on the practices of farmers and did not allow for a fi ne-tuned understand-
ing of farming systems, a noteworthy fi nding was that market integration does 
not necessarily lead to improved incomes. A link between the two is context-
specifi c. For example, the income effects of contractualization are highly dif-
ferentiated, and depend on where the contracts are concentrated on the income 
spectrum (poor households can be in a situation of heavy dependence, tightly 
bonded to the processor) and on the regional context (especially the existence 
of competition).
Off-Farm Diversifi cation and the Reshaping of the 
Rural Economy
Given the extent of poverty observed in the survey, the risk levels of households 
(including all types of risks related to climate, pests, prices, and market access) 
are a major issue and a major determinant of livelihood strategies. Households 
that face high levels of risk in their agricultural activities often seek income 
opportunities outside the farm; consequently, a large majority of surveyed 
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households engage in off-farm activities (75 percent, on average). The fi gures 
are higher in SSA (80 percent to 95 percent) and lower in non-SSA regions, 
where more on-farm specialization is observed.
Despite these general tendencies, the degree of development of the rural 
nonfarm economy remains uneven, and the rural off-farm sector is often char-
acterized by high levels of self-employment, provision of petty services, and few 
formal opportunities to earn a wage. The picture that emerges from the survey 
data is quite far removed from the buoyant rural economy frequently described 
in the literature.
Uneven Opportunities for Diversifi cation
Diversifi cation patterns are most often a combination of four main categories 
of income: agricultural and nonagricultural wage labor, self-employment, and 
transfers. 
Agricultural Wage Labor. Agricultural wage employment is a common off-
farm activity (reported by one-quarter of the sample) and can help the poor 
supplement their on-farm income between cropping seasons. However, agri-
cultural wages are generally not very high. Quoted wages (which are usually 
listed in reference to the peak season, when labor demand is high) are $2–$4 
PPP/day in the surveyed regions in SSA and $10–$15 PPP/day outside SSA. 
Agricultural jobs are almost always seasonal and provide a very limited return 
aggregated over the year. Although many rural households engage in this work, 
it is a limited complement to farming activities. The only way agricultural wage 
labor can help households escape from poverty is for a household member to 
secure a permanent job, which might pay $7 PPP/day in Senegal and as much 
as $9 PPP/day in Mexico. But these opportunities are too scarce to provide a 
sustainable solution for many. 
Nonagricultural Wage Labor. Nonagricultural wage employment is a limited 
option, mostly found in regions with unique endowments of resources, infra-
structure, and services. Only 15 percent of the surveyed households engaged in 
this activity, and the percentage varied considerably across the studied regions. 
Nonagricultural wage labor opportunities are found mainly in non-SSA coun-
tries; they appear only sporadically in SSA. An example is the maquiladoras 
(labor-intensive industrial units) in Tequisquiapan (Mexico) and Terrabona 
(Nicaragua), where an apparel industry has developed in rural areas. In SSA, 
especially in rural areas, this kind of manufacturing work is scarce; nonagricul-
tural wage labor mostly consists of jobs in the service industries. These jobs are 
generally poorly paid and in the informal sector, although some formal sector 
jobs can be found (for example, in civil service or tourism). The most lucrative 
opportunities are usually available to households that are already well-off, with 
ample human and social capital. 
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Self-Employment. Self-employment is prevalent everywhere. It is the most 
common source of off-farm income in most of the surveyed regions and the 
main diversifi cation option for the poorest households. In SSA, as well as in the 
Sotavento (Mexico), 40 percent to 80 percent of the surveyed households were 
engaged in self-employment. In Morocco, Nicaragua, and Tequisquiapan (Mex-
ico), where there are more economic options (waged jobs), the incidence of self-
employment is dramatically lower (5 percent to 15 percent). Self-employment 
activities are almost always carried out at the micro-level and are often based 
on the performance of odd jobs. Two main self-employment patterns can be 
distinguished: positive diversifi cation (generally a full-time activity), in which 
self-employment contributes signifi cantly to household income, and neutral 
diversifi cation, in which the poorest and most marginalized households develop 
coping or survival strategies by engaging in minor self-employment activities 
with very low returns. Positive diversifi cation is accessible mostly to better-off 
households—those with more or better assets and the ability to make an initial 
investment (for example, a grinder, a sewing machine, or welding equipment). 
Other types of self-employment, especially types related to coping strategies 
(for example, petty trade), could rightly be considered a form of underemploy-
ment and do not represent a good option for the alleviation of poverty.
Transfers. Transfers contribute signifi cantly to the income of rural house-
holds. Although public transfers related to farm subsidies and safety nets were 
observed only in Mexico, they factored quite heavily in household incomes 
(for example, contributing between 12 percent and 20 percent in the Sotavento 
region). Private transfers related to migration (remittances) are more common 
but diffi cult to quantify. They were reported by 24 percent of the households in 
the sample, most of them in regions with strong historical patterns of migra-
tion. The importance of remittances depends on the type of migration (long 
term or short term) and the destination (national or international, to high-
income countries or neighboring countries). However, remittances make up 
a signifi cant share of income in only one region (40 percent in Diéma, Mali). 
In the other regions where they occur, they generally account for between 5 
percent and 15 percent of total household income (Morocco, Nicaragua, and 
Senegal), except in Kenya and Madagascar, where they are insignifi cant. House-
holds in poor quintiles often engage in short-term migration with the goal of 
reducing the number of mouths to feed during the dry season. In these cases, 
remittances are often very limited or even nonexistent, and the living conditions 
of the migrants can be dire. 
Rural Adaptation That Mirrors Overall Structural Change
In addition to the direct income benefi t of migration in the form of remittances, 
a network effect also can provide indirect returns. Improvements in transport 
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and communication infrastructure allow for a new kind of household organi-
zation in which family members contribute to household income from differ-
ent locations, where they are engaged in different economic activities. These 
“archipelago systems” facilitate greater diversifi cation and risk management, 
improve the economic prospects of households, and offer new perspectives for 
rural change. This pattern was observed several times in the RuralStruc sample.
With reference to the program’s second hypothesis (H2), the overall char-
acteristics of off-farm diversifi cation illustrate heterogeneous processes of 
adaptation and rural transformation. They somewhat mirror the economic 
transition as a whole: initial diversifi cation that generates very low returns at 
the early stages of structural transformation and a more mature diversifi cation 
that consolidates the process of change at later stages. These characteristics are 
a reminder that proximity to an area of high population density is not enough 
to stimulate economic growth. The characteristics of urbanization count, espe-
cially the infrastructure, public goods, and services that are critical for the inten-
sifi cation of rural-urban linkages.
The Diversifi cation-Income Relationship and Rural 
Transformation 
Many of the RuralStruc survey results are quite sobering. Most of the surveyed 
households in SSA, as well as signifi cant shares of the sample in the three non-
SSA countries, are very poor and continue to engage extensively in subsistence 
farming. For households in the lowest income quintiles, food security is a major 
challenge. Opportunities to engage in off-farm activities offer very weak returns 
or are accessible only to the already well-off, and vertical integration and con-
tractualization processes are not well developed. 
However, the surveys also turned up some more hopeful results. Levels of 
income vary among countries and regions, and—outside SSA—considerable 
evidence shows that average incomes are rising. The situation is also improving 
in some SSA regions; for example, Bas Delta in Senegal and Nakuru North in 
Kenya. In Morocco and Nicaragua, falling levels of risk and improving mar-
ket opportunities have allowed some households to engage in more on-farm 
diversifi cation. In these two countries and in Mexico, the increasing number 
of economic options has facilitated higher returns from off-farm activities. 
This trend is most obviously exemplifi ed in Tequisquiapan (Mexico), where 
70 percent of rural households are no longer directly engaged in agriculture. 
Although this trend can result in a critical form of marginalization for house-
holds that cannot access wage employment, the average household is better off. 
In this region, among households with farms (30 percent of the sample), those 
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that have one member working in a wage-earning activity have the highest per 
capita income levels.
To explore the extent of these processes of change, the phenomena of diver-
sifi cation and specialization were studied more closely, as was their relation to 
income levels. Two indicators (the Herfi ndahl-Hirschman index and the share 
of income earned from off-farm sources) were used to illustrate the extent to 
which rural households and regions have moved away from on-farm activities 
as a source of livelihood. Several trends were identifi ed. First, households in 
surveyed zones in the richer, non-SSA countries tend to have lower levels of off-
farm diversifi cation. This result was somewhat surprising, as structural change 
is generally considered to be associated with increases in income and moving 
away from a reliance on farming. 
Second, at the subnational level, no clear pattern was seen. In some coun-
tries, richer surveyed regions were more diversifi ed; in others, they were less 
diversifi ed. Within surveyed regions, the effect was equally muddled. However, 
regardless of the direction of the diversifi cation-income relationship, the differ-
ence in diversifi cation levels among income quintiles was pronounced, indicat-
ing a strong interaction between the two factors. 
The Inverted U: A Perspective on Processes of Rural Change
To explain these observations, it was hypothesized that the diversifi cation-
income relationship is characterized by an inverted U shape. At very low income 
levels (where households focus on survival strategies), diversifi cation of income 
sources is uncommon and households are fully engaged in farming. As income 
levels start to rise and households become slightly richer, they remain at risk 
(especially from adverse shocks) but develop more room to maneuver and to 
build safety nets. As incomes continue to grow, households begin to diver-
sify their activities to cope with risk and to fi nd additional revenues. In this 
stage, diversifi cation takes place only at the household level (within-household 
diversifi cation), while the region remains highly specialized in agriculture. The 
process of diversifi cation continues to the point at which households develop 
enough of a wealth and asset base that they can earn suffi cient returns through 
specialization to meet their basic needs and manage their risks. At this point, 
households begin to specialize into different activities—some on-farm, others 
off-farm—and the result is a more diversifi ed regional economy on the whole 
(between-household diversifi cation).
An indicator was developed—the diversifi cation gap—to serve as a proxy 
for a region’s progress along this continuum. The very strong correlation 
observed between the diversifi cation gap and household income suggests that 
regions in the RuralStruc survey tend to move along the inverted U path as 
they develop. The diversifi cation-income relationship appears to include an 
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exponential component: Once a region “turns the corner” and households 
begin to specialize economically, income growth at the aggregate regional level, 
which was previously quite slow, seems to take off rapidly and lead the region 
on a path out of poverty.
Poverty Traps and the Elusive Rural Nonfarm Economy
A signifi cant fi nding of the RuralStruc analysis is that most of the surveyed 
regions in Sub-Saharan Africa are lagging in their progression along the 
inverted U. In fact, many African households seem to hit an invisible wall in 
the transition process where they cannot earn enough money through income 
diversifi cation to become secure in their livelihoods (a result of low returns 
to available off-farm income-generating activities). Consequently, they never 
turn the corner and begin to specialize. They seem to be trapped in structural 
poverty, an observation that confi rms the diffi culty of rural transformation as 
well as the program’s third hypothesis—that the globalization process includes 
the risk of transition impasses.
Finally, in the sample, the process of specialization at the fi nal stage of the 
inverted U path occurs mainly in agriculture, while specialization in other 
economic activities is observed less frequently. This striking outcome can be 
explained by a methodological bias related to the fact that the survey was imple-
mented only in rural areas and thus tends to inform mainly about specialization 
processes in the farming sector. Households that specialize in nonfarm activities 
often do so in urban areas, meaning that they frequently migrate. In addition, 
and perhaps more fundamentally, this result refl ects the somewhat ephemeral 
nature of the rural nonfarm economy, which tends to simultaneously grow and 
dissolve itself as a result of the urbanization process. Not only do off-farm spe-
cializers migrate to urban areas, but urban areas expand as rural boroughs grow 
into small cities. This phenomenon of “cities moving to the country” is a con-
sequence of increasing demographic densities and of the territorial expansion 
of cities related to the urban growth process itself. 
Main Policy Outcomes 
The RuralStruc survey results tell a story about rural transformation and pro-
vide a framework for understanding the evolving trends of diversifi cation and 
specialization. Furthermore, they show the importance of national characteris-
tics (for example, country assets, market functionality, business climate, institu-
tional arrangements, overall governance, and political stability) that determine 
how much room to maneuver is available to households as they struggle to 
escape from poverty. The RuralStruc survey results provide important insights 
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into the specifi c situation of the late developers, exemplifi ed by the surveyed 
regions in SSA, where the fact that countries are still in a very early stage of the 
economic transition limits households’ opportunities for income diversifi cation 
and access to high-return activities. 
The inverted U pattern is not deterministic; rather, it provides a concep-
tual framework to help explain where regions stand in the diversifi cation-
specialization process. This framework allows people to think systematically 
about changes that occurred in the past and to enumerate the possible causes 
of observed transition impasses. It does not predict future developmental paths, 
as these will depend on the idiosyncrasies of the local context and the nature of 
its interactions with the outside world.
For the many rural regions in Sub-Saharan Africa that are caught in a pov-
erty trap, solutions will have to come from contextualized policy interventions 
at the country level, as well as initiatives capable of bringing about stronger 
regional integration. The best way to approach SSA’s lagging transition is to 
introduce policies that can promote rural growth by simultaneously fostering 
and meeting rural demand. An important lesson from past transitions is that 
rising farm incomes trigger rural demand. To ensure that this demand is met 
with an adequate supply of goods and services, governments must support local 
investments through the provision of public goods. 
This rural development strategy is sensible for all developing countries; it 
is critical for SSA countries. In non-SSA countries, the program also found a 
marginalized rural population combined with high urban-rural inequality—a 
situation that is not politically sustainable. 
General Guidelines 
The huge challenges of poverty alleviation, rural growth, and economic transi-
tion have no easy solutions. In the absence of a silver bullet, a long shopping list 
of potentially helpful policy measures has emerged from the past two decades of 
rural development practice. The main components of this list are the improve-
ment of imperfect markets (by lowering transaction costs); the development of 
missing markets (for credit, technical support, and insurance); the provision of 
public goods (infrastructure, research, information, and capacity building); and 
the introduction of risk-mitigation mechanisms. 
Procuring all the ingredients for an effective policy regime is challenging; 
fi nding the exact recipe for success is even more diffi cult. Policies must be tai-
lored to local circumstances, so the most diffi cult task is to identify the com-
bination of policy measures that will be effective in a particular context. This 
process includes making critically important choices in terms of prioritization 
and targeting. In most countries (not only the developing ones), an important 
issue for policy makers is the pressing need to address a multitude of problems 
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at the same time, which is usually not possible owing to fi nancial and human 
resource constraints.
On the basis of the program results, which show a very strong heteroge-
neity of situations among countries, among regions, and among households, 
two major recommendations for policy making can be advanced: (1) reengage 
in development strategies at both the national and subnational levels, and (2) 
implement regional diagnoses. 
Reengaging in Development Strategies. Overall strategy design has been 
neglected over the past decades as a result of state withdrawal, excessive seg-
mentation in sectoral policy making (leading to “stovepiping”), and the dete-
rioration of public information and statistical systems—a major handicap for 
policy makers. 
In this context, reinvesting in knowledge creation is an urgent priority. As 
illustrated by the country reviews carried out during Phase 1 of the RuralStruc 
program, general socioeconomic information is defi cient, and the data needed 
to understand the dynamics of evolving rural economies are especially scarce. 
Public data collection and reporting systems (statistical systems) must be rein-
vigorated and redefi ned, and capacity in public agencies to collect and report 
data must be complemented by capacity to analyze the data and formulate rel-
evant policy conclusions. If this does not happen, policy makers will be unable 
to design measures to deal with evolving rural economies, the increasing mobil-
ity of people, and the resulting new organizational patterns of households (such 
as the archipelago system ). Reengaging in development strategies at both the 
national and subnational levels implies reinvesting in processes. Consultation 
is a requirement to secure ownership—the determining factor of shared vision 
and commitment. It takes time, adequate planning, and a signifi cant effort in 
capacity building to manage information systems, analyze results, and monitor 
processes.
Implementing Regional Diagnoses. Regional diagnoses are indispensable 
to prioritize objectives, target interventions, and sequence actions. A useful 
approach is to identify the binding constraints to agricultural growth—the 
necessary fi rst step for increasing rural demand and fostering rural diversifi -
cation—and then design policies to address them. These policies must make 
choices, identity targets, plan, and then monitor the implementation of inter-
ventions. An important caveat is to avoid becoming trapped in monosectoral 
policy making (for example, focusing exclusively on agricultural problems) and 
to embrace broader approaches that reconnect agriculture to rural development 
and rural development to a comprehensive framework of integrated multisec-
toral and regional development (an approach sometimes referred to as “territo-
rial development”).
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These two recommendations relate to the methodology of policy mak-
ing and do not prescribe any particular set of interventions. Specifi c policy 
measures formulated on the basis of these recommendations should refl ect 
country-specifi c circumstances and processes. Specifi c assets or strong natural 
advantages (for example, in mining or tourism) can offer additional room to 
maneuver in supporting new activities and rural transformation.
Building Blocks
Still, for a large majority of rural situations, where households are deeply 
engaged in farming, it is possible to suggest some major policy orientations 
or building blocks. Policy makers should keep these in mind when devising 
targeted development strategies aimed at overcoming poverty traps and facili-
tating the overall process of rural transformation. Three building blocks can 
help governments avoid shopping lists of urgent policy needs. They are rel-
evant to the specifi c circumstances of the late developers (particularly countries 
in Sub-Saharan Africa) and are based on the main fi ndings of the program. 
They focus on the following critical areas: (1) supporting family farms, (2) pro-
moting staple crops, and (3) strengthening rural-urban linkages for territorial 
development.
Supporting Family Farms. The RuralStruc program results provide arguments 
for supporting family farms and contribute to the debate about optimal farm 
size, which has been reignited by the food price crisis of 2008 and the related 
increase in land grabbing, notably in Africa. 
A false dualism lies at the heart of this debate. It sets smallholder and sub-
sistence agriculture on one side against large-scale and commercial agriculture 
on the other, when the reality is a continuum in which family farming is nearly 
always the dominant mode of production. Family agriculture—as opposed to 
large-scale managerial or capitalist agriculture—feeds most of the world. Fam-
ily farms can be subsistence oriented, commercially oriented, or a combination 
of the two. A large body of empirical evidence shows that family farms can be 
competitive in terms of production costs compared with large-scale managerial 
farms. In Sub-Saharan Africa, family farms are often competitive in the domes-
tic market but disadvantaged in global markets owing to factors unrelated to 
their size (for example, the economic and institutional environment).
The current focus on food security has overshadowed the multifunctionality 
of agriculture (specifi cally its ecological, economic, social, and cultural roles); 
family farms, because they are embedded in the local context, are the major 
stakeholders in this sector. The concern for food security has also led many 
policy makers to overlook the role of agriculture as a source of employment 
and a driver of structural transformation over the medium term. Family farms, 
because they rely heavily on labor-intensive production methods, have the larg-
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est capacity to absorb the rapidly growing labor force (195 million rural youth 
in the next 15 years in SSA). In contrast, managerial agriculture, which is much 
more likely to be capital intensive, offers fewer prospects for generating major 
labor opportunities. 
Investments in large-scale commercial agriculture (including foreign invest-
ments) can offer important opportunities for growth, diversifi cation of mar-
kets, and development of sparsely populated areas, but they should be evaluated 
in terms of the employment they are likely to generate. Investments in large-
scale commercial agriculture should be focused on segments of the value chain 
that lack capital (input supply, marketing, transformation), with the goal of 
unleashing the huge potential of family farms to increase production.
Supporting family farms can mean many different things, but this book 
avoids presenting a long list of recommendations. Rather, it suggests three 
kinds of action to address the most critical problems: (1) securing land rights, 
(2) providing public goods, and (3) supporting farmers’ organizations.
Securing land rights. Farm households face high levels of risk. The fi rst steps 
toward achieving a more secure environment are to facilitate access to farmland 
and to secure land rights, both necessary conditions for investment and innova-
tion. There is a need to facilitate land access to youth and to ease the transmittal 
of farm assets to young family workers. 
Providing public goods. Most family farms are severely constrained by their 
very low capacity for investment, a consequence of long-lasting poverty. Selec-
tive targeting of direct support can help overcome this constraint, but an even 
more effective measure is to increase the provision of public goods, notably 
information, training, and capacity building for farmers, as well as rural infra-
structure (small-scale irrigation, roads, power generation and transmission 
structure). Infrastructure can also, when possible and appropriate, facilitate 
access to sparsely populated areas and encourage internal migration.
Supporting farmers’ organizations. Because of their small size and limited 
production capacity, many family farms are unable to capture economies of 
scale in sourcing inputs, marketing outputs, and transforming products. This 
constraint can often be overcome through collective action: Providing support 
to farmers’ organizations can improve integration into value chains, facilitate 
contracting with downstream agents, and strengthen the bargaining power of 
producers. 
Promoting Staple Crops. In countries with agriculture-based economies, four 
major evidence-based arguments can be advanced for giving priority to staple 
crops. The fi rst argument stems from the ubiquity of staple crop production. In 
most developing countries, the overwhelming majority of farm households are 
involved in staple crop production (90 percent, on average, in the RuralStruc 
survey), so targeted policies that promote the production and marketing of 
20  STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND RURAL CHANGE REVISITED
staple crops can have important effects on the overall rural economy in terms 
of labor, income, and growth. The ratio of producers involved in staple crop 
production to producers engaged in production of other crops is easily 10 to 1, 
and often much higher. 
The second argument in favor of giving priority to staples is related to the 
critical role played by staple crops in risk management. Because food markets 
in rural areas often do not work well, many rural households are vulnerable to 
periods of food shortage and, consequently, often retain a signifi cant share of 
their output for self-consumption. By reducing risk, increased production of 
staples can unlock the potential for technical innovation, speed on-farm diver-
sifi cation, and encourage participation in modern value chains. 
The third argument in favor of priority for staples is related to the huge 
potential of the staple food sector. For the foreseeable future, demand for food 
will grow steadily, fueled by population growth and urbanization. Even if rising 
incomes lead to shifts in consumption patterns, staples—especially cereals—
will account for the majority of food demand for years to come. Additionally, 
rising food prices are creating progressively better returns and preventing com-
petition from low-priced imports. 
The fourth and fi nal argument for promoting staple crop production is that 
it can add value at the local level because of the huge potential for local pro-
cessing of products. This scenario could strongly contribute to strengthening 
rural-urban linkages and rural diversifi cation. 
Policy measures to increase the productivity of staple crops and improve sta-
ple markets are diverse and varied. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, however, 
two entry points seem obvious: (1) reduce postharvest losses and (2) unlock 
regional trade. 
Reducing postharvest losses. Postharvest losses are a recurring problem against 
which very little progress has been made. The economic cost of these losses is 
high (10 percent to 20 percent in cereals, and probably more in roots, tubers, 
and plantains), and the burden is borne mainly by farmers. Technical solu-
tions are available, but efforts are needed to adapt institutional and fi nancial 
arrangements to facilitate the cost-effective use of storage systems (for example, 
warehouse receipts).
Unlocking regional trade. Sub-Saharan Africa is a potentially huge market, 
but access is currently constrained by the political fragmentation of the conti-
nent and multiple recurring barriers to trade. Even though some progress has 
been made in fostering better regional integration, regional trade continues to 
lag as a consequence of nontariff barriers, lack of enforcement of regional trade 
agreements, and the high transaction costs associated with overland transpor-
tation. The most promising interventions for jump-starting regional trade are 
improving infrastructure networks and, above all, strengthening the political 
will of the members of regional economic communities.
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However, supporting staple crops is not an overall strategy. Because of the 
relatively low value of these crops compared with other commodities—for 
example, horticulture crops or livestock and livestock products—productivity 
increases in staple crops cannot be the only solution for poverty alleviation. 
Other opportunities, when they exist, must be seized. 
Strengthening Rural-Urban Linkages for Territorial Development. The devel-
opment of strong linkages between small cities and their surrounding rural 
areas is particularly critical for development. Historically, rural-urban link-
ages were forged as a result of growth in rural demand for goods and services, 
which generated new productive activities that naturally concentrated in rural 
boroughs and small towns so as to benefi t from economies of scale. In recent 
decades, this scenario has changed: Urbanization around the world has increas-
ingly been characterized by rapid “metropolization” in and around large  cities, 
which concentrates economic activity even more and offers superior job pros-
pects. Metropolization is a consequence of better transportation and infor-
mation networks, and it has given rise to large-scale migration directly from 
rural areas to metropolitan areas. In many cases, migrants completely bypass 
the smaller towns in which rural-urban and on-farm/off-farm linkages could 
be formed. And even when they stay in small and mid-size cities, they create 
an informal urbanization that takes place without adequate public goods and 
services. This constrains sustainable urban development and prevents the for-
mation of strong urban-rural linkages. 
Strengthening the intermediate level of territorial development by promot-
ing the economic vitality of towns and small cities—the so-called “missing 
middle”—seems to be an important step for fostering rural transformation in 
the context of globalization (which tends to favor long-distance over short-
distance networks). Interventions in this area can offer win-win solutions that 
not only create better local market opportunities, facilitate access to services, 
strengthen communities, and contribute to the weaving together of a region’s 
economic and social fabric, but also reduce the burdens of mega-urbanization. 
This kind of regional rural-urban dynamic is more fl exible and does not cre-
ate such a stark contrast between urban and rural conditions; it allows for the 
possibility of working on both sides of the rural-urban divide and creates a 
strong basis for a more sustainable rural nonfarm economy. This perspective 
acknowledges the multifunctionality of agriculture and the fact that it can be 
a driving force for rural and regional development. Two kinds of action can 
strengthen rural-urban dynamics: (1) improve urban services and (2) empower 
local institutions.
Improving urban services in small cities. To link towns and small cities with 
their immediate surroundings and strengthen their economic functions, trans-
portation infrastructure is key. However, as revealed by the RuralStruc surveys 
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in the well-connected rural areas of western Kenya and Senegal’s bassin arachi-
dier, road infrastructure alone is not suffi cient to foster growth and territorial 
development. The adequate provision of a range of other public goods and 
services is critical and should be a major objective for policy makers. Provision 
of health and education services—as well as assured supplies of water, electric-
ity, and telecommunications—is paramount. Most of these goods and services 
cannot easily be provided by the private sector during the early stages of devel-
opment, but fi scal incentives can be introduced that encourage private service 
providers and entrepreneurs to participate more actively in some of these areas. 
This kind of improvement in services and specifi c supports (especially in terms 
of capacity building and credit access) can strengthen nonfarm activities, espe-
cially the small-scale enterprises that complement a growing farm sector and 
are the main ingredient of a buoyant territorial development. 
Empowering local institutions. Parallel to the improvement of public goods 
and services, it is important to strengthen local institutions and local gover-
nance systems, and to facilitate the decentralization process, which in many 
countries has been more de jure than de facto. Building strong capacity in the 
government agencies and civil society organizations that are active at that level 
is a major fi rst step to foster an effective integrated local development strat-
egy. Decentralized decision-making power embedded in well-functioning local 
institutions offers the most promising opportunity to identify local assets and 
resources that can be employed in the pursuit of balanced and sustainable ter-
ritorial development.
Chapter 1
The RuralStruc program, initiated in 2005 in the context of an intense inter-
national debate on the liberalization of agricultural markets and the resulting 
consequences on farming in developing countries, aimed to provide a new per-
spective on agriculture and its role in development. Specifi cally, the program 
was implemented to reconnect issues related to trade liberalization with the 
broader discussion of rural transformation and the evolution of rural econo-
mies within globalization (see box 1.1). 
This initiative was motivated by the lack of systematic information on the 
processes under way in the rural economies of developing countries and by 
the question of what these processes mean for structural change and economic 
development. Themes such as farmers’ integration into global value chains, 
migration and remittances, the development of a rural nonfarm economy, and 
possible futures for agriculture are commonly investigated and discussed by 
scholars engaged in development and agrarian studies. The international com-
munity of donors and governments, as well as local stakeholders, also refer to 
these themes. The many comprehensive works published in these areas pro-
vide a wide range of information on the dynamics of rural change. However, 
this information often relies on scattered local case studies, making it diffi cult 
to draw general conclusions, and analyses are rarely connected to structural 
change. This situation creates a “knowledge challenge,” because a comprehen-
sive understanding of rural dynamics is the foundation for development strate-
gies and agricultural policies. 
These initial objectives shaped the RuralStruc program and its general 
framework, which was a broad comparative approach involving seven coun-
tries at different stages of their structural transformation and economic integra-
tion into the global economy (from west to east: Mexico, Nicaragua, Senegal, 
Morocco, Mali, Kenya, and Madagascar). The objectives also underpinned the 
program’s collaborative design—a key feature of its implementation. Rural-
Struc formed strong partnerships with local research teams in each country, 
Setting the Scene and 
Selecting the Tools
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with the objective of strengthening local evidence-based approaches and foster-
ing the local debate.1 
A Disconcerting and Quickly Evolving Global Context
Over the past fi ve years, during the in-depth fi eldwork implemented by the 
program, the international landscape as well as the scope and issues of the inter-
national debate have dramatically changed. It is important to keep track of this 
permanent shift in policy agendas, because these changes are the immediate 
reality to which policy makers refer.
The Starting Point
When the RuralStruc program was being planned (2005–06), two major frame-
works structured the international debate about development: the United 
Nations Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the World Trade Orga-
nization (WTO) development cycle or Doha Development Agenda (DDA), set 
at the Doha ministerial conference in 2001. Agriculture was clearly a part of 
these two frameworks, but although it sometimes occupied a key position (as 
in the case of the DDA), it was never the core issue.
The MDGs provided a global framework based on poverty alleviation. The 
fi rst goal—“To halve poverty and hunger before 2015”—is clearly agriculture-
related. First, 70 percent of the world’s poor (who make up 45 percent of the 
world’s population) live in rural areas and rely mainly on agriculture as a liveli-
hood. Second, alleviation of hunger depends on improved food availability and 
access. Agriculture’s decisive role in “pro-poor growth” was also reaffi rmed by 
broad cross-country analyses performed by the World Bank (2005). However, 
poverty remained the central issue, while agricultural development was only 
one of the means cited to fi ght poverty, along with many other thematic and 
nonsectoral options.
 BOX 1 . 1
RuralStruc: What’s in a Name?
The offi cial title of the program is Structural Dimensions of Liberalization on Agriculture 
and Rural Development. The selection of RuralStruc as the acronym refl ects a desire to 
bring structural issues back into a debate that was mainly focused on trade. 
RuralStruc refers to both rural structures and the implications of overall structural 
change on agriculture and rural economies. The program’s logo draws on the iceberg 
image: Trade liberalization is the visible tip, while structural transformation is the large 
portion under the waterline.
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The WTO negotiations logically focused on trade liberalization, in which 
agriculture was one sector among others to be liberalized. However, agriculture 
became the main stumbling block in the negotiation process. It was used by 
developing countries as a core argument to engage with developed countries 
on the broader issue of the liberalization of industrial products and services, 
which led to the failure of the 2003 Cancún ministerial and initiated a debate 
on the costs and benefi ts of trade liberalization for agriculture. This focus on 
agriculture and trade, as well as its domination of the international debate, was 
one of the main justifi cations for the RuralStruc initiative.
Since 2005, the global perspective on development has shifted dramati-
cally. The MDGs have waned in importance; they remain a somewhat distant 
reminder of the international community’s commitment to poverty alleviation 
and global development. They briefl y gained renewed attention during the UN 
Summit of September 2010, which assessed the progress so far and concluded 
that not every goal will be achieved (United Nations 2010).
At the same time, the WTO debate has faded for several overlapping and 
interlinked reasons. The fi rst reason is, of course, the emergence of new issues 
at the forefront of the international agenda, including a new debate over agri-
culture (see next section). Another reason is the profusion of research that has 
provided mixed estimates of the expected gains from liberalizing trade. This 
body of work highlights the unique situations of many developing countries, 
particularly in Africa, where trade liberalization could result in net losses rather 
than gains, adding some doubt—if not confusion—to the discussion.2 These 
fi ndings helped shift negotiations to a narrower focus on OECD (Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development) countries’ agricultural subsi-
dies and developing countries’ access to OECD markets. The fi ndings strength-
ened the opposition to the Doha Round and resulted in successive impasses, 
particularly regarding agriculture: The unsuccessful Hong Kong SAR, China, 
ministerial (2005) led to the suspension of negotiations (July 2006), followed by 
failed attempts to reach an agreement on agriculture and nonagriculture market 
access (Geneva meetings in July 2008) and, since then, recurring postpone-
ments of the conclusion of the Doha Round. “Negotiation fatigue” is another 
explanation for the fading of the WTO debate; it also explains why increasing 
attention was dedicated to bilateral or regional free trade agreements (FTAs), 
and why major stakeholders decided to carry on bilaterally what was impossible 
to achieve at the global level.
The New Issues
Over the past fi ve years, three major issues have affected the global debate about 
agriculture: growing concerns about the consequences of global climate change, 
and the eruption of the food price and fi nancial crises. 
Climate change has been fi rmly on the global agenda at least since the Rio 
Earth Summit (1992) and the Kyoto Conference (1997). However, concern has 
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increased over the past few years as a result of two broad research works: the 
Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change (Stern 2007) and Climate 
Change 2007, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report 
(Pachauri and Reisinger 2007). These analyses heightened the international 
community’s awareness and refocused the ongoing negotiations, which led 
to the Copenhagen Summit of December 2009. They emphasized the various 
adverse effects climate change is expected to have on natural resources and agri-
culture, such as extreme weather events (droughts, fl oods, heat waves) as well 
as changes in temperature, rainfall, and sea levels. All these consequences are 
likely to compound the challenges faced by farmers and agricultural workers in 
securing sustainable livelihoods. Of all the world’s regions, Sub-Saharan Africa 
is expected to suffer most from climate change: The IPCC projects annual agri-
cultural losses of between 2 percent and 7 percent of GDP in the region by 2100. 
World Development Report 2010, Development and Climate Change (WDR10) 
(World Bank 2009a), provided a comprehensive update on the challenges faced 
by developing countries, which will bear most of the costs (75 percent to 80 
percent) of the damages related to climate change. These challenges include the 
reliance of these countries on ecosystem services and natural capital for pro-
duction (mainly agriculture), the concentration of their populations in physi-
cally exposed locations, and their limited fi nancial and institutional capacities 
for adaptation. Special mitigation measures will be necessary to prevent an 
additional 120 million people from suffering from hunger, and agriculture will 
occupy a central role in resource management and carbon sequestration.
The second issue is related to the rapid emergence of the food price crisis 
(2007–08), which contributed to renewed international interest in food and 
agriculture issues, especially given the projections of a 9-billion-person world 
in 2050. Prices had been increasing progressively since 2006 and rose sharply 
at the beginning of 2008, leading to mobilization of international assistance. 
Although prices declined, forecasts have predicted greater volatility and rela-
tively high prices in the medium term; at the end of 2010, prices rebounded. 
Various factors lead to high food prices, and the relative importance of these 
factors has triggered debate. On the supply side, weather-related production 
shortfalls combined with increasing fuel costs and a trend toward lower stock 
levels are the main explanations. On the demand side, the major factors are the 
long-term changing structure of food demand related to quickly evolving diets 
in emerging countries, the development of biofuels as a response to growing oil 
costs, and speculation (even if limited) in fi nancial markets. Regardless of the 
relative importance of these factors, everyone agrees that there is no global food 
shortage in the medium term—the issue is the cost of food rather than a global 
lack of food. Thus, the main concern is the functioning of food markets and 
access to food for low-income consumers. The challenge is to avoid an exces-
sive focus on short-term issues and to concentrate simultaneously on helping 
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farmers reap the benefi ts of the current high prices, mitigating price impacts on 
the poorest consumers, increasing local food production to counteract rising 
local prices, and improving producers’ incomes through increased bargaining 
power and higher yields. 
The third issue is the unexpected and sudden onset of the global fi nan-
cial crisis in September 2008 and its dramatic effect on the world economy. 
The recovery has been a slow and fragile process. The rapid transmission of 
the downturn in the U.S. housing sector to the global fi nancial system deeply 
affected both rich and poor countries, causing contraction and recession in sev-
eral developed economies and a sharp slowdown of growth rates in many devel-
oping countries. This slowdown has been particularly challenging for countries 
with limited fi nancial resources and those that face drastically reduced revenues 
(through reduced foreign direct investment, fi scal revenue, foreign aid, and 
remittances).
The food price and fi nancial crises generated different (and disconnected) 
sets of discussions on remedies. However, to a certain extent, both crises have 
triggered temporary protectionist reactions, such as tariff increases, new non-
tariff barriers, and the provisional return of quotas and export bans. The pos-
sible risk of a “protectionist tide” is a sharp move away from the arguments 
about trade liberalization that had previously characterized the international 
debate. The food price crisis and the new resource forecasts it engendered have 
also led to new strategies targeted at food security. These strategies focus on 
new production options based on quick investments or reinvestments in inputs 
(sometimes with subsidies), infrastructure, irrigation, and large-scale agricul-
tural schemes. Land-grabbing by foreign investors, particularly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, has been an increasing matter of concern (International Land Coalition 
[ILC] 2009; World Bank 2010b). It has led to confl icting situations among local 
stakeholders in several countries and launching anew the old debate about the 
merits of small-scale versus large-scale farming (wrongly considered as, respec-
tively, smallholder and commercial agriculture). 
Which Role for Agriculture?
Fortunately, during the past fi ve years, two major contributions to the debate 
on agriculture have boosted its profi le in the international community. The fi rst 
is the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Tech-
nology for Development (IAASTD), a broad international effort to review the 
existing stock of knowledge about agriculture and assess its adequacy in light 
of current global challenges to sustainable development. In a cooperative effort 
involving 110 countries, the results were reviewed and ratifi ed at the Johan-
nesburg International Plenary Meeting (2008), then published (IAASTD 2009).
The second contribution is the publication of the World Development Report 
2008, Agriculture for Development (WDR08) (World Bank 2007). Prepared in 
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2006–07 and launched at the end of 2007, the WDR08 supplied the necessary 
momentum for a new focus and a new perspective on agriculture. It strongly 
reaffi rmed the role of agriculture as a main sector of economic activity in most 
developing countries (as a source of labor, growth, and comparative advan-
tage); as an important social sector, owing to the large share of the population 
involved; and as an important user of natural resources. After nearly 30 years 
of marginalization of agriculture in development economics—a consequence 
of the Washington consensus reforms (de Janvry 2009)—the WDR08 provided 
an insightful review of what is known about the mechanisms of agricultural 
development and how agriculture can serve as a catalyst for development. It 
is based on a regionalized vision of world agriculture and reviews the specifi c 
roles and challenges of agriculture in the development process, depending on 
its importance in the regional economy (box 1.2). 
Though the scope of the report is somewhat limited with regard to links 
between agriculture and other sectors,3 the regionalized and targeted approach 
has strongly contributed to the WDR’s success; and the broad dissemination of 
the document has facilitated agriculture’s comeback in the international debate 
on development. However, its momentum, as well as that of the IAASTD report, 
was somewhat slowed by the hectic international agenda and the short-term 
issues that arose from the food price crisis. Additionally, only a few months 
after the publication of the WDR08, different and, to some extent, contradictory 
messages were disseminated by the same and other international bodies. For 
instance, the United Nations Industrial Development Organization’s (UNIDO) 
Industrial Development Report 2009 (UNIDO 2008) highlighted the role of 
industry as the main driver of change, particularly for the “bottom billion” and 
middle-income countries.4 Adopting a different perspective, the next World 
Development Report, Reshaping Economic Geography (WDR09) (World Bank 
2008a), stressed the need for higher demographic densities, shorter economic 
distances, and fewer political divisions (see box 3.1). The WDR09 demonstrated 
that these objectives can be achieved through increasing agglomeration and 
integration processes, highlighting the role of urbanization.5
In the end, despite this very unstable and somewhat confusing environment, 
agriculture is fi rmly back on the agenda, and donors and governments are reen-
gaging. The UN Secretary-General’s High Level Task Force on the Global Food 
Security Crisis, launched in April 2008, helps coordinate international efforts. 
At the L’Aquila Summit (July 2009), the Group of Eight industrialized countries 
(G8) pledged to mobilize $20 billion over fi ve years to boost food security; this 
pledge was confi rmed at the G20 Summit in Pittsburgh in September 2009. In 
April 2010, the Global Agriculture and Food Security Program (GAFSP) was 
offi cially launched with a fi rst contribution of close to $1 billion. Finally, at the 
Seoul G20 Summit in November 2010, it was decided to launch an “agricultural 
G20” to foster international cooperation, especially in combating food price 
volatility.
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B OX 1 .2
The WDR08 and Its Three Worlds
The WDR08 proposes a tiered approach to agriculture for development and identifi es 
three distinct worlds of agriculture that depend on agriculture’s contribution to growth 
and the rural share of total poverty in a country. The three worlds are agriculture-
based, transforming, and urbanized. In each world, the agriculture-for-development 
agenda differs in pursuit of sustainable growth and poverty reduction. 
In agriculture-based countries, which include most of Sub-Saharan Africa, agricul-
ture and its associated industries are essential to growth and to reducing mass pov-
erty and food insecurity. They provide jobs, activities, and incomes. In transforming 
countries, which include most of South and East Asia and the Middle East and North 
Africa, rapidly rising rural-urban income disparities and persistent extreme rural poverty 
are major sources of social and political tension; rural diversifi cation and agricultural 
income growth are the answers to these challenges. In urbanized countries—includ-
ing most of Latin America, much of Europe, and Central Asia—agriculture can help 
reduce the remaining rural poverty if smallholders become direct suppliers in modern 
food markets, good jobs are created in agriculture and agro-industry, and markets for 
environmental services are introduced.
The WDR08 suggests three paths out of rural poverty: (1) agricultural entrepreneur-
ship, (2) the rural labor market, and (3) the rural nonfarm economy and migration to 
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Although food security is narrower in scope than agricultural and rural 
development as a whole, this context does provide an opportunity to broaden 
the debate and to propose a perspective that does not restrict agriculture to 
food supply but embraces its other functions as well (environmental, economic, 
social, cultural). As stated by the IAASTD, this multifunctionality6 is a unique 
feature of agriculture, given that the sector is the core activity for rural liveli-
hoods and rural poverty alleviation; is the basis for rural diversifi cation and the 
development of rural-urban links; and is central to the provision of environ-
mental services. Its role as a driver of structural change must be reaffi rmed, and 
questions must be asked about the viability of possible pathways out of rural 
poverty in the era of globalization.7 This critical issue has to be pushed to the 
front of the policy debate and should justify reengaging in the development of 
policy frameworks that adopt the necessary long-term focus. 
Main Objectives and Hypotheses of the Program: 
Reconnecting the Dots 
Originally, the RuralStruc program had three specifi c objectives: (1) to con-
tribute to the analytical knowledge base about structural changes related to lib-
eralization and economic integration, and the consequences of these changes 
on developing countries’ agriculture and their rural economies (box 1.3); 
(2) to feed and improve the international and national debates by promoting 
and reconnecting these issues; and (3) to provide perspectives for policy making. 
cities or other countries. Often two or more paths operate simultaneously, and the 
complementary effects of farm and nonfarm activities can be strong. But although 
rural households engage in farming, labor, and migration, one of these activities usu-
ally dominates as a source of income.
Box Table 1.2.1 Characteristics of the WDR08’s Three Worlds of Agriculture
 
 Ag. based Transforming Urbanized
Rural population (millions), 2005 417 2,220 255
Rural population (%), 2005 68 63 26
GDP per capita (2000 US$), 2005 379 1,068 3,489
Agriculture in GDP (%), 2005 29 13 6
Annual Ag. GDP growth (%), 1993–2005 4.0 2.9 2.2
Annual Non-Ag. GDP growth (%), 1993–2005 3.5 7.0 2.7
Rural poverty rate (%), 2002 51 28 13
Source: World Bank 2007, p. 31–33.
Note: The poverty line is $1.08 a day in 1993 PPP.
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The third goal relied directly on the program’s design and the operationaliza-
tion of its research results, while the fi rst and second goals were more subjective. 
They implied a clear positioning, and the program chose to place the discussion 
of agriculture and rural change into the context of the structural transforma-
tion framework—to reconnect the development debate to global issues and 
avoid discussions trapped in sectoral approaches. 
The structural transformation of economies and societies is a core issue in 
development studies. Historical records and statistical evidence8 show a pro-
gressive shift from agriculture (the original primary activity of every sedentary 
population), to industry (the secondary activities), and then to services (the 
tertiary activities). The well-known underlying dynamic of this structural trans-
formation—the economic transition from one confi guration to the next—is 
productivity gains in agriculture, based on innovation that fosters technical 
change and allows labor and capital transfers toward other economic activities. 
 BOX 1 .3
Liberalization or Globalization?
In the early defi nition of the RuralStruc program, liberalization was understood in a 
broad sense as a global process of change, begun in the early 1980s, that included 
trade and domestic reform, state withdrawal from economic activities, privatization, 
and, in many developing countries, the reform of the state through decentralization.
The aim of the RuralStruc program was to focus on all the structural dimensions 
of this new context, which explains the choice of a title for the program. However, 
although the program adopted this broad defi nition of liberalization, the offi cial posi-
tioning of the program’s name quickly appeared inadequate. First, because the under-
standing of its objectives was often restricted to the policy package dimension of the 
reform process associated with liberalization, the program was often perceived as a cri-
tique of the reforms, which was not its purpose. Second, this misinterpretation implic-
itly limited the understanding of the scope of the processes at play.
After discussions with both the donor community and the national partners, it 
appears that it would have been clearer to use “globalization” rather than “liberaliza-
tion” in the program’s name. Although the use of “globalization” might suggest an 
excessive scope, the context to which the program refers clearly corresponds with the 
new international regime that emerged in the early 1980s and its consequences for 
agriculture, rural economies, and the process of economic transition as a whole. This 
new regime is characterized by new roles for the state and private actors, as well as by 
a broad and deep movement toward integration of the world economy.
The RuralStruc program has progressively adopted this broader positioning for the 
presentation of its results. “Globalization and Structural Change in Rural Economies” 
has been used as a title for the Phase 2 national reports and policy briefs, and the title 
of this book clearly refers to globalization. 
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This process is accompanied by progressive spatial restructuring from scattered 
activities (typically agriculture) to more concentrated ones (typically indus-
try), with migration of labor and people from rural areas to cities. Alongside 
this process of growing urbanization, overall economic transformation creates 
higher incomes and an increase in wealth, which translate into improved living 
conditions. This, in turn, along with medical progress, initiates a demographic 
transition: the progressive reduction of mortality and birth rates, the difference 
between which explains population growth dynamics. 
Although this process of global structural transformation occurs at different 
paces and can follow various paths, its basic pattern has been observed through-
out the world. It started with the closely related agricultural and industrial revo-
lutions of Western Europe at the end of the 18th century, and continued in 
European offshoots (mainly the United States), other European regions, the 
majority of Latin America, and various parts of Asia. 
Reference to this process has forged the classical development paradigm that 
underlies development economics.9 Currently, one of the main challenges is the 
acceleration of the pace of change related to globalization and, thus, the grow-
ing asymmetries among regions of the world characterized by their different 
stages in this process of structural transformation. 
This conceptual positioning strongly shaped the rationale of the RuralStruc 
program and its hypotheses. While the trade liberalization debate focused 
on expected gains from the liberalization process and their consequences for 
growth and poverty,10 the program’s objective was to reengage in the debate on 
economic transition within globalization and to elaborate on possible struc-
tural diffi culties rather than just on transitional problems.11 RuralStruc aimed 
to reconnect the discussion of agriculture with some challenging issues, such as 
the increasing productivity gaps among countries, lagging economic diversifi ca-
tion, and the demographic challenges faced by several regions. These issues are 
recurring blind spots in the international debate, but they are critical for the 
structural transformation of developing countries.
Three hypotheses were advanced to structure the research process with 
regard to the debates on agriculture, food markets, and rural diversifi cation 
(box 1.4). The fi rst hypothesis (H1) refers to the global restructuring of agri-
food markets and the increasing asymmetry in international competition. It 
states that these processes lead to the development of increasing differentiation 
among farm structures and among marketing, processing, and retailing struc-
tures. This hypothesis raises several questions: What is the balance between the 
potential integration of farmers in modern emerging value chains and their 
possible exclusion? What are the scope, speeds, and characteristics of these pro-
cesses? Do they induce a segmentation dynamic with concentration, marginal-
ization, and, sometimes, exclusion within and from the farm sector, leading to 
the emergence or consolidation of multiple-track agriculture? 
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The second hypothesis (H2) relates to the existing processes of adaptation 
among rural households as a response to the many changing factors in agricul-
ture and their impact on farm viability. Rural households engage in new con-
fi gurations of activities and income systems characterized by the changing role 
of agriculture and the growing importance of off-farm activities and transfers 
(private transfers related to migration and, possibly, public transfers linked to 
specifi c support systems). The following questions are relevant to this hypoth-
esis: What are the characteristics of these new confi gurations? How do they 
differ among countries? Are these dynamics new or do they follow the historical 
paths of structural transformation? How do they reshape the characteristics of 
rural areas and of rural-urban links? Are they effective approaches to sustain-
ability in rural livelihoods?
The differentiation dynamics in agriculture and the possible diffi culties 
of rural households’ adaptation (in the absence of effective alternative activi-
ties and incomes) could create transition impasses in the process of structural 
transformation. This is the third hypothesis (H3), which refers primarily to the 
characteristics of what the WDR08 called “agriculture-based countries.” In these 
countries, the weight of agriculture in employment and activity structures, the 
strong urbanization process without signifi cant industrialization or job cre-
ation, limited economic diversifi cation in a context of growing international 
competition, and heavy demographic pressure create a unique challenge for 
development. Will some countries face impasses in escaping poverty owing to 
a lack of alternatives (Kydd 2002) and limited migration opportunities? What 
 BOX 1 .4
The RuralStruc Program’s Three Hypotheses
H1: The global restructuring of 
agrifood markets reinforces a process 
of differentiation and  segmentation 
within agricultural economies.
H2: Farm households are 
adapting to the new context by 
adopting composite strategies of 
activities and income that are 
reshaping rural economies.
H3: Marginalization trends introduced by these processes lead to 
risks of transition dead ends linked to the relative scarcity of 
alternative activities and sources of employment.
Rural Structure
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are the potential social, economic, and political consequences of such dead ends 
in the economic transition?
General Design of the Program: Country Case Studies, 
Regional Surveys, and Collaborative Processes
To assess the relevance of the hypotheses and answer the questions posed, the 
RuralStruc program attempted to identify the primary similarities and dif-
ferences in countries’ processes of adaptation to the new context, taking into 
account the characteristics of their rural transformation and their own trajecto-
ries of structural change. The program design was supported by a collaborative 
framework that engaged local teams in an internal process of analysis with the 
dual objective of “better understanding for better policy making” (the motto 
of the program).
A Comparative Approach
Comparison is a powerful tool for analytical work because it highlights conver-
gences and divergences, and identifi es key explanatory factors. However, a com-
parative approach is risky and can lead to deep methodological errors. Rural-
Struc did not make comparisons between countries (for example, Mexico and 
Madagascar), as this would have made little sense and would have induced clas-
sical selection bias.12 Likewise, facing the classical challenge of ex post analysis, 
the goal was not to evaluate impacts, because that would have led to information 
diffi culties (particularly the lack of years of reference for evaluation) and to a 
risky discussion on the direction of causality. In fact, the word “impact” was pur-
posely avoided in the offi cial title of the program; “dimensions” was preferred. 
The objective of the comparative approach was to illustrate processes of 
change in agriculture and the rural economy related to liberalization, economic 
integration, and globalization to identify and understand patterns and differ-
ences that can be useful for policy making. In its implementation, the program 
endeavored to adopt a global, multidisciplinary, and historical perspective on 
the dynamics of change by focusing on national trajectories and their critical 
junctures,13 which can modify the nature of relationships among agriculture, 
the rural sector, and the overall economy.
Country Selection. The process of selecting country case studies for compara-
tive purposes involves trade-offs among objective criteria related to research 
goals and operational issues (which refer to local partnerships); conditions for 
implementation (especially allocated time and fi nancial and human resources); 
and contributing partners’ buy-in and their own interests. 
In preliminary discussions, the program’s contributing donors decided that 
a focus on Sub-Saharan Africa was justifi ed by the critical structural situation 
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of the continent and the many efforts already undertaken to revitalize its agri-
cultural sector. Concurrent with the progressive reengagement of the donor 
community in agriculture, African governments are notably dedicated to the 
implementation of the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) 
Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Program (CAADP).14 This 
program has become the African—indeed, the international—reference for 
action in agriculture and is currently being operationalized.
To engage in the comparative approach, it was decided to select a small sam-
ple of countries. These countries were not intended to represent the large diver-
sity of possible development trajectories, but they did correspond to a spectrum 
of situations in the process of structural transformation. Some countries were 
far ahead in this process; in others, economic transition and the pace of integra-
tion into the world economy had been slow or unequal.
Among the program’s seven country case studies, Mexico was chosen as 
an example of advanced economic transition, with a high urbanization level 
and a limited role for agriculture in the economy. The Mexican rural econ-
omy showed evidence of being broadly affected by huge migration fl ows to the 
United States and by deep integration and liberalization processes, accelerated 
15 years ago with the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agree-
ment (NAFTA).
On the other hand, Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA)—represented by Kenya, 
 Madagascar, Mali, and Senegal—illustrated the initial stage of economic tran-
sition, with partial integration and liberalization processes initiated through 
state and market reforms, and an important enduring role for agriculture and 
other primary activities.
Morocco and Nicaragua illustrated an intermediate stage of structural trans-
formation, corresponding to countries characterized by rapid integration pro-
cesses owing to their proximity to powerful economic zones in which free trade 
agreements had recently been implemented.15 In these countries, agriculture 
(characterized by dualistic structures) remains a major political issue and inter-
national migrations play a big role in the political economy.
In addition to the criteria of gradual and differentiated integration, three 
specifi c macro-economic criteria were used to select countries for the program: 
GDP per capita, the share of agriculture in GDP (AgGDP), and the share of 
the economically active population engaged in agriculture (AgEAP) (see table 
1.1).16 These criteria are basic indicators of a country’s stage of economic tran-
sition. With the exception of Mexico, the selected countries are low-income 
or lower-middle-income countries. They display a wide range of situations in 
terms of poverty, human development, governance, and business climate, with 
stark contrast between SSA and non-SSA countries and clear gradual indicators 
results among countries. 
Using the WDR08 typology, the selected countries represent the three worlds 
of agriculture: (1) agriculture-based (Kenya, Madagascar, Mali); (2) transforming 
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Table 1.1 Selected Indicators for the RuralStruc Countries
Country Mali Senegal Madagascar Kenya Morocco Nicaragua Mexico
Number
 1 ISO code MLI SEN MDG KEN MAR NIC MEX
 2 Income group 2009 Low Low Low Low Lower middle Lower middle Upper middle
 3 GDP per capita 2007 (US$) 552 952 395 718 2,373 1,023 9,715
 4 GDP per capita 2007 ($ PPP) 1,084 1,666 935 1,437 3,980 2,578 12,780
 5 $2 / day (PPP) 2005 (% of pop.) 77.1 60.4 89.6 39.9 14.0 31.9 4.8
 6 National Gini index 2005 39.0 39.2 47.2 47.7 40.9 52.3 48.1
 7 % AgGDP 2007 37 14 26 25 14 20 4
 8 Transition stage (WDR08) Ag. based Transforming Ag. based Ag. based Transforming Transforming Urbanized
 9 Population 2005 (Thds) 11,833 11,281 17,614 35,817 30,495 5,455 105,330 
10 Urbanization stage (WDR09) Intermed.  Intermed.  Intermed.  Incipient  Intermed.  Intermed.  Advanced 
11 % rural 2005 69.5 58.4 71.5 79.3 45.0 44.1 23.7
12 % AgEAP 2005 78 72 72 73 29 18 19
13 Human development (index 2010) 0.37 0.45 0.49 0.50 0.62 0.63 0.79
 Human development (rank 2010) 128 121 110 106 98 96 46
14 Rule of law (Gov. Indicator 2008) –0.35 –0.31 –0.46 –0.98 –0.11 –0.86 –0.64
 Political stability (Gov. Indicator 2008) –0.21 –0.16 –0.42 –1.25 –0.47 –0.39 –0.62
15 Doing Business (rank 2010) 155 151 138 94 114 119 41
Sources: 
 1. International Standard Organization country codes.
 2. World Bank—Classifi cation of economies 2010. http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-
classifi cations/country-and-lending-groups. Economies are divided among income groups 
according to 2009 gross national income (GNI) per capita, calculated using the Atlas 
 method. The groups are: low income, $995 or less;lower middle income, $996–3,945; 
 upper middle income, $3,946–12,195; and high income, $12,196 or more. 
 3. World Bank—Data Development Platform 2010.
 4. World Bank—Data Development Platform 2009 using the poverty purchase parity conver-
sion factor calculated for January 2007–April 2008.
 5. World Bank—Data Development Platform 2010. Poverty headcount ratio at $2 a day (PPP) 
(% of population).
 6. World Bank—Data Development Platform 2010.
 7. World Bank—Data Development Platform 2010.
 8. Word Bank, World Development Report 2008—see Box 1.2 for defi nition.
 9. United Nations—World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision http://esa.un.org/unpp.
10. Word Bank, World Development Report 2009. The urbanization classifi cation refers to ur-
ban shares: incipient is below 25%, intermediate is between 25 and 75%, and advanced is 
above 75%.
11. United Nations—World Urbanization Prospects: The 2007 Revision. http://esa.un.org/unup/
12. FAO—FAOSTAT 2010. http://faostat.fao.org/site/452/default.aspx
13. UNDP—Human Development Indicators. http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/. The HDI is com-
bining indicators of life expectancy, educational attainment and income and is rated from 0 
to 1. It ranks 135 countries.
14. World Bank & Brookings Institution—Worldwide Governance Indicators 2010. http://info.
worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. The Worldwide Governance Indicators (previously 
KKZ index) scores six indicators from –2.5 to +2.5. The six indicators are: voice and account-
ability, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, control of 
corruption. Only two are provided here.
15. World Bank & IFC—Doing Business 2010. http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings. The Ease 
of Doing Business indicator ranks out of 183 countries.
Notes: for numbers 5 and 6, Mali and Mexico values are for 2006.
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(Senegal, Morocco, Nicaragua); and (3) urbanized (Mexico).17 In the selected 
countries, agriculture contributes less and less to economic growth but main-
tains a signifi cant role in national employment—between 70 percent and 80 
percent of the labor force for the SSA countries, and less than 30 percent in 
Mexico, Morocco, and Nicaragua.18 The seven countries also correspond to 
the three urbanization stages of the WDR09: incipient, intermediate, and 
advanced.19 
Population size also played a role in the selection process. To avoid extreme 
situations, both the most populous countries (for example, China, India, Indo-
nesia, and Brazil) and the very smallest were not chosen.20 This decision is dis-
putable because there is no direct correlation between economic transition and 
demographic size. However, the WDR09 reminds us that “size matters,” and 
it can be a strong asset facilitating structural transformation. Large domestic 
markets offer economies of scale and accessible demand, which provide sub-
stantial maneuvering room for domestic fi rms in the context of increasing com-
petition linked to globalization. This is especially the case in industrialization, 
research, and capacity building.21 Therefore, the selected countries have a small 
to medium demographic size—except for Mexico, they all have between 5 mil-
lion and 35 million inhabitants. These criteria precluded the selection of any 
Asian countries.22
The selected SSA countries refl ect the diversity of situations among low-
income countries (Madagascar, Mali, and Senegal are included in the least 
developed countries [LDC] group). They display a diversity of geography 
(Southern, East, and West Africa, including a landlocked country, Mali); colo-
nial history (former French or British colonies); activity structure (including 
the role of migrations); and the state of the national debate around agriculture 
and privatization.23 
The choice of Mexico, with its demographic and economic characteristics, 
violated many selection criteria: Mexico is an upper-middle-income country, 
an OECD member, and an emerging economy. The point in selecting Mexico 
was to provide a useful background picture that showed the restructuring of a 
rural economy in a context of strong liberalization and economic integration.24 
There is no perfect sample; however, the RuralStruc country cases offer a 
wide range of situations that fi t with the program’s objectives and help draw 
a differentiated picture of the processes of change under way. These countries 
shed light on the structural characteristics of economies with different degrees 
of economic diversifi cation and urbanization, various migration patterns, dif-
ferent types of public policies, and diverse agricultural sectors. Agricultures are 
characterized by the goods they produce, the size of their main value chains, and 
their market orientation (domestic or international, staple or high-value). All 
these factors are related to natural and historical conditions that have shaped 
local agrarian systems and markets. Thus, the agricultural sectors of the selected 
38  STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND RURAL CHANGE REVISITED
country cases are generally focused on annual crops (mainly cereals), including 
irrigated crops, but also include traditional commodities such as sugar cane, 
cotton, groundnut, and coffee. The sample could have benefi ted from including 
a strong plantation-based agricultural economy (such as some countries of the 
Gulf of Guinea in West Africa), where perennial crops (coffee, cocoa, palm oil) 
have long shaped the agrarian systems.25
Operationalizing the Comparative Work. The RuralStruc program was con-
ceived to include two phases. The main objective of Phase 1 was to generate 
broad country overviews based on desktop studies on the role of agriculture in 
the economy. These studies specifi cally examined market structures and their 
evolution, the development and differentiation of farm structures, and the risks 
of transition impasses and possibilities for adaptation. Phase 1 also provided an 
opportunity to identify missing information related to the processes of struc-
tural change in agriculture and to share views with national partners on the 
general approach of the program.
Phase 2 was originally designed to produce specifi c information at the 
regional and value-chain levels, based on qualitative interviews with farmers, 
middlemen, and other economic agents, and targeting issues identifi ed in the 
fi rst phase. However, the Phase 1 results highlighted the weakness of the knowl-
edge base and identifi ed signifi cant information gaps regarding the process of 
rural transformation, particularly with regard to rural household activities, 
income, and integration into markets. Consequently, Phase 2 was modifi ed to 
include more direct primary data collection at the household level.26 
The objective of the household surveys in each country was to generate orig-
inal information—both qualitative and quantitative—on the processes under 
way in agriculture and the rural economy. It was hoped that this information 
would facilitate understanding of the roles of agriculture in local economies and 
rural livelihoods, for example, types of rural income generation, combination 
of activities and income sources, and multifaceted livelihoods. 27 
Regional Fieldwork
The overall design of the fi eldwork and the selection of regions were as follows.
Design and Limitations. The decision to implement rural household surveys 
focusing on activities and incomes shaped the operationalization of the pro-
gram and its outputs. The preference for rural and not just farm households was 
justifi ed by the need to more precisely identify agriculture’s role with respect 
to other rural activities and sources of income. This choice made it necessary 
to deal with analytical categories whose defi nitions can be complicated, like the 
offi cial defi nition of “rural,” which varies among countries (see box 1.5).
Targeting household incomes led the program to focus on the core issue of 
income estimates, which, in rural areas, means dealing with farm incomes and 
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the diffi culties of approximating them. The program dealt with these diffi culties 
by employing a heavy survey framework with extensive questionnaires.28 
The survey work encountered a few localized diffi culties (such as delays 
and missing information resulting from Kenya’s postelection violence in early 
2008), but the main constraint was the limitation inherent in a one-shot 
survey, a consequence of the duration of and funding for the program. The 
one-time nature of the fi eldwork was a major diffi culty due to the program’s 
hypotheses, which were developed in dynamic terms. It is also a source of bias 
 BOX 1 .5
Rural versus Urban: What Defi nition for Each Country?
Although the defi nition of “rural” varies from country to country, there does seem to 
be a commonality: The defi nition is rarely positive. In most cases, rural refers to the 
residual population after subtracting the urban population from the total population 
(FAO defi nition). There is no uniform defi nition for “urban”—it is most often based 
on the size of settlements but can also be based on population density or administra-
tive boundaries, and sometimes on the provision of services. The RuralStruc countries 
defi ne rural in the following ways:
Kenya: The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics defi nes rural as a locality with a human 
population of less than 2,000.
Madagascar: Rural areas are districts in which the proportion of agricultural economi-
cally active population (as defi ned for the Agricultural Census) exceeds 50 percent (RS 
2 Madagascar, 26).
Mali: Rural households include all households in rural areas, which are defi ned as the 
opposite of towns. Through at least one of the members, rural households are involved 
in agricultural activities, broadly defi ned (RS 2 Mali, 20).
Mexico: A rural locality is defi ned by the national statistical system as a place with 
fewer than 2,500 dwellers. However, this threshold is debated, and the country team 
used the common reference of 5,000 inhabitants instead (RS 2 Mexico, 6).
Morocco: Rural areas are defi ned by default as any areas that are not included in the 
scope of an urban area. Urban areas change their boundaries over time owing to the 
expansion of cities and the reclassifi cation of rural localities to urban. There is no statis-
tical defi nition of the rural population (RS 2 Morocco, 6).
Nicaragua: The offi cial defi nition of rural areas is districts with fewer than 1,000 
dwellers (RS 2 Nicaragua, 11). 
Senegal: Rural is defi ned in opposition to urban, which has an administrative defi ni-
tion: All “communes” are classifi ed as urban, even if they have all the attributes of 
rural areas, including a farm-based economy (RS 2 Senegal, 39).
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owing to the interannual variation in farm incomes (for example, the impact 
of drought on yields). 
One way to mitigate this severe restriction would have been to benchmark 
the surveys on the basis of existing panels, but this option was not feasible. In 
the fi rst place, it would have been diffi cult within the allocated time frame to 
deal with several different baselines, survey frameworks, and methodologies. 
Second, panels with a specifi c focus on rural incomes are scarce. In developing 
countries, household panel data (when they exist) have usually been developed 
to estimate poverty, notably in the context of structural adjustment programs 
started in the 1980s–90s. These data most often deal with household expendi-
tures and frequently target urban households, which typically constitute the 
main share of the country samples.29 
Although many local case studies exist, few data are available on rural 
incomes. This situation is often a consequence of the depletion of national sta-
tistical systems, but it also frequently results from statistical frameworks that do 
not target the rural economy, just agriculture. This makes it hard to conceptual-
ize the ongoing processes of rural change. A rare exception is the Rural Income 
Generating Activities (RIGA) project, developed by FAO in collaboration with 
the World Bank, which offers a coherent framework for a cross-national com-
parison of rural income sources (box 1.6).30 
The RIGA results were used extensively by the WDR08, most notably to 
discuss the roles of rural activity and income source diversifi cation as a way out 
of poverty.31 However, they were not directly usable for the RuralStruc analysis 
owing to different years of reference and missing country cases.
Because the program lacked easy options for benchmarking the household 
surveys, the drawbacks related to the one-shot data collection were mitigated by 
complementing the surveys with specifi c fi eldwork and desk reviews on selected 
value chains and the characteristics of the surveyed regions. These activities 
allowed for contextualization—a fi ne-tuned analysis of the household survey 
results that incorporates the historical background of the processes of change 
under way, especially the restructuring of agricultural markets. The value chains 
were selected by the national research teams according to their importance in 
the economy at both the national and regional levels. Each value-chain analysis 
presented characteristics of supply and demand, their evolution in the con-
text of liberalization, and the existing integration and differentiation processes 
resulting from the global restructuring of agrifood markets. 
The selected value chains, which included both staples and commodities, are 
listed in table 1.2.
Selection of the Surveyed Regions. The purpose of the household surveys was 
not to obtain a statistically representative sample but rather to provide a com-
prehensive picture of rural realities. Consequently, in each country, the pro-
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gram selected regions that illustrated underlying trends that had been previ-
ously identifi ed. 
Regions were chosen by the national teams on the basis of Phase 1 results and 
their own expertise. The goal in selecting regions was to illustrate the regional 
 BOX 1 .6
The Rural Income Generating Activities Project (RIGA)
The RIGA project was intended to fi ll some of the major gaps in the understanding 
of the rural nonfarm economy (RNFE) by using a database constructed from a pool 
of Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) and other multipurpose household 
surveys made available by the World Bank and the FAO. It analyzed sources of rural 
household income from 32 household surveys in 18 countries: Albania 2002 and 2005; 
Bangladesh 2000; Bolivia 2005; Bulgaria 1995 and 2001; Ecuador 1995 and 1998; 
Ghana 1992 and 1998; Guatemala 2000 and 2006; Indonesia 1992 and 2000; Kenya 
2004–05; Madagascar 1993–94 and 2001; Malawi 2004; Nepal 1995–96 and 2003–
04; Nicaragua 1998, 2001, and 2005; Nigeria 2004; Pakistan 1991 and 2001; Panama 
1997 and 2003; Tajikistan 2003; and Vietnam 1992–93, 1997–98, and 2002. 
The RIGA database is composed of a series of constructed variables about rural 
incomes created from the original data sources. The sample of countries and the indi-
cators built offer geographic coverage, as well as adequate quality and suffi cient com-
parability to allow for cross-country analysis, despite pervasive differences in the quality 
and level of information available in each survey. 
Numerous analyses based on the RIGA project have been published. The database 
allows researchers to (1) evaluate the participation in and income received from RIGAs; 
(2) analyze the role of household assets in participation in each activity; (3) analyze the 
role of household assets in the income received from each activity; and (4) disaggre-
gate rural nonfarm activities by industry. 
Source: Carletto et al. 2007, and http://www.fao.org/economic/riga/en/.
Table 1.2 Main Value Chains Analyzed in the RuralStruc Country Studies
Country Value chains
Mali Meat and dairy, dry cereals, rice, onion, cotton
Senegal Groundnut, cassava, rice, dairy, maize, tomato
Madagascar Rice, maize, potato, dairy, green bean
Kenya Maize, milk, sugarcane
Morocco Cereals, red meat, olive oil, tomato, citrus
Nicaragua Basic grains, vegetables, dairy, coffee, sesame
Mexico Maize, dairy, fruit, and vegetables
Source: RuralStruc Phase 2 reports.
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dynamics relevant to understanding the processes of change currently under 
way in the country. Various criteria were used depending on the country, but all 
related to market access (infrastructures and proximity to cities), the presence 
of integrated value chains, the level of public investments and public goods, and 
the situation regarding natural resources.
Three kinds of regions were specifi ed: 
• Winning regions, where the ongoing dynamics of integration to markets 
(whether related to specifi c value chains, the proximity of urban centers, or 
good infrastructure) provide opportunities and are strong drivers of change
• Losing regions, characterized by trends toward marginalization owing to 
local constraints (low factor endowment, lack of public goods), poor con-
nection to markets, or high poverty rates, and where household sustain-
ability appears to be increasingly diffi cult
• Intermediary regions, where the trends are imprecise and depend on the 
evolution of the local economic and institutional contexts, which will either 
provide new opportunities and reduce the existing constraints or not.
Using this general typology, at least three regions (one per type) but sometimes 
more were selected for data collection in the seven study countries (see table 1.3). 
Surveyed localities were chosen by the national teams in every region on the basis 
of their local knowledge, with the objective of illustrating the regional dynamics. 
In each locality, the selection of households to survey was randomized.
For certain surveyed regions, fi ne-tuning based on the fi rst survey results 
led to the identifi cation of signifi cant differences between areas in the same 
Table 1.3 Selected Surveyed Regions in the RuralStruc Countries
 Ex ante classifi cation
Country Winning Intermediary Losing
Mali Koutiala Diéma Tominian
Macina
Senegal Senegal Delta Bassin arachidier: Casamance
North (Mekhé) 
South (Nioro)
Madagascar Antsirabe Alaotra Morondava
Itasy
Kenya Nakuru North Bungoma Nyando
Morocco Souss Saïss Chaouia
Nicaragua El Viejo Muy Muy Terrabona
El Cuá La Libertad
Mexico Tequisquiapan (Querétaro) Sotavento (Veracruz) Ixmiquilpan (Hidalgo)
Source: RuralStruc Phase 2 reports.
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region. Consequently, a few of the original surveyed regions were split in two 
to provide a more accurate representation of regional characteristics (to avoid 
misleading effects from averaging opposite extremes). This choice was usually 
made on the basis of statistically signifi cant differences in household incomes 
between surveyed localities in the same region and sometimes on particular 
local conditions, such as remoteness or natural characteristics. This was the case 
in Senegal, Madagascar, and Mexico, where several regions were split in two.32 
These choices enabled the program to take into account different households’ 
asset endowments and agrarian structures, refl ected in income patterns.33
Thus, owing to the characteristics of the sampling method, the RuralStruc 
surveys are statistically representative at the local level (village or community) 
only. However, because the program relied on national teams of experts to select 
the surveyed regions, with reference to their factor endowments and connection 
to markets, the results provide an accurate estimate of the country’s existing 
regional trends in terms of agricultural development, rural incomes, and rural 
diversifi cation. They illustrate the diversity of the rural situations at the national 
level, which is confi rmed by the Phase 2 national reports (see chapter 3).
Approximately 8,000 rural household surveys encompassing 57,000 peo-
ple were implemented in 26 regions34 of the seven selected countries between 
November 2007 and May 2008—before the full development of the food price 
crisis. The data collected primarily refl ect the 2007 crop season. Forty percent 
of the surveyed households are in the three non-SSA countries. 
Surveys in each region were based on the same positioning and question-
ing, and used the same survey instrument framework. Despite data limitations, 
this design offers a set of comparable statistics referring to the same period of 
time (a key difference from RIGA) that documents both overarching patterns 
of development and the great diversity within rural societies.35 
The Partnership at Work
One of the original characteristics and strengths of the RuralStruc program was 
the methodological choice to develop activities through local partnerships and 
rely on national teams. This choice facilitated the implementation of the pro-
gram, notably the process of data collection, but it also strongly improved the 
quality of both the data and the analysis by providing an additional safeguard 
in terms of accuracy and consistency of the collected information and of the 
general understanding of the processes under way. In the end, it facilitated both 
local ownership and the public policy debate. 
Between the launching workshop in April 2006 and the publication of the 
fi rst draft of this synthesis in June 2009, the national and coordination teams 
engaged in continuous exchanges, which intensifi ed during the launching and 
ending stages of each phase, during joint fi eld missions, and at several collec-
tive events.
44  STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND RURAL CHANGE REVISITED
The same terms of reference, adjusted collaboratively, were used for each 
phase, and a consultative process was adopted for the design of the survey 
instrument. The same methodological framework was used in each of the seven 
countries, including common defi nitions and selection of core transversal vari-
ables to be used for the analysis, with the necessary local adaptations. The major 
diffi culties related to variable defi nitions and data analyses were discussed at 
a workshop, as was the outline of the Phase 2 report. Also, a common effort 
was employed to build an aggregated merged database focusing on a core set 
of variables that each national team extracted or calculated from the national 
data sets. Finally, the country results were thoroughly discussed on the basis 
of the cross-country data analysis and national reports to consolidate the fi nal 
outcomes of the program. 
The teams disseminated results in each of the surveyed countries after 
Phase 1, and the results of Phase 2 have been disseminated in some of the par-
ticipating countries. The format and pace of these dissemination events (which 
should continue after the formal end of the program) depend on the local polit-
ical agenda and the willingness of the local partners and contributing donors to 
participate in the events. 
Formal dissemination events for Phase 2 have been held in two countries 
so far (Mali in April 2010 and Senegal in June 2010), and both were structured 
the same way. The country team prepared a set of “policy briefs” on program 
results and recommendations that were discussed during a workshop involving 
representatives from farmer organizations, civil society, national government, 
local government, the private sector, and donors. 
International dissemination will continue and will involve the country teams. 
In addition to several presentations of the program and its fi rst results in vari-
ous forums since 2006, a preconference workshop was held during the 27th 
International Conference of Agricultural Economists in Beijing (August 2009).36 
Synopsis of the Book
This book, presenting the fi nal results of the RuralStruc program, offers a com-
parative analysis of rural change articulated with the existing debate on agricul-
ture, rural development, and structural transformation. It relies on the exten-
sive fi eldwork and analyses developed by the country teams, based on rural 
household surveys and desk reviews, and presented in 14 country reports.37 The 
country-based material is complemented by a literature review that provides 
the necessary background for interpreting the program’s results and highlight-
ing its contribution to thematic research and the policy debate.
The book consists of six chapters; fi gure 1.1 shows how they fi t together. 
The reader can follow the progression or go directly to the chapters of inter-
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est. Technical annexes were not included due to editorial constraints. They are 
accessible in the appendix posted on the RuralStruc web page and provide addi-
tional information on the methodology, the local partnerships, the description 
of surveyed regions, and data results that did not fi t into the core document. 
This fi rst chapter has explained the motivation behind the program, with 
reference to past and ongoing international debates, as well as the methodology 
used. It described how the program employed a two-stage process that involved 
both qualitative and quantitative research, and it presented the program’s three 
hypotheses related to (1) the extent of integration processes in agriculture and 
their consequences on farm households and the agricultural sector; (2) the 
development of the rural nonfarm economy (RNFE) and how it reshapes rural 
realities; and (3) the risks of transitional dead ends, in which some households 
and regions are left behind in the process of structural transformation. 
Chapter 2, Challenges of Structural Transformation, is a summary of the 
overall processes of structural change, particularly the characteristics of eco-
nomic and demographic transitions. It provides a frame of reference for the 
discussion in the rest of the report and addresses the question of the viability 
of the historical sequence of structural transformation in a globalizing world. 
It cites the situation of the least developed countries—mainly in Sub-Saharan 
Africa—which remain at the early stages of their transition processes. The chap-
ter also presents the characteristics of the RuralStruc countries with regard to 
their demographic and economic structures, and highlights their main chal-
lenges and the various roles played by agriculture.
Chapter 2:
The Challenges of Structural Transformation
Chapter 1:
Setting the Scene and Selecting the Tools
Hypothesis
1
Hypothesis
2
Hypothesis
3
Chapter 6:
From Regional 
Patterns of 
Rural Transformation 
to Policy Guidelines
Chapter 3:
Rural Realities:
Agriculture and
Poverty
 
Chapter 4:
Exploring Off-Farm
Diversification and the
Rural Nonfarm Economy
Chapter 5: Searching for
New Patterns of 
On-Farm Specialization
 Figure 1.1 A Tool to Navigate the Report
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Chapter 3, Rural Realities, examines the surveyed regions by focusing on the 
role of agriculture in household activities and incomes, and the extent of poverty. 
After underlining the central role of agriculture across very different regional set-
tings, the chapter uses micro-level survey data to present the income characteris-
tics of the households. Two themes dominate this review: the strength and persis-
tence of absolute poverty, and the extent to which households are still engaged in 
agriculture, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. The chapter shows that this poverty 
holds when calculated a number of different ways: per head, per adult equivalent, 
and even in kilocalories. The last section of the chapter discusses the livelihood 
strategies observed in the survey in the context of the WDR08 typology, which 
refers to three pathways out of rural poverty: farm specialization, rural labor, and 
migration. Two large groups of households are defi ned: those that are strongly 
specialized in on-farm activities and those that are more diversifi ed. Households 
with signifi cant off-farm specialization are limited in number. 
Chapter 4, Exploring Off-Farm Diversifi cation and the Rural Nonfarm Econ-
omy, examines the extent of diversifi cation in the surveyed regions, investigates 
the different types of off-farm activities and incomes (agricultural wage labor, 
nonagricultural wage labor, self-employment, public and private transfers, and 
rents), and identifi es characteristics of the households that are involved in these 
activities. It reviews the current debate and clarifi es the defi nitions of “rural 
nonfarm economy” (RNFE) and “off-farm,” which includes agricultural wage 
labor and is the lens used by the program. The chapter focuses on the second 
hypothesis and discusses how patterns of off-farm diversifi cation contribute to 
the process of change and the reshaping of the rural economies. It differentiates 
coping strategies at the initial stage of diversifi cation from more mature and 
positive diversifi cation at a later stage. 
Chapter 5, Searching for New Patterns of On-Farm Specialization, focuses 
on agriculture. After reviewing the patterns of the “big restructuring” related 
to market liberalization and the new agrifood markets, it investigates the char-
acteristics of on-farm activities in the surveyed regions. The chapter explores 
the fi rst hypothesis with regard to the consequences of changes under way in 
the sector. Rather than the “new agriculture” suggested in the literature, the 
program results highlight the persistence of old agricultural patterns, including 
the importance of self-consumption and staple production (connected to risk-
management strategies and weak market environment), and the limited role of 
contractualization. However, the connection of farm households to markets is 
signifi cant everywhere.
Chapter 6, From Regional Patterns of Rural Transformation to Policy Guide-
lines, discusses the determinants of the regional levels of income and elaborates 
on the core diversifi cation-specialization relationship that is central to the pro-
cess of structural transformation. On the basis of statistical analyses, it identifi es 
an inverted U pattern that helps explain the process of rural transformation. It 
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highlights the specifi c situation of Sub-Saharan Africa, where obstacles along 
the transformation path appear to trap most of the regions surveyed in poverty. 
This illustrates the risk of transitional impasse cited in the third hypothesis. The 
second part of the chapter draws on the accrued evidence to propose possible 
policy guidelines. It suggests methodological orientations and three building 
blocks specifi cally targeted to SSA’s early-transitioning regions that could help 
them overcome risks of persistent traps.
Notes
 1. National reports were produced for each phase of the program. They are referenced 
in the document using RS 1 [country] for Phase 1 reports and RS 2 [country] for 
Phase 2 reports. The list of reports is provided at the beginning of the bibliography.
 2. Among recent and often contradictory research work, see, for instance, Bouët et 
al. (2005); Boussard, Gérard, and Piketty (2005, 2006); Polaski (2006); or, more 
recently, Peréz, Farah, and Grammont (2008) on Latin America; Zepeda et al. 
(2009) on Kenya; and the work coordinated by Anderson on “Krueger/Schiff/Valdés 
Revisited” (Anderson 2010).
 3. Specifi cally, the limitation is in regard to the scope of intersectoral linkages in the 
context of globalization. This discussion is developed in chapter 2. For criticism of 
the WDR08 framework, see, among others, Akram-Lodhi (2008) and Oya (2009).
 4. The “bottom billion” refers to Paul Collier’s 2007 book that focuses on 50 so-called 
“failing states” that are stuck in poverty; 70 percent of these states are in SSA. Collier, 
who is one of the two authors of UNIDO’s report, fed the controversy about the role 
of agriculture, noting that it will not be able to alleviate poverty and that the only 
option is a broad migration to cities (Collier 2008, 2009). For more on this debate, 
see chapter 6.
 5. Two departments of the World Bank—the Poverty Reduction and Equity Group 
and the Finance, Economics and Urban Department—have launched a joint work 
program on poverty reduction during the rural-urban transformation in developing 
countries, with the objective of combining the two WDR perspectives. See Simler 
and Dudwick (2010). This work was completed in 2011 (Dudwick et al. 2011).
 6. There has been a long and tense international debate about recognizing multifunc-
tionality as a feature unique to agriculture, and it has been heavily intertwined with 
ongoing policy discussions. Many European states adopted policies promoting mul-
tifunctionality in the 1990s despite strong opposition in the WTO from countries 
(mainly the Cairns Group countries and the United States) that denounced their 
actions as market distortions. On these debates and on the multifunctionality of agri-
culture in general, see Barthélémy et al. (2003), Losch (2004), Caron and Le Cotty 
(2006), and Groupe Polanyi (2008). In addition, FAO implemented a Roles of Agri-
culture project between 2000 and 2006 that developed a broad set of case studies and 
analyses on the roles of agriculture at the different phases of development (FAO 2007).
 7. A long tradition of stimulating research in agrarian studies questions the conse-
quences of ongoing processes of change and the related risks of economic and social 
impasses. See the Journal of Agrarian Change and, for a recent review of the current 
debates and their evolution, Akram-Lodhi and Kay (2009a and b).
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 8. See, for example, Johnston and Kilby (1975), Chenery and Syrquin (1975), and 
 Timmer (1988, 2009).
 9. Development economics emerged at the end of World War II with the idea of catch-
ing up the growth process of industrialized countries, with reference to the take-off 
of 19th century Western European countries. It established a debated evolutionist 
vision of development in which countries must go through “necessary stages.” Eco-
nomic and demographic transitions are further discussed in chapter 2.
10.  Economic research rarely addresses other consequences of liberalization. For the 
potential employment dimensions of liberalization, see, for instance, Hoekman and 
Winters (2005). For environmental dimensions, see Cook et al. (2010).
11.  In the economic literature, diffi culties related to liberalization are generally per-
ceived as temporary. This is the case for unemployment, which is supposed to refl ect 
the time needed for adaptation to the new context and for reaching a new equilib-
rium (Winters, McCulloch, and McKay 2004).
12.  Owing to the selection process and the self-selection of the country cases, any con-
clusion from direct comparison to explain variables would suffer from systematic 
error ( Collier and Mahoney 1996).
13.  The concept of critical juncture is found in path dependence approaches and refers 
to the identifi cation of key choice points at which a particular option is selected 
by governments, coalitions, or social forces and leads to the creation of recurring 
institutional patterns. See Mahoney (2001) and Pierson (2000).
14.  CAADP is one of the fl agship programs of the New Partnership for Africa’s Devel-
opment (NEPAD). Launched in 2003, it aims to increase agricultural investment to 
10 percent of national budgets (Maputo Declaration) and facilitate the preparation 
of investment plans. CAADP focuses on four pillars to improve productivity and 
growth: land and water management, market access, food supply and hunger, and 
agricultural research. See http://www.nepad-caadp.net.
15.  The European Union and the United States in the case of Morocco, and the United 
States in the case of Nicaragua (with the Central American–Dominican Republic 
Free Trade Agreement [CAFTA-DR]).
16.  In table 1.1 and in the document as a whole, country data have been sorted from left 
to right, fi rst by region (SSA, North Africa, and Latin America) and then by income 
level based on the survey results (see chapter 3).
17.  The appearance of Senegal, a country with 72 percent of its economically active 
population (EAP) in agriculture, in the “transforming world” illustrates the ambigu-
ity of using rural or rural poverty instead of AgEAP as a criterion for the analysis. 
The defi nition of rural varies among countries (see box 1.5) and has a restrictive 
defi nition in Senegal. Nicaragua is not mentioned in the WDR three worlds analy-
sis, which excludes countries with fewer than 5 million inhabitants (even though 
Nicaragua passed this limit in 2000). However, using the same criterion, Nicaragua 
would be part of the transforming countries group.
18.  AgEAP shares are computed from FAO based on International Labour Organiza-
tion (ILO) data. In the case of Nicaragua, the share of the active population engaged 
in agriculture seems to be strongly underestimated. According to the Central 
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Bank of Nicaragua, 29 percent of the labor force was employed in the sector (RS 1 
Nicaragua, 28).
19.  Country groupings are always debatable. However, qualifying Kenya as a coun-
try facing incipient urbanization is somewhat surprising, given the huge urban 
growth observed in the country. See box 3.2 and Harre, Moriconi-Ebrard, and Gazel 
(2010).
20.  “Small” and “large” are relative values. Among the 192 member states of the United 
Nations, only 11 countries have more than 100 million inhabitants; 25 countries 
have more than 50 million people; and 50 countries have more than 20 million—but 
80 countries have fewer than 5 million inhabitants. The median country population 
is 7 million.
21.  If the case against the most populous countries in the selection is easily understand-
able, the case against the smallest is trickier. They can also face diffi culties in their 
economic transition in today’s world, but the population numbers at stake are glob-
ally less illustrative of the transition challenges and the risks of dead ends.
22.  If China and India are global exceptions, most of the Asian countries (for example, 
Thailand, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines) have large populations. If we 
exclude the republics of the former Soviet Union and the confl ict and postcon-
fl ict countries (Cambodia and Sri Lanka), the alternatives are limited. Within this 
demographic range, Nepal or Malaysia could have been interesting cases, the latter 
being already deeply engaged in structural transformation. The selection of Nicara-
gua is disputable—it is a postconfl ict country, affected by a civil war between 1978 
and 1989, and its population is limited. Guatemala and Honduras were discussed 
as alternative options to illustrate the CAFTA-DR countries, but Nicaragua was 
selected for operational reasons.
23.  Owing to its insularity, Madagascar is a unique country case study in Southern 
Africa. Mozambique and Zambia were other possible case studies but, again, the 
availability of local partners prevailed. 
24.  Mexico also holds a special status among developing countries as a result of its long-
standing agricultural policy, initially based on the revolutionary agrarian reform 
that ran from the 1920s to the 1970s. In spite of liberalization of the land market 
in 1992, this trajectory has shaped the structure of the Mexican agriculture (RS 1 
Mexico).
25.  The selection includes regions engaged in tropical perennial crops. Among the coun-
try cases, examples are found in Kenya and Nicaragua (coffee). Perennials are also 
strongly represented in Morocco (mainly citrus and olive trees).
26.  Decision of the fi rst Advisory Committee meeting in March 2007. The program 
benefi ted from a governance structure that included a 10-member Advisory Com-
mittee from academia and a Steering Committee of contributing donors.
27.  Phase 1 was implemented between April 2006 and March 2007. Phase 2 was sched-
uled for implementation between June 2007 and June 2008, but the new choices 
related to the household surveys required a new schedule. Phase 2 was launched in 
September 2007 and lasted until June 2009, with extensions for Kenya, Morocco, and 
Mexico until January–March 2010. 
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28.  See annex 1 in the appendix posted at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ruralstruc, 
which presents the detailed methodology used for the fi eldwork (units of analysis, 
sampling procedures, dates of collection); the diffi culties; and the technical solutions 
that were adopted to deal with them. 
29.  This is broadly the case for the Living Standards Measurement Studies (LSMS) initi-
ated by the World Bank in the 1980s, which include 32 countries. In Africa, most of 
the poverty household surveys were implemented on a national basis, using a very 
similar approach.
30.  In the coming years, the LSMS-ISA program (LSMS Integrated Surveys on Agricul-
ture), launched in 2009 by the World Bank and the Bill and Melinda Gates Founda-
tion in seven SSA countries, will provide panel data focusing on agriculture and 
linkages between farm and nonfarm activities.
31.  RIGA results are also a main reference of the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD) Rural Poverty Report 2010, which also makes use of the Rural-
Struc survey results (IFAD 2010).
32.  In Senegal, the Senegal River Delta region was divided in two—Lower Delta (Bas 
Delta) and Upper Delta (Haut Delta)—as well as the north of the bassin arachidier: 
Mekhé 1 and 2. In Madagascar, the Antsirabe and Alaotra regions were also split in 
two: Antsirabe 1 and 2, and Alaotra 1 and 2. In Mexico, it was decided to drop the 
results of Ixmiquilpan, in the Otomi region of the Hidalgo state, which had been 
selected as a losing region, because the inconsistencies in the survey results were 
insurmountable. Then, the Sotavento (Veracruz state) was divided into the lowlands 
(Tierras Bajas) and the mountains (Sierra de Santa Marta). The Sotavento subre-
gion of Sierra de Santa Marta, characterized by remoteness,  low provision of public 
goods, and a primarily indigenous population, offers the characteristics of a losing 
region and mitigates the dropping of Ixmiquilpan.
33.  Maps of the surveyed regions are displayed at the end of the book. Their main char-
acteristics are provided in annex 3 in the appendix posted at http://www.worldbank
.org/afr/ruralstruc.
34.  Owing to the regional fi ne-tuning, the results are displayed for 30 regions and sub-
regions (among the 26 surveyed regions, 5 regions are divided in two, minus the 
dropped Mexican region of Ixmiquilpan). See the table in annex 1 in the appendix 
posted at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ruralstruc. 
35.  The contributing donors agreed to provide public access to the RuralStruc data-
bases (country databases and core merged database). This dissemination, includ-
ing adequate documentation using international standards (metadata and variable 
description), will be progressively implemented with support from the Accelerated 
Data Program coordinated by the World Bank and the PARIS21 Secretariat. Data are 
already available through the World Bank’s Micro Data Library at http://microdata.
worldbank.org/index.php/catalog/670.
36.  International dissemination events are listed in annex 2 in the appendix posted at 
http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ruralstruc.
37.  The 14 RuralStruc country reports are posted on the World Bank’s RuralStruc Web 
page: http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ruralstruc.
Chapter 2
The previous chapter underscored several new issues that have emerged as 
growing international concerns in the policy debate in recent years, issues that 
have changed the policy landscape. Among them, the fi nancial crisis unexpect-
edly contributed to the resurrection of a theme that had long been ignored in 
the policy agenda: structural transformation. Although this topic had remained 
fully relevant in academic circles, it was largely absent from the discussions of 
policy makers. Reconnecting structural issues with the policy debate was a core 
motivation for the RuralStruc program. 
The political comeback of structural transformation is still very limited. 
Short-term issues and rescue plans demand most of the attention of govern-
ments and donors, and consequently limit their ability to strongly reengage 
in long-term structural policies. However, two recent contributions are worth 
citing: the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development report 
Combating Poverty and Inequality: Structural Change, Social Policy and Politics 
(UNRISD 2010), and the African Union and Economic Commission for Africa 
Economic Report on Africa 2011 titled Governing Development in Africa: The 
Role of the State in Economic Transformation (UNECA 2011). Interest on the 
donor side can also be identifi ed: Justin Lin, the World Bank’s chief econo-
mist, has repeatedly called for a “new structural economics” as a framework for 
rethinking development (Lin 2010).
Two factors can be put forward to explain this progressive new focus on 
structural issues. First, the fi nancial crisis has raised questions about the sus-
tainability of the existing growth model and its global imbalances. Thus, new 
structural solutions are being sought to allow a more sustainable and inclusive 
development regime, a process exemplifi ed by the many attempts to improve 
world governance through international regulations and the growing role of the 
G20. Second, the dramatic actions of rich country governments in dealing with 
the consequences of the fi nancial crisis through bailouts is a clear reminder of 
the limits of market-only approaches and suggests that states still have a role to 
play, particularly in dealing with regulatory and structural issues. 
The Challenges of 
Structural Transformation
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With this evolving context in mind, the main objectives of this chapter are 
to provide background on the processes of structural change currently under 
way and to discuss specifi c challenges faced by the RuralStruc countries and 
regions with respect to their economic and demographic transitions. The chap-
ter addresses the situation of Sub-Saharan Africa in particular, as it was the last 
region in the world to begin its structural transformation. 
Regional Differences and Positioning of the 
RuralStruc Countries
There are major differences between the economic and demographic structures 
of the RuralStruc countries, which are illustrative of their stage in the process 
of structural transformation and, more broadly, of the dynamics of the world’s 
regions.
Uneven Economic Transitions 
The seven RuralStruc countries were selected because they demonstrate differ-
ent stages of the structural transformation process. Although a deep analysis 
based on macroeconomic data could have been presented for each country,1 
this book restricts the discussion to simple and comprehensive fi gures, and to 
the most important stylized facts. This allows for a clear presentation of the 
seven countries’ positioning within the process of structural change. 
Figure 2.1 is a reminder of the wide differences in income levels among 
world regions and, above all, of the dramatic differences in their growth over 
time. It compares SSA as a whole with the three non-SSA RuralStruc countries 
and other comparators, and underscores the long stagnation of Sub-Saharan 
Africa compared with other regions (with the notable exception of Nicaragua, 
whose growth trajectory refl ects the consequences of its civil war).
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 show the economic transition of each of the RuralStruc 
countries (and some comparators) from 1965 to 2005 using three basic indica-
tors: GDP per capita, the share of agriculture in GDP, and its share in employ-
ment. This is an effi cient way to measure the structural evolution of an economy 
away from one entirely centered on agriculture. The fi gures demonstrate very 
signifi cant differences in the extent and pace of structural change.
 Figure 2.2 shows the share of agriculture in employment and in GDP over 
time. The squiggly lines could be termed the countries’ “signatures,” not only 
for their visual resemblance but also because they summarize each country’s 
unique development trajectory. The fi gure illustrates the importance of agri-
culture over time, highlights the positioning of world regions through country 
examples, and shows how the share of agriculture in GDP decreases from SSA 
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Note: To avoid clutter, the graph displays an aggregate line for Sub-Saharan Africa rather than a line for the four 
RuralStruc SSA countries. At this scale, the differences among the SSA countries in terms of evolution are slight.
Figure 2.1 Evolution of GDP per Capita among Selected Countries and Regions, 1960–2009
to Asia and Latin America. It also shows the decreasing share of agricultural 
employment in the labor force. This change occurs slowly at fi rst, exemplifi ed 
by the stagnant employment structure observed in Sub-Saharan Africa, and also 
by China, where the decrease is similarly very slow. 
The difference between agriculture’s share in GDP (AgGDP) and its share 
in employment (AgEAP) illustrates a well-known characteristic of structural 
transformation: an inequality of incomes between agriculture and the other 
sectors of the economy that refl ects differences in factor productivity (Timmer 
and Akkus 2008). Figure 2.3 shows this structural gap, which clearly highlights 
rural-urban income differences. The structural gap widens during the early 
stages of economic development, a consequence of rapidly expanding economic 
activity in cities and the resultant accumulation of wealth. It narrows as the 
economy diversifi es overall and as urbanization continues, leading to the pro-
gressive convergence of rural and urban sectors into a fully integrated economy, 
with a gap near or equal to zero. 
Among the RuralStruc countries, the comparison of gap values confi rms 
that Mexico is deeply engaged in its structural transformation. It is a diversi-
fi ed economy in which agriculture no longer plays a major role (5 percent of 
GDP). However, even after this transition, the risks of growing marginalization 
in Mexico’s rural economy continue to exist: 25 million people still live in rural 
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 Figure 2.2 Share of Agriculture in GDP and in EAP over Time, 1965–2005
percent
Brazil 1965   
China 1965
Indonesia 1965
Kenya 1965
Madagascar 1966 Mali 1967
Morocco 1980
Senegal 1980
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
AgGDP/GDP
A
g
E
A
P
/
E
A
P Mexico 1965
TH
E C
H
A
LLEN
G
ES O
F STRU
C
TU
RA
L TRA
N
SFO
RM
ATIO
N
 
 
55
Sources: WDI; FAO; authors’ calculations.
Note: Final year is 2005. Starting year is given with the country name.
 Figure 2.3 Structural Gap and GDP per Capita, 1965–2005 (5-Year Averages)
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areas, and between 15 percent and 20 percent of the labor force is in agriculture. 
Mexico’s diffi culties in this convergence process are shown through a compari-
son with Brazil, whose gap value is decreasing much more rapidly.2 
The cases of Morocco and Nicaragua3 are more tenuous, because agricul-
ture still plays a signifi cant role in overall value added (15 percent and 20 per-
cent, respectively). The convergence between the rural and urban sectors is well 
under way, and this process has been especially quick in Morocco. However, the 
successful deepening of these two countries’ economic transitions will rely on 
their capacity to skillfully manage their internal economic integration in a way 
that avoids marginalizing remote areas (the mountain zones in Morocco and 
Autonomous Caribbean Regions in Nicaragua). Agricultural policies could play 
a signifi cant role in limiting the exclusion processes. The Moroccan govern-
ment has addressed this issue; in 2008, it launched a new rural development 
strategy—Le Plan Maroc Vert—based on two pillars: the development of the 
agro-industrial sector (mainly based on a nucleus of smallholders supplying 
export-oriented processors called “aggregators”) and the promotion of family 
agriculture. The relative levels of attention afforded to the two pillars and how 
different approaches would affect the marginalization of rural households con-
tinue to be strongly debated (RS 1 and RS 2 Morocco). 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the process of structural change has barely begun. 
Fifty years after their political independence, SSA countries continue to be char-
acterized by the weight of the agricultural sector in GDP. On average, it stands 
at about 20 percent, but in most countries—including Kenya, Mali, and Mada-
gascar—it is over 30 percent.4 SSA countries are also notable for the weight of 
agriculture in their employment structures. Except in South Africa, agriculture 
employs, on average, 65 percent of the subcontinent’s economically active pop-
ulation; in many countries, including the four RuralStruc countries, the fi gure is 
between 70 percent and 85 percent. Thus, agriculture is still the principal source 
of economic activity and household income. 
The most striking phenomenon is the great inertia of SSA’s economic 
structures. Trajectories in the transition are stagnant (see fi gures 2.2 and 2.3), 
although the populations show signifi cant mobility, demonstrated most effec-
tively by the speed of urbanization. With an urbanization ratio (percentage of 
the population living in urban areas) approaching 40 percent, the urban popu-
lation has increased by a factor of 12 since 1960 (see table 2.5). However, this 
dynamic has not been accompanied by any sort of signifi cant industrialization. 
The urbanization-without-industrialization phenomenon so widely observed 
in Sub-Saharan Africa contrasts with patterns seen in other developing regions, 
notably Asia, where changes in the economic structure happened very quickly 
(see fi gure 2.4). This has resulted in an overwhelmingly high share of services in 
SSA economies, mainly related to informal urban activities and to the market-
ing of agricultural products.5
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The lack of a dynamic manufacturing sector in SSA has meant that increases 
in the economically active population have mainly occurred in agriculture or 
the informal urban sector, which play the role of shock absorbers for Africa’s 
population. The informal urban sector represents about 30 percent to 45 per-
cent of nonagricultural GDP and 70 percent to 90 percent of overall nonagri-
cultural employment (Jütting and De Laiglesia 2009). 
With a fragmented regional market consisting of 42 states (continental SSA 
only), limited success in effective regional integration, and deep levels of pov-
erty that limit local capital accumulation, the growth of SSA’s economies is 
highly dependent on external forces. It is prone to trade shocks related to price 
volatility and to foreign direct investment and public aid budgets that are often 
pro-cyclical. These characteristics, along with low labor productivity (a result 
of the sectoral distribution of labor discussed above), frequent political insta-
bility, and rapid population growth (see next section), explain SSA’s very weak 
economic growth and high volatility compared with the rest of the world (table 
2.1). This chaotic growth pattern has greatly contributed to the short-term 
vision of many political leaders and private investors. 
In the past two years, the literature on African economic development has 
been brimming with very optimistic titles: Lions on the Move and an Emerging 
Africa Where Poverty is Falling . . . Much Faster Than [we] Think! 6 However, these 
victory statements must be carefully weighed against the historical perspective. 
Although the recent growth period and Africa’s apparent resilience to the 
global fi nancial crisis are good news, it is not clear that they are the result of 
Sources: WDI; World Bank 2009.
Note: Latin American countries are not included as comparators because most of their economic diversification 
occurred before 1965.
 Figure 2.4 Evolution of GDP Structure: SSA versus Asia, 1965–2005 
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structural solutions that will sustain growth in the long term. 7 With some excep-
tions (situations of catching up and improvements in governance), growth has 
initially been brought about by a boom in raw materials. Growth was slower in 
SSA than in other developing countries (notably East Asia) and it was mainly 
concentrated in services and construction—the investment rate remained the 
lowest of any developing region (Ali and Dadush 2010). So far, recent prog-
ress has not changed the structural anemia of the subcontinent; in fact, gaps 
between it and the rest of the world have continued to widen.8 
New Patterns in Demographic Transitions 
Economic and demographic transitions are closely intertwined. World popula-
tion growth is rapid and characterized by differential growth rates across societ-
ies. Consequently, countries are at different stages in demographic transition—
a process characterized by a successive reduction in both mortality and birth 
rates.9 As a result of these differences, an increasing share of the world’s popu-
lation comes from developing countries. This trend will challenge economic 
growth, exacerbate the existing asymmetries among regions, and ultimately 
affect every region’s economic structure. 
According to UN estimates, the world’s population should reach 9.2 bil-
lion by 2050—more than 2 billion more people than today (see table 2.2).10 
Although these statistics are widely discussed,11 the distribution of this popula-
tion increase across regions receives less attention. While Europe shows charac-
teristics of the fi nal stage of demographic transition (with an aging and declin-
ing population), Sub-Saharan Africa and South-Central Asia are still booming. 
However, the latter two regions are growing at different rates: SSA’s population 
should double by 2050, reaching 1.7 billion people, while South-Central Asia 
should “only” grow by 40 percent.12 Thus, by 2050, Sub-Saharan Africa should 
be the second most populous region of the world, after South Asia. At the same 
time, East Asia’s population growth (mainly China) should come to a halt as a 
consequence of a huge increase in incomes and possibly a result of the radical 
Table 2.1 Compared Dynamics of GDP per Capita Growth among 
Regions, 1960–2007
Region
%
per year
Variation
coef.
North Africa and Middle East 2.06 1.68
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.72 3.10
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.73 1.38
East Asia & Pacifi c 5.44 0.76
South Asia 2.72 0.99
Source: Arbache and Page 2007.
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birth policies in place in China since the 1970s, the consequences of which are 
debated. As a result, East Asia will progressively face the problem presently seen 
in Europe—the burden of an aging population—which will weigh heavily on 
the region’s growth rate. Japan is already confronting this situation.
The main result of differential population growth rates (which could change 
in the event of exceptional circumstances) will be a new mapping of the world 
and a likely shift in the balance of power. Guengant (2007) says that by 2050, 
SSA should have regained its former share of the world population—around 
20 percent—and overtaken China. (Interestingly, the two had very similar 
populations in the 16th century—around 100–120 million.) Europe and North 
America combined should represent fewer than 15 percent of the world’s total 
population (table 2.2).
The different demographic prospects of the RuralStruc countries illustrate 
variations around these overall regional trends. Three SSA countries—Kenya, 
Madagascar, and Mali—exceed the regional average increase. Nicaragua’s 
growth is very similar to that of Central America (38 percent), while Mexico—
part of the same UN subregion—shows a clear slowdown consistent with the 
end of its demographic transition (table 2.3).
The main economic concern regarding the demographic transition relates 
to the evolution of the population’s activity structure, which in turn refl ects its 
age structure (Bloom, Canning, and Sevilla 2001). This evolution is revealed 
in dependency ratios (or activity ratios) that summarize the proportions of 
active and inactive people in the economy.13 In the fi rst phase of demographic 
transition, the population is young, with a high share of inactive youths; dur-
ing the second stage, these cohorts become active and—if the conditions for 
growth exist (good economic, institutional, and political environment)—offer 
a potential bonus to the economy referred to as the “demographic dividend.” 
Table 2.2 World Population by Region, Absolute and Share, 1960–2050
millions
Year     1960 1990 2010 2050 2010–50 
Eastern Asia 779 26% 1,337 25% 1,564 23% 1,600 17% 36 2%
South-Central Asia 627 21% 1,250 24% 1,780 26% 2,494 27% 713 40%
Sub-Saharan Africa 229 8% 518 10% 863 12% 1,753 19% 890 103%
Latin America and the 
 Caribbean 220 7% 442 8% 589 9% 729 8% 141 24%
Northern America 204 7% 283 5% 352 5% 448 5% 97 28%
Europe 604 20% 721 14% 733 11% 691 8% –42 –6%
Other regions 359 12% 739 14% 1,028 15% 1,434 16% 406 40%
World 3,023 100% 5,290 100% 6,909 100% 9,150 100% 2,241 32%
Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects, 2008 revision.
Note: For the definition of regions, see http://esa.un.org./wpp/Excel-Data/definition-of-regions.htm.
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The third stage corresponds to the aging of these cohorts, which increases the 
dependency ratio (or decreases the activity ratio).
Figure 2.5 illustrates these staggered and differentiated demographic transi-
tions. As a result of its high population growth rate since the 1960s (higher than 
2.5 percent per year over 40 years, with a peak of 3 percent in the 1980s), Sub-
Saharan Africa during the 1980s and 1990s faced the weakest activity ratio ever 
recorded, with only about one active person for every inactive person.14 Under-
standing this heavy burden helps provide perspective on SSA’s two decades 
Table 2.3 Population of the RuralStruc Countries, 1960–2050
millions
Country  1960 1990 2010 2050  2010–50 
Kenya 8.1 23.4  40.8  85.4 44.5 109%
Madagascar 5.1 11.2  20.1  42.7 22.5 112%
Mali 5  8.6  13.3  28.3 14.9 112%
Senegal 3  7.5  12.8  26.1 13.2 103%
Morocco 11.6 24.8  32.3  42.6 10.2  32%
Nicaragua 1.8  4.1   5.8   8.1  2.3  40%
Mexico 37.9 83.4 110.6 128.9 18.3  17%
Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects, 2008 revision.
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F igure 2.5 Activity Ratio by Selected Regions, 1950–2050
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of economic crisis and structural adjustment, as well as its current situation. 
During the same period, East Asia benefi ted from an outstanding demographic 
dividend. Its activity ratio grew beyond two active people for every inactive one 
and fueled the economic growth of the region.15 South Asia, whose transition 
lags behind East Asia’s by about 30 years, should see this demographic windfall 
around 2035–40, while SSA will have to wait until after 2050 to reap the benefi ts 
of a more favorable demographic structure. 
When examined in terms of yearly cohorts of people—particularly yearly 
cohorts of young labor market entrants—these different demographic trends 
reveal a coming surge in the labor supply over the next decades in SSA and 
South Asia.
Figure 2.6 shows the size of the yearly cohort of labor market entrants and 
illustrates the same trends in the world’s most populous regions (Asia and SSA).16 
It provides an estimate of the labor absorption needs of the various regional econ-
omies. Currently, Sub-Saharan Africa’s yearly cohort of new EAP is around 17 
million; it should reach 25 million in 15 years. The peak will occur after 2050. For 
a medium-size SSA country (15 million people), the yearly cohort was 250,000 
in the 2000s; it is expected to reach 400,000 in the 2020s. This means that SSA 
will see a surge of around 330 million new market entrants in the next 15 years—
Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects, 2008 revision.
Note: Yearly cohorts correspond to 1/10 of the 15–24 age group. 
F igure 2.6 Yearly Cohorts Entering the Labor Market by Selected Regions, 1955–2050
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roughly equivalent to the current U.S. population.17 This number is not a projec-
tion: These 330 million new labor market entrants have already been born. 
Table 2.4 shows what these trends mean for the RuralStruc countries. In SSA, 
the peak period for labor supply will be after 2050; this is the major difference 
between SSA and non-SSA countries, where the peak period has already passed 
or will soon pass. During the next decades, achieving adequate economic growth 
to create demand for the coming labor surge will be a major concern for Sub-
Saharan African societies and governments (World Bank 2009c; UNRISD 2010).
Structural Transformation in a Global Open Economy
The evolutionist view that underlies the canonical model of economic tran-
sition is insuffi ciently questioned today, given the new confi guration of the 
global economy. The globalization process that began at the end of the 1970s is 
unique and too often mischaracterized as a second globalization, with reference 
to a fi rst globalization that occurred between the 1860s and World War I. This 
period was characterized by an increasing movement of goods, labor, and capi-
tal among Europe, its immediate periphery (Russia and the Ottoman Empire), 
and the new worlds—mainly the United States (Berger 2002), but it did not 
affect the whole world. Rather, it was a process of convergence in the North 
Atlantic economy, driven by migration fl ows (O’Rourke and Williamson 1999) 
and governed by a geopolitical order that included European colonial empires 
and an American sphere of infl uence in Latin America.
The processes at play today refl ect the growing integration of the world. This 
globalization is facilitated by continuous technological progress in the trans-
portation of goods, capital, and information; strengthened by the liberalization 
policies begun in the early 1980s; and characterized by a greater concentration 
Table 2.4 Labor Market Entrants in the RuralStruc Countries
thousands
Country 
New labor market 
entrants in 2010
Peak of annual 
additional labor supply Peak time
Kenya 847 1,545 > 2050
Madagascar 405 736 > 2050
Mali 278 524 > 2050
Senegal 269 452 > 2050
Morocco 638 644 2005
Nicaragua 125 129 2015
Mexico 1,984 2,008 2015
Source: United Nations, World Population Prospects, 2008 revision.
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of assets being held by global fi rms and institutional investors, as well as the 
development of intrafi rm trade and the outsourcing of production. Global-
ization is also characterized by a convergence in thinking related to common 
concerns about global change, especially with regard to the impact of human 
activities on natural resources and climate.
These characteristics foster a deep interconnection of markets and of human 
societies and, in the process, greatly affect the structures of both. They tend to 
simultaneously weaken local links in favor of more distant relations (notably 
in terms of production) and widen existing asymmetries among the different 
regions of the world. 
Is the Historical Sequence of Structural Change Viable Today?
One of the main questions is whether or not, or to what degree, the historical 
sequence of structural change is viable for today’s late developers. This debate 
includes many traps. Although it has many variants, the historical path of struc-
tural transformation is a stylized fact of history, confi rmed by statistical evi-
dence.18 This is a positive, not a normative, statement. However, notions such 
as “development” and “emergence” are ambiguous and carry certain overtones 
related to the European (or western) view of world history.19 In this view, the 
structural trajectory of today’s developed countries is used as the evolutionary 
measuring stick against which changes in economies and human societies are 
judged (Gabas and Losch 2008). Despite the limitations and biases inherent 
in this framework, this book refers to “fi rst” or “late” developers to describe a 
country’s position with regard to the observed historical transition processes.
Timmer and Akkus (2008) argue that if countries are lagging in the process 
of structural change, it is mainly related to economic growth diffi culties and 
does not imply failure of the historical transformation process. Although this is 
true in absolute terms, it understates the role of specifi c historical conditions in 
past transitions and the potential diffi culty of replicating the structural trans-
formation in the same way today.
Importance of the Moment in Time. Prospects for change in any country or 
region depend not just on internal conditions in terms of population, educa-
tion, natural resources, and so on, but also on the relationship with the outside 
world (Gore 2003). For example, limited competition for a country’s industrial 
exports could mean easier industrialization. Because opportunities, constraints, 
and the balance of power are always evolving, historical context matters. Thus, it 
is important to highlight the need for a historical perspective in discussing the 
ongoing processes of structural change.
Today, the evolutionary frame of reference tends to omit three major char-
acteristics of previous transition processes. The fi rst is the global balance of 
power at the time of the Western European and North American transitions 
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over the 19th and the better part of the 20th centuries. These early transitions 
from agrarian societies toward more diversifi ed economies cannot be discon-
nected from European political and military hegemony, which began to develop 
in the 16th century and was expressed most overtly through colonization and 
unfair treaties.20 
This hegemony, which is fully embedded in the history of world capital-
ism (Braudel 1979; Wallerstein 1989), reduced or eliminated competition21 and 
allowed for very attractive situations of both supply and demand with captive 
markets. Together with the agricultural revolution of the 18th century (Mazoyer 
and Roudart 1997), it made specialization and industrialization possible (nota-
bly through consistent food supplies based on cheap imports) and facilitated 
high business profi tability, which resulted in increased capital accumulation 
and investment. When the United States went through its own transition in the 
mid- to late 19th century, it reproduced and deepened many of the features of 
the European transition.
The second omission is the huge outfl ow of migrants from Europe during the 
transition, an opportunity that was fully intertwined with European hegemony 
(Hatton and Williamson 2005). Between 1850 and 1930, nearly 60 million Euro-
peans migrated to new worlds: the Americas, Australia, New Zealand, and Africa 
(mainly Algeria and Southern Africa).22 These “white migrations” (Rygiel 2007) 
facilitated the adjustment of European economies and their management of the 
labor surpluses resulting from their demographic transitions, more specifi cally 
from rural depopulation and from the insuffi cient pace of job creation in urban 
sectors, despite a strong process of industrialization (Losch 2008).
The third omission is specifi c to the Latin American and Asian transitions, 
which are frequently cited to confi rm the infallibility of the pattern of structural 
change. Latin American and Asian countries began their transition processes 
during a very specifi c period of national self-centered development (Giraud 
1996) that characterized the international regime between the 1929 fi nancial 
crisis and the 1970s (the beginning of the globalization period). Through-
out the world, nation-states implemented their own “development projects” 
(McMichael 1996), characterized by import substitution, protection, and strong 
state intervention (Chang 2002). Public policies were of paramount impor-
tance for both industrialization (Evans 1995; Amsden 2001) and agriculture 
modernization (Djurfeldt et al. 2005), and they initiated the so-called “devel-
opmental state.” The independent Latin American countries engaged in this 
process between the two world wars and continued these policies during the 
three decades after WWII.23 They were followed by many of the newly indepen-
dent Asian countries in the 1950s, and in both cases Cold War funding played 
its role. Although state-led development strategies produced mixed results and 
were eventually dropped for reasons of ineffi ciency, in most countries they con-
tributed to the creation of a strong economic and institutional fabric (skills, 
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processes, experiences). Once the scaffolding of strong state support was rolled 
back, this foundation helped facilitate the countries’ adaptation to globalization. 
Sub-Saharan Africa has followed a different path. Its lack of structural 
transformation over the past 50 years can be largely explained by the historical 
sequence that led to the continent’s late insertion into the global economy and 
the conditions under which this was fi nally accomplished. A primary factor was 
colonial rule, with its captive markets and explicit obstacles to industrialization 
and education, which led to a deep specialization in primary sectors. Another 
was the political conditions under which African states were created, especially 
their inherited colonial borders and adoption of external administrative sys-
tems, which resulted in young states that lacked “institutional thickness” (Amin 
and Thrift 1993). This situation made attempts at national political integration 
very diffi cult and costly. 
Finally, and perhaps most important, during the early 1980s African states 
faced a trifecta of globalization, the restrictive policies of structural adjustment, 
and the heavy burden of their demography (notably, their lowest ever activity 
ratios). At that time, most African states were only 20 years old. Their youth 
strongly restricted their institutional capacity to effectively deal with these 
issues—an important fact that is too often forgotten. They did not have the 
necessary room to maneuver to engage in strong modernization policies and 
to create and implement coherent development strategies, as was done in Asia 
and Latin America.
The Diffi culties of Replication. Past transitions occurred within the specifi cities 
of their own time, and late developers have to deal with the characteristics of a 
global open economy. This offers signifi cant new opportunities but eliminates 
others, exacerbating asymmetries.
Growing Gaps and Shorter Distances. Although each country may be at its own 
stage of economic and demographic transition, they look out on the same world. 
As a result of their specifi c development trajectories and diverse modalities and 
sequences of integration into the global economy, they have different compara-
tive advantages. However, comparative advantages are not necessarily determin-
istic. Late developers can benefi t from the technological progress and past expe-
riences of the fi rst developers to help build their own skill and asset bases. At the 
same time, they can seize new opportunities to access growing global markets.
However, these advantages to late-developing countries are constrained by 
the fact that they must also deal with huge and still growing asymmetries in 
productivity and competitiveness, not just in the international market but in 
their domestic markets as well. They must compete on a “stormy open fi eld” 
(Birdsall 2006), where their productivity is challenged by fi rms from abroad 
(particularly from the major emerging countries), while dealing at the same 
time with the instability of the world economic environment and the growing 
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consequences of global change. These are dramatic challenges for the structural 
transformation of the late developers. 
The overall productivity gap faced by SSA is about 1 to 5 compared with 
other developing countries and 1 to 100 compared with OECD countries.24 
Such a gap is a major and enduring obstacle to global competitiveness: Even 
if comparative advantages exist for specifi c factors (for example, the cost of 
labor), these are not enough. Competitiveness is not based on production costs 
alone but includes an economy’s responsiveness to the quality requirements of 
markets and the volume of product a country is capable of supplying. Thus, 
although quality requirements are a primary barrier to entry into the produc-
tion of sophisticated products, the volume of supply determines market share, 
which is the core indicator of competitiveness. 
This observation is valid for all sectors of activity, for manufacturing as well 
as agriculture, and for all countries. Thus, the current context of increasing food 
demand and high prices is equally favorable to producers around the world, but 
producers in late-developing countries will have a harder time taking advantage 
of the new opportunities. They will have to quickly upgrade the quality of their 
products and increase the supply. If they cannot do this, the new demand will 
be met by others, and their market shares will suffer.
These asymmetries of productivity and competitiveness in the context of an 
open economy affect the local dimension of structural transformation as well. 
Trade across any distance was greatly facilitated by the liberalization process and 
is quicker than ever as a result of modern telecommunications and transporta-
tion. A major consequence of this trend is that the strong local linkages among 
agriculture, industry, and urbanization—which powerfully contributed to the 
foundations of old economic transitions—are increasingly weakened by the 
propensity to rely on imports (UNRISD 2010). While imports are often more 
cost-effi cient and timely—a signifi cant advantage—they do not strengthen the 
local dimension of development.
The reliance on imports has resulted in changes in patterns of urbaniza-
tion in many developing countries, where cities (particularly large ones) often 
depend signifi cantly on imports rather than on their own resources or the 
resources of their surrounding regions. This situation has contributed to the 
dramatic expansion of the informal sector, which acts as a buffer in dealing 
with the differential between labor supply and labor demand. This process of 
“informalization” is exacerbated in Sub-Saharan Africa, where a long history 
of very slow economic growth did not affect the fast pace of urbanization (Fay 
and Opal 2000). Even without the promise of jobs, cities retained their allure: 
services, potential opportunities, way of life, and so on. 
Despite a signifi cant level of heterogeneity in the informal sector,25 it can be 
characterized as one of low productivity, marked by underemployment, a lack 
of job security, and low returns.26 These factors contribute to the development 
THE CHALLENGES OF STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION  67
of urban slums, which are proliferating around cities in the developing world 
(UN-Habitat 2003; Davis 2006). 
Restricted Room for Maneuver. In addition to competitiveness gaps and the 
changing geography of trade, late developers’ transition prospects are hindered 
by two constraints that were not present during previous transitions: limits on 
the range of available policy interventions and limits on the opportunities for 
international migration.
A number of the policy interventions that characterized the transitions of 
many Latin American and Asian countries are not available to late developers, 
owing to the current policy agenda. The existing global economic consensus 
is built on market liberalization and the suppression of policies deemed to be 
distortive. This perspective prohibits many interventions that in the past were 
used to promote modernization and increase productivity in both agriculture 
and manufacturing, notably in Asia (Chang 2002). For example, the policies 
under which the Republic of Korea and Taiwan modernized in the second half 
of the 20th century might not be possible under today’s WTO regime (Birdsall, 
Rodrik, and Subramanian 2005).
In the case of agriculture in Sub-Saharan Africa, Bezemer and Headey (2008) 
show how these external restrictions were endogenously exacerbated by a per-
sistent urban bias in African domestic policy agendas.27 This was manifested in 
the extensive taxation of agricultural exports and limited protection from food 
imports, which favored cheaper food access for urban dwellers. These policies 
contributed to the heavy burdens faced by African farmers.28
However, some of the policy restrictions related to the international consen-
sus are softening, for example, with so-called “smart subsidies.” But even with 
more room to maneuver, many governments do not have the fi nancial capacity 
to engage in this sort of support while continuing to procure public goods. Bud-
get constraints are severe in a global context marked by an unstable economic 
environment and volatile levels of international assistance. Additional means 
will have to be found through fi scal reform. 
The second constraint relates to international migrations, which are no lon-
ger a viable option for large numbers of people leaving agriculture and unable 
to fi nd other employment opportunities in their own countries. International 
migrations have been a growing issue in development studies, although primar-
ily with reference to the impact of remittances,29 which, in aggregate, account for 
more international capital fl ows than does offi cial overseas development assis-
tance. However, the relative ease with which migrants can remit their earnings 
masks the fact that migration itself is relatively restricted. Even though the total 
number of international migrants (people living outside their home country) is 
estimated at 200–210 million, one cannot imagine the repetition in the current 
geopolitical order of the mass migration from Europe beginning in the mid-19th 
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century. If international borders were opened, “people would certainly come” 
(Pritchett 2006). But migration is a touchy political issue and borders remain 
closed to people, although largely open to goods, capital, and many services.30
The most active and remunerative migration routes are concentrated in 
regions peripheral to the European Union and the United States,31 and future 
options for migration will likely depend on the demographic evolution of the 
high-income countries (plus China) and their demand for foreign labor. This 
demand will likely continue to be met by countries on their periphery, so most 
late developers will not be able to replicate the migration patterns of the rich 
world’s border countries. Countries such as Mexico and Morocco have approx-
imately 10 percent of their nationals living abroad, and the opportunity for 
migration at this scale plays a big role in their political economies: It provides 
large-scale cash transfers and serves as a relief valve for internal tensions asso-
ciated with structural transformation. To illustrate the impracticality of this 
model for Sub-Saharan Africa, if 10 percent of the region’s population were to 
migrate, it would mean an outfl ow of 85 million people, mainly to Europe. This 
is a politically unfathomable scenario.
Transition Options for Late Developers 
All these conditions limit the ability of the late-developing regions to replicate the 
historical transition process, and there is a growing debate in the development 
community and in academia about the best options for transition under these 
circumstances. Discussions refer particularly to SSA and frequently compare the 
subcontinent with Asia. One of the most critical questions is how to manage the 
labor supply that exits agriculture (Headey, Bezemer, and Hazell 2010).
The division of population between rural and urban areas will determine 
the extent of the geographical and sectoral challenges related to a fast-growing 
labor supply. Although its fi gures are debatable, the UN’s World Urbanization 
Prospects database offers useful estimates. 
Table 2.5 shows the urbanization ratio for the principal regions of the world 
over time and into the future. It illustrates the very rapid process of urban 
growth under way in SSA, even when compared to South Asia’s urban growth. 
However, the subcontinent should remain primarily rural until sometime 
around 2030. 
Another feature of SSA’s demography is that it is the only region in which 
rural populations will still be growing in absolute terms in 2050 (see table 2.6). 
While other regions should register a signifi cant decrease in their rural popula-
tions between 2010 and 2050 (–50 percent in East Asia, –10 percent in South 
Asia, –45 percent in Europe), SSA’s rural areas are expected to add 150 million 
people (nearly 30 percent). 
As mentioned earlier, 330 million of today’s children will enter SSA’s labor 
market over the next 15 years. On the basis of the forecast urbanization ratios 
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(fi gure 2.7), 195 million of them will be in rural areas (59 percent) and 137 mil-
lion in cities (41 percent). These workers will present the region with both an 
opportunity for growth and a serious challenge for employment.32 
What are the options for employment creation? More broadly, what policy 
priorities will facilitate sustainable growth and foster economic transition on 
the one hand and both benefi t from and support the demographic transition 
on the other? 
In this debate, views are often strongly divided between industrialists and 
agriculturists (urbanists and ruralists). For the former, manufacturing is the 
only real driver of African development and thus of the subcontinent’s struc-
tural transformation. The industrialists believe that agricultural productivity 
is too low, the challenges are too great, and the expected progress is too slow; 
thus, it is more realistic to develop manufacturing and services. The agricultur-
Table 2.5 Urbanization Ratio by World Regions, 1960–2050
percent
Region  1960 1990 2010 2025 2035 2050
Urban
population
multiplier
Eastern Asia 20.2 33.0 48.5 59.2 65.5 74.1 4.8
South-Central Asia 18.1 27.2 32.2 39.6 46.5 57.2 5.1
Sub-Saharan Africa 14.8 28.2 37.3 45.2 51.2 60.5 9.5
Latin America and the 
 Caribbean 48.9 70.6 79.4 83.5 85.7 88.7 4.4
Northern America 69.9 75.4 82.1 85.7 87.6 90.2 2.0
Europe 56.9 70.5 72.6 76.2 79.5 83.8 1.5
World 32.9 43.0 50.6 57.2 62.2 69.6 3.5
Source: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects, 2007 revision.
Table 2.6 Rural Population by World Regions, 1960–2050
millions
Region   1960  1990  2010  2050 2010–50 
Eastern Asia 622 31% 896  30% 805 24% 414 15% –391 –49%
South-Central Asia 513 25% 910  30% 1,207 35% 1,067 38% –140 –12%
Sub-Saharan Africa 195 10% 372  12% 541 16% 693 25% 151 28%
Latin America and the
 Caribbean 112 6% 130   4% 121 4% 82 3% –39 –32%
Northern America 61 3% 70   2% 63 2% 44 2% –19 –30%
Europe 261 13% 213   7% 201 6% 112 4% –89 –44%
Other regions 264 13% 425  14% 474 14% 369 13% –105 –22%
World 2,029 100% 3,016 100% 3,413 100% 2,782 100% –631 –18%
Sources: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects, 2007 revision, and World Population Prospects, 2008 
revision; authors’ calculations.
70  STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND RURAL CHANGE REVISITED
alists point out that poverty is above all a rural issue and that the rural poor are 
deeply engaged in agriculture. Thus, agriculture can be a major tool for poverty 
alleviation, especially in light of the rapidly rising demand for food. Addition-
ally, agricultural development creates opportunities for diversifi cation through 
the processing of products and an increase in rural demand driven by increased 
agricultural incomes. 
To help clarify this long-standing debate, it is useful to look more closely at 
the economies of cities and of rural areas, and review their respective capacities 
to absorb a growing labor force.
On the urban side, the decades of structural stagnation in SSA economies 
are a strong reminder of the failure of traditional models of transition in the 
region.33 As previously noted, rural depopulation and the exit of labor from 
agriculture mainly fed the informal urban sector. Manufacturing never really 
took off, and much of the industrialization that did occur later fell victim to its 
own failures or to the policies of the structural adjustment period.
Although manufacturing is a very narrow sector in SSA, many believe that 
current conditions present a new opportunity for industrialization. Among the 
main arguments put forward in support of this view are an improved busi-
ness climate in many countries, the progressive growth of Asian industrial costs 
Sources: United Nations, World Urbanization Prospects, 2007 revision, and World Population Prospects, 2008 
revision; authors’ calculations.
 Figure 2.7 Yearly Cohorts Entering Rural and Urban Labor Markets and Rural Population 
Share in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1955–2050
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related to increasing wages (notably in China), and new opportunities for task-
based production or light manufacturing (UNIDO 2008). The last argument 
refers to specialization in certain segments of a value chain, rather than engag-
ing in the manufacture of end products. This opportunity is a consequence 
of the development of outsourcing and intrafi rm trade that characterizes glo-
balization. It is appealing to late developers because it requires less capital and 
fewer skills, and is possible in a weaker economic and institutional environment. 
Some economists cite new possibilities for the development of a service 
industry. The multiple possibilities offered by outsourcing and options related 
to the development of information and communication technology (ICT) and 
cloud computing are frequently discussed, especially in the context of leapfrog-
ging the industrialization stage. Opportunities exist, but whether or not they are 
large enough to enable countries to bypass industrialization is debatable, partic-
ularly in an environment in which services are becoming increasingly tradable. 
Competition will be fully at play, and the challenges associated with winning 
an effective market share will be high (UNRISD 2010). Countries should not 
underestimate the requirements associated with such a strategy.
As noted earlier, industrialization did not occur over the past four decades in 
SSA, despite a huge process of urbanization that offers all the economic advan-
tages of density vaunted by the WDR09 on economic geography. But upgrading 
from the current environment to a buoyant manufacturing sector will require 
more than just the exploitation of a country’s comparative advantage (for exam-
ple, labor costs); it will take heavy investment. The government should play a 
large role, procuring infrastructure and offering incentives to encourage private 
investment, although the specifi c types of incentives it should offer are highly 
debated (Lin and Chang 2009). However, given the challenges SSA will face over 
the short and medium term (the 15-year period to which this chapter frequently 
refers), it is diffi cult to imagine the creation of hundreds of thousands jobs a year 
in manufacturing. Thus, fi rst priority should be upgrading the existing produc-
tive base, which means providing adequate incentives and supporting the most 
promising parts of the informal sector—those with potential for modernization. 
On the rural side, echoing the title of Christiaensen and Demery’s 2007 
book, there is a need to get “down to earth” or, more precisely, down to basic 
arithmetic (Headey, Bezemer, and Hazell 2010). The “big fi gures” presented in 
this book are unambiguous: Approximately 65 percent of SSA’s population still 
lives in rural areas, 65 percent of the labor force is engaged in agriculture, and 
60 percent of the new workers entering the labor market between now and 
2025 will be rural. Thus, rural issues must be addressed to deal with poverty 
and also manage the economic and demographic transitions. Rural activities 
will account for the “major part of the equation of youth employment” (World 
Bank 2009c), and failure in rural development will accelerate depopulation of 
the countryside and create an additional burden for cities.
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“Rural activities” refers to both agriculture and the rural nonfarm economy 
(RNFE), which are strongly interrelated. As described by an abundant literature, 
increasing farm income drives rural demand, which in turn fosters the develop-
ment of new activities, rural transformation, and economic change. 
Because of the growing demand for food that has resulted from booming 
populations and increasing urbanization, agricultural growth will be steady for 
decades to come. For the late developers, the critical question is which growth 
model will be encouraged. This choice will condition the labor absorption 
capacity of agriculture, as well as the overall sustainability of its development. 
Favoring family farms and labor-intensive practices will not have the same con-
sequences on labor absorption as favoring large-scale managerial enterprises 
and capital-intensive production techniques. Similarly, promoting the multi-
functionality of agriculture with a specifi c focus on resource management will 
have a different effect on absorption and sustainability than promoting a strong 
intensifi cation based on industrial inputs.
Limited natural resource endowments could pose a major obstacle to sus-
tainable labor absorption in agriculture and to agricultural development in 
general (Alexandratos 2005). This is particularly the case for the stock of arable 
land, which is frequently unknown because of the lack of reliable information 
systems. And land availability is a relative concept. Its potential for output and 
employment depends on the way people use it—their level of technology, the 
infrastructure resources available, and the extent to which public goods are pro-
vided (water access and irrigation, roads, eradication of endemic diseases, and 
so on). Each situation has its own constraints and opportunities, which directly 
affect the options for development. 
This discussion has stressed the need to understand the characteristics of 
rural situations as a prerequisite for assessing the constraints and room to 
maneuver, and for identifying the options for fostering rural transformation. 
But although a better appreciation of factor resources and their availability is 
indispensable, it is not enough. The realities and the economic environment 
under which rural households sustain their livelihoods and develop their activi-
ties must be understood. This includes the nature and extent of each activity 
and source of income, and how these might be modifi ed by ongoing dynamics 
related to globalization. The following chapters explore this reality through the 
results of the fi eldwork implemented by the RuralStruc program. 
Notes
 1. This work was undertaken during the fi rst phase of the program. It relied on inter-
national sources to facilitate the overall positioning of the program and the back-
ground of the country studies developed by the national teams.
 2. The situation of China is worth noting: Although the country has experienced rapid 
growth, a strong increase of GDP per capita, and a dramatic decrease in the eco-
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nomic weight of agriculture, the structural gap is still widening. This very specifi c 
situation is the result of booming cities, mainly along the coast, and lagging rural 
areas, where a signifi cant share of the population still lives (760 million people, or 
56 percent, in 2008). This population remains principally engaged in agricultural 
activities (according to FAO—which possibly overstates the weight of agriculture—
the AgEAP is around 500 million people), and the gap between urban and rural 
incomes is a source of increasing social and political tension.
 3. Nicaragua is not included in fi gure 2.3 because its time series is too short.
 4. The weight of agriculture is very signifi cant in foreign trade. It is the primary foreign 
exchange earner for nonmining and non-oil-producing countries.
 5. The other main sectors are extractive industries and construction, which were 
dropped from the primary and secondary sectors, respectively, to highlight the spe-
cifi c trends of agriculture and manufacturing.
 6. These titles are, respectively, those of McKinsey (2010), Radelet (2010), and 
Sala-i-Martin and Pinkovskiy (2010). McKinsey’s African lions seem to have been 
shrewdly named to complete the “zoo of emergence” (Gabas and Losch 2008) that 
includes the Asian dragons and tigers, and the Latin American jaguars. Note that the 
“lions” counted by McKinsey include the entire African continent, the GDP of which 
is shared among North Africa (41 percent), South Africa (21 percent), and the rest 
of SSA (38 percent) based on Africa’s GDP breakdown for 2008 in constant 2000 
US$ (World Development Indicators).
 7. GDP per capita grew about 3.5 percent a year between 2004 and 2008, and bounced 
back to 2.3 percent in 2010 after the 2009 drop.
 8. Using the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, Arrighi and Zhang (forth-
coming) compare SSA’s GNP per capita (including South Africa) to the GNP of what 
they call the First World (North America, Southern and Western Europe including 
Scandinavia, Israel, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan). They show that the share of 
SSA (as a percentage of the First World’s GNP per capita) dropped from 5.6 percent 
in 1960 to 2.3 percent in 2005 (table 1, 43).
 9. In the fi rst stage of the transition, the drop in the mortality rate before any compa-
rable decline in the birth rate leads to high population growth, which then progres-
sively diminishes as birth rates slow down. Today, progress in health care and welfare 
exacerbates the scale of the process and shortens its cycle.
10.  The United Nations World Population Prospects are a major reference. The projec-
tions are based on a set of assumptions—notably the fertility rate—that is revised 
every two years. The “medium variant” results of the 2008 revision have been 
selected. 
11.  According to many specialists, the UN projections are underestimated (Guengant 
and May 2009). They are based on a convergence paradigm with a fertility rate target 
for 2050 that is contradicted by many national censuses. As an example, the 2009 
Malian population census (INSTAT 2009) reports a 3.6 percent yearly increase in 
the Malian population between 1998 and 2009, a far higher rate than the 2.4 percent 
cited in the World Population Prospects.
12.  Beyond this overall picture of a booming Sub-Saharan African population are sig-
nifi cant differences among countries. The growth rate of many countries, mostly in 
Southern Africa, has been affected by the HIV pandemic, and total fertility (num-
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ber of children per woman) is unevenly declining. Most of the Sahelian and Cen-
tral African countries, as well as the African Horn, still report very high fertility 
(six to seven children per woman), while some countries (for example, Senegal, 
Nigeria, and Kenya) have begun a gradual and halting slowdown (four to fi ve chil-
dren per woman). These two groups encompass 85 percent of SSA’s population. 
The countries that are clearly engaged in their transitions (three to four children 
per woman) are Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, and Southern Africa (with the exception of 
Mozambique). South Africa is far ahead in the process (2.5 children per woman). See 
United Nations, World Fertility data 2008, Guengant (2007) and Gendreau (2010).
13.  The ratio commonly used is the dependency ratio, which relates the economically 
active population (EAP, ages 15 to 64) to the economically inactive population (non-
EAP, under 15 and over 64). The ratio is calculated by dividing the total number 
of non-EAP by EAP. However, the program decided to use the activity ratio (EAP/
non-EAP), which is more illustrative. Note that these EAP ratios overestimate the 
active population: The “working age” group includes many inactive and unemployed 
persons. Thus, real dependency or activity ratios, including the employment rate, 
should be used. In many developing countries, and notably in SSA, this approach is 
complicated by the size of the informal sector and poor information on the labor 
market. For more on this topic, see, among others, Oudin (2003).
14.  The ratio was less than 1 in some countries. The real activity ratio, including the 
effective employment rate, would be worse.
15.  The activity structure’s gap between SSA and East Asia is higher today: 1.2 versus 2.5 
(see the dots in fi gure 2.5).
16.  Cohorts are commonly calculated by taking 1/10 of the 15–24 age group, creating an 
estimate of the new entrants in the labor market; that is, youth looking for a job or 
an activity that provides an income. This is different from the increase in the labor 
force, which can be estimated by using the net increase (n+1–n) of the EAP (15–64 
age group). The second calculation gives a lower yearly cohort than the fi rst: 12 
million in 2010 for SSA compared with 17 million. In addition to the imprecision 
of the EAP, it can also be misleading because the labor markets in most developing 
countries include many people who continue to work after 65, notably in the agri-
cultural and urban informal sectors, and also retirees from the formal sector who try 
to augment their pension incomes. Thus, the yearly cohort of labor market entrants 
gives a clearer estimate in terms of new labor supply. 
17.  The fi gures for South and Central Asia are as follows: a yearly cohort of 35 million 
people in 2010, 37 million in 2025, and an accrued amount of 575 million new labor 
market entrants over the 15-year period.
18.  Timmer and Akkus (2008) have tested the evolution of the structural pattern in 86 
countries. The results confi rm the robustness of this historical process. The authors 
included the seven RuralStruc program countries in their sample; they do not 
diverge much from the general pattern.
19.  Rist (1996) refers to development as a “European belief” grounded in a unilateral 
vision of history, or what Goody (2006) calls the “theft of history.” The term “new 
worlds” refl ects the same European perspective, which gave little credence at that 
time to indigenous peoples.
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20.  The conditions that led to European hegemony cannot be developed here, but the 
“discovery” and domination of the Americas appear to have been critical (Grataloup 
2007). Pomeranz (2000) notes that hegemony was also related to the fortunate loca-
tion of coal in Western Europe, which profoundly changed the continent’s relation-
ship to natural resources compared with that of China.
21.  Bairoch (1997) notes that in 1750 India and China accounted for slightly over half 
of world manufacturing production.
22.  The estimates vary, depending on whether migrants who returned to their home 
countries are counted. European migrations to the Americas were primarily to the 
United States, which took in up to 1.3 million immigrants a year at the turn of the 
20th century (Daniels 2003), for a total of about 35 million migrants. Canada and 
the southern part of South America (Argentina, Southern Brazil, Chile) were other 
important destinations.
23.  See the huge work produced by the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin 
America (CEPAL).
24.  Overall productivity is calculated by applying value added to the total working pop-
ulation. The average constant values per worker—based on 2000 to 2005 series—are 
around $500 for SSA, $2,500 for the other developing countries, and $50,000 for 
OECD countries (UNCTAD 2006).
25.  Ranis and Stewart (1999) distinguish between two informal subsectors: a traditional 
subsector of the so-called “sponge type,” stemming from the surplus of agricultural 
labor, with incomes sometimes lower than rural incomes; and an informal subsector, 
now undergoing modernization, that revolves around the formal urban sector. 
26.  These underemployment traps were detected by Todaro (1971) 40 years ago.
27.  There has been an extensive literature on this urban bias and its effect on devel-
opment since Lipton’s initial work (1977) and Bates’s contribution (1981), which 
overlooks some factors related to the idiosyncrasies of every country. The primary 
explanations for the bias are the legacy of colonialism and an adverse political con-
text, in which the rural African populations had diffi culties expressing their voice, 
while urban constituencies were more directly able to put pressure on governments. 
Among the cited obstacles to voice were authoritarian political regimes, low threat 
of rural-based communist insurgency (compared to Asia), low population density, 
and communication barriers.
28.  Anderson and Masters (2009) show a 40-year trend of “disprotection” while other 
developing countries were protecting their agriculture, notably OECD countries.
29.  See, among others, Maimbo and Ratha (2005) and Lucas (2005, 2008).
30.  Discussions on the liberalization of migration often refer only to the liberalization of 
trade in labor. The main reference here is mode 4 of WTO’s General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS) on “movement of natural persons” (individuals traveling 
from their own country to supply services in another, that is, migrant workers). On 
this trade perspective, see Winters et al. (2003).
31.  Migrations between developing countries must not be underestimated. Half of 
developing country migrants reside in other developing countries. However, as 
 demonstrated by Ratha and Shaw (2007) who explore these “South-South migra-
tions,” 80 percent of these migrations take place between countries with contigu-
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ous borders and with relatively small differences in income. Consequently, they 
accounted for only 10 percent to 30 percent of developing countries’ remittance 
earnings in 2005. These major differences in returns between destination countries 
are fully confi rmed by the RuralStruc surveys (see chapter 4).
32.  In comparison, the labor force surge in South-Central Asia (the other booming 
region) will result in 575 million new workers over the same period, 64 percent (370 
million) in rural areas and 36 percent (205 million) in cities. 
33.  The dualistic model proposed by Lewis (1954), suggesting labor transfers from a 
traditional agriculture-based sector (with low productivity and a surplus of labor) 
toward a modern urban industrializing sector, was a major contribution to devel-
opment economics. See a recent application of Lewis’s perspective on the role of 
agriculture in transition in Berthelier and Lipchitz (2005).
Chapter 3
When the RuralStruc country teams began implementing the surveys it was 
expected that each region would present different trends in terms of integra-
tion into markets, regional dynamism, and economic returns (translated into 
income levels). After all, the surveyed regions include representatives from 
countries in each of the WDR08’s three worlds of agriculture. More specifi -
cally, the expectation was to fi nd very different situations among regions with 
different a priori classifi cations—winning, losing, and intermediate—that cor-
responded to different opportunities for pathways out of rural poverty and dif-
ferent situations in the process of structural transformation. 
The results, however, were surprisingly nuanced. Differences among regions 
are important, and the largest gap is between the surveyed regions in Sub-
Saharan Africa and those elsewhere, refl ecting very different levels of wealth 
and development outside of the sub-continent. But despite this diversity, two 
similarities stood out: the consistent importance of agriculture in the activities 
of rural dwellers and the staggering magnitude of poverty, almost across the 
board, in both absolute and relative terms.
This chapter provides an overall picture of rural realities in the surveyed 
regions. It focuses on agriculture’s role in activities and incomes, proposes a 
comparison of estimated rural incomes to international and domestic poverty 
lines, and notes their distribution. It goes on to fi ne-tune the income estimates 
and address the situation of the lowest income households by assessing their 
food vulnerability. Finally, it relies on the WDR08 typology to identify the main 
categories of households on the basis of their income structure, which can indi-
cate trends in rural diversifi cation and possible pathways out of rural poverty.
The Central Role of Agriculture across 
Different Regional Settings
The regions surveyed by RuralStruc are primarily agricultural regions, with-
out any major extractive industries.1 They are primarily engaged in an annual 
Rural Realities: Agriculture 
and Poverty
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crop-type agriculture centered on the production of staples, mainly cereals. The 
 specifi c crop is often maize in Mexico, Nicaragua (together with beans), and 
Kenya; rice in Madagascar; rice, millet, and sorghum in Senegal and Mali; and 
durum and wheat in Morocco. Traditional commodities produced for export or 
local agro-industries are present in every region, as well as fruits and vegetables 
and livestock with, in some cases, dairy production (see chapter 5).
Consequently, it was not a surprise to fi nd a deep involvement of the surveyed 
households in agriculture in the broad sense; that is, crops, livestock, hunting, fi sh-
ing, and gathering of natural resources, as well as processing of related products. 
What was surprising was the observed share of “farm households”—rural house-
holds engaged in on-farm activities.2 The RuralStruc teams expected to fi nd more 
rural dwellers fully participating in other activities, but in most regions, 95 percent 
to (more often) 100 percent of surveyed households were farm households (fi gure 
3.1). Excluding the landless families of Alaotra in Madagascar (one of the main rice 
baskets of the country, where some households rely on agricultural waged labor), 
the two major exceptions are the Souss region in Morocco and the Tequisquiapan 
region in Mexico, both characterized by strong ties to cities and a more diversifi ed 
local economy, which is consistent with the development of the country.
In Souss, 25 percent of the households are fully engaged in off-farm activi-
ties. This diversifi cation results from the proximity of several surveyed zones 
to Agadir (a city of nearly 800,000 people and Morocco’s fi fth largest) and its 
tourism industry, and above all from the development of agricultural waged 
labor in the coastal plain’s commercial fruit and vegetable sector. Although 
the Sotavento region in Mexico also shows a slightly higher share of nonfarm 
households than in the other surveyed regions (15 percent), Tequisquiapan 
is the most dramatic outlier. There, only 28 percent of households are farm 
households. The surveyed region of Tequisquiapan corresponds to six localities 
selected in a valley north of the city of San Juan del Rio (around 210,000 inhab-
itants), 150 km southeast of the city of Querétaro (whose metro area is home 
to around a million inhabitants). With a strong urban network, the region has 
been a fast-growing zone over the past two decades.3 It has seen the develop-
ment of both agribusinesses (vegetables and poultry exported to the United 
States) and manufacturing (maquiladoras, as well as high-tech industries such 
as aeronautics), which has led to the emergence of a strong labor market and the 
exit of many rural dwellers from agriculture (Rello and Morales 2002).
The examples of Souss and Tequisquiapan highlight the importance of regional 
contexts and show how they affect rural households’ activities. Population den-
sities and urbanization rates (which refl ect different stages in the processes of 
demographic and economic transition), characteristics of the urban network (its 
concentration and its hierarchy), and the development of transport infrastructure 
(which determines the fl uidity of fl ows of people and goods) all shape regional 
landscapes. These features contribute to the observed heterogeneity among rural 
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Figure 3.1 Share of Surveyed Rural Households with Farms
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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economies in particular and within and between countries in general—the core 
theme of the WDR09 on economic geography (see box 3.1). 
Access to markets and public goods (often provided in urban areas) and ease 
of networking owing to the quality of communication infrastructure strongly 
affect the scope of diversifi cation of rural households. Maps in fi gure 3.3 show the 
travel time in hours to the nearest city of 50,000 inhabitants. They refl ect both the 
urban structure of the country and the effi ciency of its transportation network, 
and illustrate a remarkable heterogeneity among the RuralStruc SSA countries.4 
Nevertheless, and despite clear differences among regional contexts, the aver-
age regional share of household income earned from on-farm activities is high 
in the RuralStruc sample and confi rms the strong role of agriculture in the 
surveyed regions.5 In 22 of 30 regions, on-farm income makes up more than 50 
percent of overall income; in 11 regions, the share is 70 percent or more (fi gure 
3.2). The signifi cant role of agriculture is illustrated by another interesting pat-
tern that will be discussed later: The share of household income from on-farm 
 BOX 3 . 1
Density, Distance, and Division: The Three Major Geographic 
Features of Economic Development according to the WDR09
The World Development Report 2009, titled Reshaping Economic Geography (World 
Bank 2008a), distinguishes three geographic dimensions of economic development 
that shape market forces: (1) density (economic output per km2); (2) distance (between 
lagging and leading regions where activity is concentrated); and (3) division (thickness 
of barriers related to borders, currencies, regulations, ethnicity, and so on).
The three Ds—density, distance, and division—correspond to three scales: local, 
national, and international. They create disparities in welfare both regionally and 
among countries that can destabilize parts of a country, entire nations, and even some 
world regions (p. 22). Governments have many instruments to reduce these dispari-
ties. The WDR09 distinguishes three types of instruments: (1) institutions (land, labor, 
and trade regulations), which are “spatially blind”; (2) infrastructure (which facilitates 
movement of goods, people, services and ideas), which is “spatially connective”; and 
(3) interventions (for example, fi scal incentives and preferential trade access), which are 
“spatially targeted.” 
The WDR09 proposes a rule of thumb for economic integration: “An I for a D.” For 
a one-dimensional problem (density, distance, or division), spatially blind institutions; 
for a two-D challenge, institutions and infrastructure; and for a three-D predicament, 
all three instruments.
Although the report offers tools for analyzing existing asymmetries, its standard-
ized and evolutionist approach (see chapter 2) has led to criticism of its unilinear vision 
of rural-urban transition and its blind spots, such as the role of fi nancial markets in 
redrawing the map of the world (see, for instance, Hart 2010).
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 Figure 3.2 Average Share of On-Farm and Off-Farm Income per Region
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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 BOX 3 .2
Urbanization, Transportation Networks, and Rural Livelihoods
The Sub-Saharan African countries are broadly part of the WDR08’s agriculture-based 
world (although Senegal, one of the very few exceptions, is classifi ed as a transform-
ing country). However, the RuralStruc SSA countries refl ect very different economic 
dynamics. Levels of population and population densities, rates of urbanization and 
types of urban networks, and the quality and density of communication infrastructure 
all affect the strength of market connections and, consequently, shape rural household 
activities. 
Maps in fi gure 3.3 show the size of remote areas and the regional imbalances in 
terms of market access. They also show how different countries are at different stages 
of urbanization and have divergent population patterns. Mali and Madagascar illus-
trate highly polarized situations in which the transportation network shapes the overall 
pattern, while Kenya and Senegal illustrate dramatic processes of densifi cation. 
In Kenya, where urbanization is booming (the share of urban population jumped 
from 32 percent to 45 percent over the past 10 years), rural people living in the central 
highlands, the central part of the Rift Valley, and the western regions can access cities 
of at least 50,000 inhabitants in less than two hours. Nakuru North, one of the sur-
veyed regions, is very close to the city of Nakuru, which is the fourth largest city in the 
country (estimated 2010 population, 544,000) after Nairobi, Mombasa, and Kisumu. 
However, over the past 20 years, the western part of the country has witnessed a 
spectacular process of progressive densifi cation of its rural areas and the emergence of 
two conurbations. One, the western conurbation north of Lake Victoria’s Kendu Bay, 
is home to around 3.9 million people and includes a network of 13 cities, the larg-
est being Kisumu and Bungoma. The other is the Nyanza-Kisii conurbation south of 
Kendu Bay, home to 2.1 million people and four main cities (Harre, Moriconi-Ebrard, 
and Gazel 2010). The Bungoma survey zone is part of the rural area of the western 
conurbation, while the Nyando zone is between the two conurbations (east of Kendu 
Bay) and enjoys similarly high population densities. 
In Senegal, the historical trend of populating the western part of the country has 
accelerated since the mid-20th century with the development of the bassin arachidier 
and its main cities (Thiès, Kaolack, Diourbel), which fl ourished with the groundnut 
industry. However, the past three decades have seen a progressive shift toward the 
coastal area. A majority of the Senegalese population is located within 100 km of the 
Atlantic coast and in less than two hours can reach Dakar, Mbour, Thiès, or St Louis. 
The contrast in densities with neighboring Mali is remarkable. 
However, these maps say nothing about the asymmetric distribution of a country’s 
urban population among its cities. When using the primacy index (population of the 
largest city/population of the second city), Senegal and Mali reveal the extreme weight 
of their capital cities. Although West African urbanization is becoming more dense in 
general, the persisting situation in these two countries weakens their urban structures. 
See the Africapolis study (Denis and Moriconi-Ebrard 2009) and the earlier West Africa 
Long-Term Perspective Study (Club du Sahel-OECD 1998). 
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sources grows with regional wealth in fi ve of the seven surveyed countries: the 
two exceptions are Kenya and Mexico.6
Surveyed regions in Mali, Madagascar, Morocco, and Nicaragua are most 
heavily involved in farm activities; unsurprisingly, Mexico shows a very dif-
ferent profi le (though the Tierras Bajas zone does illustrate some agricultural 
specialization). Senegal and Kenya reveal different patterns: With the exception 
of Casamance, where many regional characteristics are similar to those in Mali, 
all Senegalese and Kenyan surveyed regions display a high level of off-farm 
income—around 60 percent. Strong connections to cities owing to higher den-
sities and better infrastructure networks (box 3.2) are part of the explanation. 
However, the amount of off-farm activity does not necessarily imply a discon-
nection from agriculture; many of these activities are related to agriculture, 
notably trade of agricultural products and waged labor in agro-industries.
Widespread Rural Poverty
If agriculture’s role remains so important in the surveyed regions, what are their 
characteristics in terms of income level and income distribution? In response 
to this question, the following section uses household results aggregated at the 
regional level to provide a general positioning of the sample with reference to 
existing baselines and discusses income differences within and among coun-
tries.7 Because of the methodology adopted, the comparison is indicative only.
Average Incomes and Poverty Levels
The survey results show a wide range of situations in terms of income levels 
and income distribution which help to further characterize the regions, their 
similarities and differences.
Box Table 3.2.1 Level of Urban Concentration in the RuralStruc Countries
Country Largest city Second city
Primacy
indices
Reference
year
Kenyaa Nairobi Mombassa  4.2 2010e
Madagascarb Antananarivo Toamasina  7.8 2005
Malia Bamako Sikasso 11.3 2010e
Senegala Dakar Thiès 10.5 2010e
Moroccoa Casablanca Rabat  1.9 2010e
Nicaraguab Managua León  6.5 2005
Mexicob Mexico Guadalajara  4.9 2003
Sources: a e-Geopolis/Menapolis & Africapolis, b UnStats.
Note: e = estimates.
84  STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND RURAL CHANGE REVISITED
Figure 3.3 Travel Time to the Nearest City of 50,000 in the Four SSA Countries
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Overall Presentation. A striking observation is the very low level of income in 
the surveyed regions, even making a distinction between SSA regions, where 
poverty is overwhelming, and non-SSA regions (see table 3.1 and fi gure 3.4).8 
Not surprisingly, owing to the strong and well-known rural-urban divide in 
terms of welfare, the average income in these rural areas is below the national 
GDP per capita: Only the surveyed zones of Alaotra 2 (Madagascar) and El Cuá 
(Nicaragua) exceed this threshold.
The largest gap between observed household incomes and published 
national GDP per capita is recorded in Mexico, where average incomes in sur-
veyed regions are four to seven times below the national average ($12,780 PPP). 
The situation in Mexico is worth exploring, because the country is by far the 
most engaged in its structural transformation and can therefore inform discus-
sion about the major characteristics of the process of change. The observed gap 
confi rms the high level of income inequality in the country and the uneven 
spatial distribution of poverty, which is highly concentrated in rural areas, as 
confi rmed by the national Gini indexes (RS 1 Mexico).9 The gap refl ects the 
diffi culty of bringing about convergence between rural and urban incomes, one 
of the most sensitive structural problems during the transformation process, 
and one that is a particular challenge in fast-transitioning countries such as 
China (see the structural gap discussion in chapter 2). This gap further reveals 
a rural pattern that is exacerbated by the survey methodology, but which also 
has a more generic dimension. Because it focused on localities defi ned as rural 
according to the selected defi nition (below 5,000 inhabitants), the survey 
excluded many better-off households (including some farm households) who 
migrated to large rural boroughs or small towns, where they access better ser-
vices (RS 2 Mexico, 28). As discussed in chapters 4 and 6, this complicates the 
task of capturing an evolving rural reality in which the “rural” is progressively 
dissolved within the “urban” through rural depopulation and urbanization.
When considering poverty rates as defi ned by “absolute” and “relative pov-
erty” lines of $1 and $2 PPP per day, the difference between SSA and non-SSA 
countries is staggering.10 In SSA, nearly all the surveyed regions are near the 
$1 line, with the poorest region of Mali well below the line. Only the richest 
regions of Senegal, Madagascar, and Kenya are above $2 a day. While Nyando 
and Bungoma in Kenya are as poor as the other SSA regions, Nakuru North is a 
notable exception—it has an estimated average income comparable to those in 
the other non-SSA countries (fi gure 3.4).
The gap in average income per capita between the poorest and richest zones, 
highlighted when the focus is on income differences among regions, is an indica-
tor of regional differentiation. The smallest gap is found in Morocco, with a ratio 
of only 1.8, and the highest is in Madagascar and Kenya (3.5).11 Income distribu-
tions show strong inequalities—a common feature of most agrarian systems—
evidenced by the very high incomes of the richest 5 percent of households; this 
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Table 3.1 Overall Annual Income in the Surveyed Regions
    Global annual income per capita in $PPP
GINICountry Region 
Ex ante
classifi cation #HH Mean Median Min Max Perc 05 Perc 95
Mali Tominian losing 155 196 155 29 2,229 50 405 0.37
Diéma intermediary 148 303 205 33 5,568 60 727 0.47
Koutiala winning 153 301 265 13 995 82 613 0.30
Macina winning 154 422 350 31 1,595 64 942 0.37
Senegal Casamance losing 239 360 263 1 3,059 33 1,022 0.47
Mekhé 1 intermediary 111 436 323 23 2,442 55 1,166 0.44
Nioro intermediary 252 376 305 16 2,828 78 988 0.41
Haut Delta winning 61 443 268 26 2,238 78 1,106 0.47
Mekhé 2 intermediary 113 641 511 38 2,996 125 1,578 0.39
Bas Delta winning 121 1,014 757 64 6,696 182 2,675 0.56
Madagascar Antsirabe 2 winning 303 340 247 56 2,640 102 822 0.40
Alaotra 1 intermediary 385 429 315 41 2,679 133 1,078 0.38
Morondava losing 506 493 384 39 2,440 132 1,255 0.38
Itasy intermediary 503 520 404 95 3,678 176 1,221 0.36
Antsirabe 1 winning 206 626 440 65 6,272 130 1,456 0.43
Alaotra 2 intermediary 115 1,181 788 125 7,521 180 3,309 0.53
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Kenya Bungoma intermediary 299 527 341 5 4,484 30 1,629 0.48
Nyando losing 285 568 259 6 11,224 29 1,924 0.56
Nakuru N. winning 289 1,973 1,077 14 22,222 197 6,375 0.51
Morocco Chaouia losing 228 1,960 882 11 25,833 77 9,832 0.63
Saïss intermediary 261 2,941 1,242 9 73,849 81 10,144 0.67
Souss winning 240 3,583 1,493 20 54,054 106 12,497 0.66
Nicaragua Muy Muy intermediary 299 1,140 543 24 38,466 64 3,783 0.63
Terrabona losing 281 1,136 560 4 20,616 71 3,663 0.60
La Libertad losing 288 2,038 895 12 106,712 75 3,179 0.60
El Viejo winning 290 1,908 1,006 7 50,864 132 5,919 0.68
El Cuà winning 300 2,835 1,166 27 32,946 179 11,246 0.65
Mexico Sierra SM. intermediary 175 1,571 1,162 264 15,922 391 4,049 0.41
Tierras B. intermediary 145 2,728 2,024 216 16,907 548 8,225 0.41
Tequis. winning 364 2,486 1,888 50 21,808 470 6,575 0.39
  Total    7,269        
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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Fi gure 3.4 Average Annual Income per Capita in the Surveyed Regions
$PPP
Sources: RuralStruc surveys for household incomes; WDI database for GDP data.
Note: Mexico’s GDP per capita is $12,780.
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is a reminder of the shortcomings of average values.12 When median income per 
capita is used, the patterns within and among the surveyed regions are modifi ed. 
Although the ordinal ranking of regions from poorest to richest is unchanged, the 
profi les are more compact, particularly in Morocco and Nicaragua (fi gure 3.5). 
In spite of the limitations of the survey sample, the differences in income 
levels and income distributions among rural areas in the seven countries say 
something about structural transformation: In Sub-Saharan Africa, at the ini-
tial stages of economic transition, the overwhelming rural majority is poor and 
inequality is limited (with Gini indexes between 0.35 and 0.45). In Morocco and 
Nicaragua, which are moving quickly in the transition, average rural incomes 
are notably higher but with a strong inequality (Ginis between 0.6 and 0.7). This 
translates into wide differences between average and median incomes. Two of 
the regions in Mexico, which is the furthest advanced of the sample countries in 
the process of structural transformation, has the highest median rural incomes 
for two of the surveyed zones and lower Ginis (0.4).13 In Mexico, the inequality 
question has changed and is now a rural versus urban issue. The marginaliza-
tion of the countryside—el campo—has become a critical political concern.14
In Sub-Saharan Africa there is an apparent disconnect between household 
income (fi gure 3.2) and distance to market (fi gure 3.3). Income results do not 
seem to refl ect proximity to markets, but they do seem to be correlated with a 
region’s share of on-farm income as shown in fi gure 3.2. On the one hand, Mali 
and Madagascar are characterized by strong regional heterogeneity of access to 
markets and by the importance of their on-farm income shares. On the other 
hand, Senegal and Kenya have easier market access and more involvement in 
off-farm activities (which can account for up to 40 percent of earnings). Yet, 
rural areas are equally poor in all four countries. The three (relative) exceptions 
to this poverty among the 19 surveyed regions are Nakuru North in Kenya, Bas 
Delta in Senegal, and one Alaotra subregion in Madagascar. Nakuru and Bas 
Delta do not have better access to cities than the other surveyed regions (Bun-
goma and Nyando and the bassin arachidier, respectively). This observation is 
a reminder of an obvious fact: Time to urban markets is not the silver bullet, 
and the characteristics of urbanization (economic diversifi cation, public goods, 
services, and levels of urban income) count.
Characterization and Classifi cation of the Surveyed Regions. What do these 
results mean with regard to the ex ante classifi cation of winning, losing, and 
intermediary regions used by the national teams to select the regional country 
cases? If one takes average household income aggregated at the regional level 
as a good proxy for regional characteristics in terms of rural wealth and rural 
dynamism, the survey results closely align with the ex ante estimate (see table 
3.1). There are, however, some slight differences in ranking (reduced if medians 
are used) and a few challenging results, which will be discussed below.15 
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Fi gure 3.5 Median Annual Income per Capita in the Surveyed Regions
$PPP
Sources: RuralStruc surveys for household incomes; WDI database for GDP data.
Note: Mexico’s GDP per capita is $12,780.
0
2,000
2,500
3,000
3,500
500
1,000
1,500
4,000 $12,780
$
P
P
P
/
c
a
p
i
t
a
GDP per capita $1 $2
To
mi
nia
n
Dié
ma
Ko
uti
ala
Ma
cin
a
Ca
sam
an
ce
Me
kh
é 1
Ni
oro
Ha
ut 
De
lta
Me
kh
é 2
Ba
s D
elt
a
An
tsi
rab
e 2
Ala
otr
a 1
Mo
ron
da
va
Ita
sy
An
tsi
rab
e 1
Ala
otr
a 2
Bu
ng
om
a
Ny
an
do
Na
ku
ru 
N.
Ch
ao
uia Sa
iss
So
us
s
Mu
y M
uy
Te
rra
bo
na
El 
Vie
jo
La
 Li
be
rta
d
El 
Cu
á
Sie
rra
 SM
.
 T.
 Ba
jas
Te
qu
is.
Mali Senegal Madagascar Kenya Morocco Nicaragua Mexico
RURAL REALITIES: AGRICULTURE AND POVERTY  91
In Mali, Koutiala, at the center of the cotton zone, was chosen as a win-
ning region. It was supposed to illustrate the success of the “white revolution” 
of cotton in the savannah region. The disappointing income results reveal a 
crisis in the sector that affects all aspects of regional dynamism. The long-
standing unfavorable international cotton price and uncertainties stemming 
from delayed reforms have resulted in a progressive reduction in cultivated 
area and led to a decrease in farm incomes. Additionally, large family sizes and 
migrations into the cotton zone from other parts of Mali (initially motivated 
by the high returns on cotton) explain the growing stress on resources and 
falling economic returns. The situation of Koutiala illustrates the famous par-
adox of Sikasso (named after the other major cotton-growing area in Mali), 
which expresses the contradiction between the success story of the cotton 
sector and the relatively low level of income per person in the cotton region 
(see box 3.3).
BOX  3 .3
The Paradox of Sikasso . . . and Koutiala
In Mali, cotton is a strategic sector and is often considered to be the driver of develop-
ment of the south of the country. The cotton sector directly involves 275,000 produc-
ers and nearly 3 million people. Called the “white gold of Mali,” cotton fi ber has been 
the country’s primary export for several decades. The market has grown continuously 
since the 1960s, especially after the devaluation of the CFA franc in 1994. The few 
interruptions in this growth were related to crises in value-chain management; the 
most dramatic was the “cotton hold-up” of 2001, when cotton production shrank 
by half as a consequence of a sowing strike by farmers who were dissatisfi ed with the 
new prices. A public monopsony, the CMDT (Compagnie Malienne de Développement 
des Textiles), which engaged in a diffi cult (and still unachieved) privatization process, 
deeply shaped the sectors development. CMDT was in charge of providing inputs, 
extension, collecting, ginning, and marketing and of broader rural development in the 
cotton area (roads, capacity building of producer organizations, rural credit, technical 
support, training and literacy programs). The development of the sector allowed farm-
ers to invest in equipment and livestock and to increase their assets, and all of this con-
tributed to cotton’s reputation as a powerful driver for poverty alleviation and regional 
development. However, the Malian Poverty Assessment (EMEP) survey (DNSI 2004) 
and other related studies showed that cotton production areas, such as Sikasso, have 
widespread poverty and among the highest child malnutrition rates in the country. The 
main characteristics of this paradox, according to Wodon et al. (2005) and Mesplé-
Somps et al. (2008), are the following:
Poverty in the cotton-growing regions is globally less severe than in other regions. 
(box continues on next page)
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Regions’ income levels are generally consistent with their ex ante classifi -
cations in Senegal, but it is worth mentioning the bassin arachidier and the 
Delta. A main observation in Senegal is the general lack of regional variation. 
Casamance is the poorest of the surveyed regions, but owing to a crisis in the 
groundnut sector, the bassin arachidier  (historically the linchpin of the Senega-
lese economy) is no longer any better off. Mekhé 2 was able to obtain somewhat 
better economic returns only through crop diversifi cation (cassava) and off-
farm activities (handicrafts). The Haut Delta, despite its contract production 
of tomatoes, is similar to the other lagging regions and is much poorer than 
the Bas Delta.
In Kenya, Nyando and Bungoma were chosen to illustrate different situ-
ations. Bungoma, the intermediate region—endowed with better natural 
Household consumption is quite sensitive to cotton prices and volumes produced, 
and to other conditions that affect local agriculture, notably rainfall. The fact that 
the EMEP survey was implemented in 2001—the year of the sowing strike—directly 
affected the survey’s results. 
Malian cotton producers are clearly better equipped in durable goods (bicycles, 
motorcycles, radios, television sets) than farmers in other regions. This equipment 
spreads the benefi ts of cotton production over the long term, regardless of the cir-
cumstances of a particular year. It also refl ects the preferential access to credit in the 
cotton sector. 
The education level is generally better in cotton-growing areas, for both primary 
school attendance and level of adult literacy. 
Owing to cotton’s reputation in terms of monetary returns, Sikasso is the only region 
after the capital, Bamako, with a positive net migration fl ow. However, this migration 
has affected income per capita, making the region, in some ways, a victim of its success. 
Although these indicators may cast the cotton-zone in a positive light, it is impor-
tant to remember that welfare there is highly dependent on prices and somewhat 
fragile in the long run, given the context of degradation of natural resources.
The RuralStruc program’s Phase 2 results reinforce these fi ndings. The dependency 
ratio in Koutiala is the highest of the four study regions, reducing the positive effects 
of cotton production in terms of average income. While the price of cotton was 
low during the reference period of the survey (crop season 2006–07), the level of 
income in the cotton-growing region of Koutiala was comparable to that in the Diéma 
region, a remote rainfed area characterized by a high level of international emigration. 
However, the cotton producers of Koutiala are better off than those of the Tominian 
zone, the poorest of the surveyed zones. These disappointing income results mask an 
important issue: In the cotton areas, farmers are generally less vulnerable, because they 
are better equipped and better capitalized, particularly in terms of livestock, which 
plays a buffer role. 
Sources: RS 2 Mali; communication with the RuralStruc Mali team 2009.
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resources and engaged in more diversifi ed agricultural activities, particularly 
coffee production—was supposed to have been better off. But the estimated 
incomes in the two regions are similarly sobering and do not differ signifi cantly. 
They both show a high involvement in sugar cane production characterized 
by low returns and reliance on self-consumption. On the other hand, Nakuru 
North, where incomes are 3.5 times higher, confi rms its status as a winning 
region and exemplifi es the Kenyan success story. Located in the Rift Valley, with 
good natural conditions and benefi ting from a dense and well-connected local 
urban network, the region is engaged in maize as well as high-value products in 
the dairy and horticulture industries. The city of Nakuru offers many off-farm 
opportunities, boosted by its strategic positioning on the Mombasa/Nairobi/
Uganda corridor. Another specifi c characteristic of Nakuru North is its low 
dependency ratio (half that of the two other regions), which reveals higher pro-
ductive capacities per household and consequently higher earning potentials.
The Antsirabe region in Madagascar is a highly diversifi ed agricultural 
region (rice and temperate cereals, horticulture, dairy), that is well connected 
to markets and benefi ts from good infrastructure. Antsirabe, the third larg-
est city in the country with about 200,000 inhabitants, is only 150 km from 
the capital, Antananarivo, with which it is connected by a paved road in good 
condition. The Antsirabe region was originally selected to illustrate a winning 
region. However, severe natural constraints (bad weather conditions and phyto-
sanitary problems, specifi cally, potato disease) strongly affected yields and, 
consequently, farm incomes during the surveyed crop season. Additionally, the 
regional analysis showed that the region was quite heterogeneous, with remote 
areas facing marketing diffi culties and turning more toward self-consumption 
activities that brought lower economic returns. These factors led to the Rural-
Struc program’s decision to distinguish between the two subregions.
In Nicaragua, the surprise comes from the two areas mainly dedicated to 
livestock production—Muy Muy and La Libertad—which were supposed to 
illustrate very different situations. Muy Muy (located in the “milky way” or 
dairy belt) was chosen as an intermediary region because of the development 
of integrated dairy value chains, but the income estimates revealed a harsher 
reality than expected, mainly because farmers do not benefi t from higher milk 
prices that are captured downstream. On the other hand, La Libertad, selected 
as a losing region because of constraints such as its location in a remote moun-
tain area with insuffi cient transport infrastructure and lack of public invest-
ments, appeared better off, partly owing to larger land holdings and a specifi c 
opportunity to produce and sell farm-processed cheese.
Finally, in Mexico, the aggregated results for the Sotavento region are, as 
expected, lower than for Tequisquiapan. However, and surprisingly, the average 
income of the Tierras Bajas subregion is higher than that of Tequisquiapan, the 
winning region, which proves that the returns from intensive maize produc-
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tion can be signifi cant and more lucrative than a full specialization in off-farm 
activities (see below and box 5.5).
Distribution of Rural Incomes. A closer look at the distribution of incomes 
confi rms the strong difference between SSA and non-SSA countries, as well 
as the importance of intraregional inequalities. When the survey results are 
aggregated at the national level and when income classes (defi ned as intervals 
of $1 PPP) are used, the difference in the shape of the curve is striking (fi gures 
3.6 and 3.7). 
In the sample, the reach of absolute poverty ($1/day/person) ranges from 
3 percent of the population in the Mexican surveyed regions to 74 percent in the 
Malian regions. In the SSA surveyed regions, 90 percent to 95 percent of the house-
holds are captured in the fi rst three classes (Kenya being slightly better off and Mali 
worse off). In Mexico, Nicaragua, and Morocco, the distribution is smoother, and 
the Mexican sample shows a markedly different pattern, peaking at the $3–$4 
income class. In the three non-SSA countries, incomes per person per day above 
$13 are relatively common (between 5 percent and 15 percent of the sample).
To better characterize the regions and their income structures, the results 
have been split into household quintiles, each consisting of 20 percent of the 
household sample (see fi gures 3.8 and 3.9). This breakdown sheds new light on 
the rural reality of the surveyed regions.
Figure  3.6 Distribution of Households by Income Classes in SSA Surveyed Countries 
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
$PPP/capita/day
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
pe
rc
en
t
Mali Senegal Madagascar Kenya
0–1 1–2 2–3 3–4 4–5 5–6 6–7 7–8 8–9 9–10 10–11 11–12 12–13 >13
RURAL REALITIES: AGRICULTURE AND POVERTY  95
A major issue is the level of poverty in the fi rst quintiles, which is dire. The 
worst incomes per capita are recorded in the poorest regions of Mali, Senegal, 
and Kenya, with a yearly average of $64 PPP (Tominian), $54 PPP (Casamance), 
and $51 and $61 in Nyando and Bungoma, respectively. This is only 15 percent 
of the value of the $1 a day absolute poverty line. The fi rst quintiles in Mada-
gascar are somewhat better: around $150. A major surprise comes from the 
poorest regions of Morocco and Nicaragua, which are just as poor as the regions 
surveyed in Madagascar. With the exception of Mexico, the fi rst quintile always 
accounts for less than $1 a day.
Two common features can be seen in the quintile distributions:
The increase of the average global income per person from quintile 1 to 4 is 
relatively linear (the income of quintile n being from 1.3 to 2 times the income 
of quintile n–1), while a sharper jump is recorded for quintile 5 (the income 
of Q5 ranging from 2.7 to 5.4 times the income of Q4, in Diéma, Mali, and El 
Viejo, Nicaragua, respectively).
The profi le of the fi fth quintile differs from region to region, yet the income 
distribution of the richest quintile clearly indicates the same phenomenon in 
many regions: The average of the fi fth quintile is pulled up by a handful of 
better-off households, benefi ting from very specifi c social and economic condi-
tions (for example, a one-off high receipt of a high level of remittances, rents 
Figure  3.7 Distribution of Households by Income Classes in Non-SSA Surveyed Countries 
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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Figure  3.8 Incomes per Household Quintile by SSA Surveyed Regions
$PPP per capita
Source: RuralStruc surveys. 
Note: $1 PPP poverty line (---); $2 PPP poverty line (___).
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Figure 3 .9 Incomes per Household Quintile by Non-SSA Surveyed Regions
$PPP per capita
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
Note: $1 PPP poverty line (---); $2 PPP poverty line (___).
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related to housing rentals, or an unusually good endowment in land and capital 
which translates into higher agricultural output).16 
Fine-Tuning the Income Groups
To further investigate the economic reality of the surveyed households, the anal-
ysis is deepened by using adult equivalent ratios and by discussing food security 
through income conversion into kilocalories. The wealth status of farm house-
holds and female-headed households is also compared to the sample averages. 
Improving Comparability by Using Adult Equivalent Ratios. Per capita ratios 
were used in the previous sections to compare the survey results with poverty 
lines and GDP per person, but it is more accurate to use an equivalent adult 
approach (EqA) to take into account the very signifi cant differences that can 
exist among households, regions, and countries in terms of household struc-
tures. Adult equivalents are used in the following sections and chapters.
A substantial amount of literature exists on equivalence scales; the Rural-
Struc program adopted a conversion based on nutritional needs per age and 
gender. This equivalence scale overemphasizes the role of food consumption 
and is consequently less accurate for higher income households. However, it 
corresponds to the structural reality of most of the surveyed households, in 
which food expenditures and self-consumption are central.17
Differences in household structures depend on demographic dynamics and 
are exacerbated by social structures and cultural patterns in a given country. 
Figure 3.10 shows major differences between West African countries, charac-
terized by large households, and the other countries, which are more likely to 
have classic nuclear families. The large traditional family structures of Mali and 
Senegal—which aggregate several nuclear households under the authority of 
an elder, most often the head of lineage and the landlord—still play a central 
economic role. 
The variations in size and structure translate into different dependency 
ratios, which directly affect the production capacity (the number of economi-
cally active household members/inactive members), the consumption pattern, 
and the available income in EqA. As shown in table 3.2, the higher dependency 
ratios in the SSA countries confi rm the weight of young people and illustrate 
the unachieved demographic transition of the continent (see chapter 2).
The dependency ratio for the surveyed households is around 1.1 to 1.2 in 
Mali and Madagascar, 1.0 to 1.1 in Senegal, and reaches 1.3 in Kenya, with 
the exception of Nakuru, which has a very atypical situation.18 The non-SSA 
countries are far ahead in the transition process and should have lower ratios; 
this is the case in Morocco and in two Mexican regions, but Nicaragua and 
Sotavento’s Sierra de Santa Marta have different patterns.19 These differences are 
important in terms of productive capacity and the looming challenges related 
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Source: RuralStruc surveys. 
Note: Box plots show the distribution of the regional samples. The bottom of the boxes gives the first quartile, the top of the box the third quartile, and the horizontal line within 
the box is the median. The bottom end and the top end of the whiskers show the lowest and highest data within 1.5 interquartile range (IQR). Dots and stars are outliers. Extreme 
values are excluded from the figure.
Figure 3.10 Size of Households
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to an increasing labor force. The conversion to adult equivalents increases the 
comparability between average incomes and results in the improvement of the 
regional income levels in a range of 14 percent to 28 percent.
Are Farm Households Better or Worse Off? The surveyed households were 
mostly farm households. What is their estimated wealth compared with that of 
nonfarm households? When the two types of households are compared, as in 
Table 3.2 Household Structure and Income per Adult Equivalent
  Household size Dependency 
ratio
Total income $PPP Difference
Country  No. person No. EqA per capita per EqA %
Mali Tominian 11.1 9.3 1.09 196 234 19
Diéma 18.8 15.3 1.19 303 368 21
Koutiala 14.8 12.1 1.25 301 368 22
Macina 12.9 10.5 1.15 422 516 22
Senegal Casamance 14.3 11.8 1.15 360 439 22
Mekhé 1 14.7 12.2 0.99 436 527 21
Nioro 11.8 9.5 1.15 376 484 29
Haut Delta 12.1 10.1 0.85 443 524 18
Mekhé 2 15.0 12.4 1.04 641 769 20
Bas Delta 10.7 9.0 1.00 1,014 1,205 19
Madagascar Antsirabe 2 5.8 4.8 1.19 340 409 20
Alaotra 1 5.2 4.4 1.01 429 506 18
Morondava 5.5 4.5 1.23 493 597 21
Itasy 5.5 4.5 1.21 520 622 20
Antsirabe 1 5.7 4.8 1.21 626 744 19
Alaotra 2 6.0 5.1 0.90 1,181 1,346 14
Kenya Bungoma 6.7 5.6 1.30 527 641 22
Nyando 6.3 5.4 1.35 568 660 16
Nakuru N. 6.5 5.7 0.61 1,973 2,258 14
Morocco Chaouia 7.1 6.1 0.68 1,960 2,280 16
Saiss 6.6 5.8 0.59 2,941 3,419 16
Souss 5.8 5.1 0.57 3,583 4,131 15
Nicaragua Muy Muy 5.8 4.7 1.02 1,140 1,417 24
Terrabona 5.5 4.5 0.84 1,136 1,458 28
El Viejo 5.6 4.5 0.94 2,038 2,575 26
La Libertad 5.8 4.8 0.89 1,908 2,329 22
El Cuá 6.0 4.9 1.00 2,835 3,610 27
Mexico Sierra SM. 4.6 4.0 0.85 1,571 1,824 16
Tierras Bajas 4.3 3.7 0.63 2,728 3,144 15
Tequis. 4.6 3.9 0.61 2,486 2,879 16
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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table 3.3, the results are surprising. The “poor farmer” is a common character-
ization in rural areas of developing countries, and one might expect an income 
advantage for households entirely engaged in rural nonfarm activities. However, 
this is not the case. In the six regions where more than 10 percent of the sur-
Table 3.3 Household Incomes with and without a Farm
  Households with farm Households without farm
  Observations $PPP per EqA Observations $PPP per EqA
Country  No. % Mean Median No. % Mean Median
Mali Tominian 155 100  234  187 0 0 — —
Diéma 148 100  368  252 0 0 — —
Koutiala 153 100  368  318 0 0 — —
Macina 154 100  516  418 0 0 — —
Senegal Casamance 239 100  439  316 0 0 — —
Mekhe 1 110 99  531  394 1 1  120  120
Nioro 240 95  460  358 12 5  972  585
Haut Delta 58 95  525  307 3 5  489  527
Mekhe 2 111 98  775  609 2 2  448  448
Bas Delta 120 99  1,212  889 1 1  421  421
Madagascar Antsirabe 2 303 100  409  296 0 0 — —
Alaotra 1 336 87  526  388 49 13  373  321
Morondava 501 99  597  469 5 1  591  676
Itasy 497 99  625  490 6 1  373  250
Antsirabe 1 206 100  744  525 0 0 — — 
Alaotra 2 103 90  1,455  1,052 12 10  405  369
Kenya Bungoma 299 100  641  429 0 0 — —
Nyando 283 99  661  306 2 1  495  495
Nakuru N. 289 100  2,258  1,213 0 0 — —
Morocco Chaouia 225 99  2,280  1,002 3 1  2,309  1,890
Saiss 261 100  3,419  1,503 0 0 — — 
Souss 181 75  4,758  2,122 59 25  2,208  1,157
Nicaragua Muy Muy 290 97  1,436  670 9 3  803  734
Terrabona 260 93  1,457  690 21 7  1,470  1,081
El Viejo 264 92  2,678  1,176 24 8  1,440  1,279
La Libertad 283 98  2,353  1,251 7 2  1,350  1,269
El Cuá 299 100  3,619  1,428 1 0  995  995
Mexico Sierra SM. 155 89  1,937  1,444 20 11  947  645
T. Bajas 125 86  3,383  2,506 20 14  1,651  1,158
Tequis. 101 28  3,697  2,873 263 72  2,565  2,055
  6,749    520    
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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veyed households are without a farm, farm household income is, on average, 
twice that of households without a farm (with the exception of Tequisquiapan, 
where the difference is lower).
The situation is easily understandable in Madagascar, where families without 
land access in Alaotra are worse off and rely primarily on low-paying agricul-
tural wages. The case of the Sierra de Santa Marta in the Mexican Sotavento is 
comparable: Nonfarm households have very few opportunities to sustain their 
livelihoods in this somewhat remote area. But the situations of Souss (Morocco) 
and Tierras Bajas and Tequisquiapan (Mexico) are paradoxical, because higher 
returns from nonfarm activities might have been expected. This surprising 
result from the survey tempers the common view about vibrant rural nonfarm 
activities. It is explored further in chapter 4.20
The Wealth Status of Female-Headed Households. With the exception of the 
two West African countries and Morocco, the share of female-headed house-
holds is around 10 percent of the sample. Signifi cantly higher shares exist in 
Alaotra 1, El Viejo (20 percent), and Nyando (30 percent).21 
These differences have multiple explanations related to the diverse ways 
different cultures handle certain life incidents (death, divorce) and to diverse 
migration patterns. In nuclear families, as in Nicaragua and Mexico (and to a 
lesser extent in Madagascar and Kenya), it is often the husband who leaves for 
long-term migration, while in West Africa it is mainly young dependents. The 
Nicaraguan civil war also left its footprint on these fi gures.
When a female heads a household, the household size is often smaller, 
which is logical in nuclear family contexts. The variation in the average income 
between male- and female-headed households is less important than one might 
expect (table 3.4): Incomes in female-headed households are generally about 10 
percent lower, with a few exceptions (Macina, and again El Viejo and Nyando). 
On the other hand, in Tequisquiapan and the Sierra de Santa Marta in Mexico, 
average incomes of female-headed households are notably higher. Although 
the survey encountered diffi culties in capturing the reality of migrations (see 
chapter 4), these results speak for themselves. While incomes refl ect the role 
of remittances, household sizes are smaller and illustrate the consequences of 
long-term migrations (these households are in the early stages of their family 
cycle, and migrants are mainly men under 40 years of age who have left their 
wives in charge of the household).
Viability of Low-Income Households and Food Insecurity. The earlier break-
down of income results into household quintiles illustrated the dire situation 
of households in the fi rst quintile in every surveyed region outside of Mexico. 
Their situations improve slightly when EqA is used (an increase of between 15 
percent and 30 percent at the regional sample level—see table 3.2) but remain 
calamitous. How do the poorest households manage to survive, and how are 
they able to sustain their livelihoods with such low income levels? 
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The program used kilocalories (kcal) as a unit for income measurement to 
determine whether quintile 1 households were able to sustain their minimum 
food requirements with their existing incomes. This approach is a proxy—
household needs cannot be reduced to food needs only, but it provides an 
estimate and helps refi ne the comparison among surveyed regions. Household 
incomes in EqA were transformed into kilocalories by using the local cost of 
households’ main food staple. Incomes in kcal per EqA per day were then com-
Table 3.4 Share, Size, and Annual Income of Female-Headed Households
  Female-Headed HH HH size in EqA $PPP per EqA
Country Region No. % Male HH Female HH Male HH Female HH
Mali Tominian 0 0.0 9.3 —  235 —
Diéma 0 0.0 15.3 —  368 —
Koutiala 1 0.7 12.1 4.4  367  495
Macina 2 1.3 10.6 6.2  520  203
Senegal Casamance 7 2.9 11.9 9.2  441  365
Mekhé 1 3 2.7 12.4 6.3  519  799
Nioro 13 5.2 9.6 7.7  473  698
Haut Delta 5 8.2 10.5 5.8  499  794
Mekhé 2 1 0.9 12.5 4.4  772  399
Bas Delta 6 5.0 9.1 7.0  1,207  1,163
Madagascar Antsirabe 2 25 8.3 4.9 3.6  409  406
Alaotra 1 82 21.3 4.6 3.6  516  471
Morondava 82 16.2 4.8 3.2  601  574
Itasy 54 10.7 4.7 3.1  616  670
Antsirabe 1 14 6.8 4.9 2.3  736  852
Alaotra 2 11 9.6 5.3 3.6  1,362  1,188
Kenya Bungoma 33 11.0 5.7 4.7  628  745
Nyando 87 30.5 5.8 4.6  818  300
Nakuru N. 48 16.6 5.9 4.4  2,255  2,272
Morocco Chaouia 11 4.8 6.2 4.1  2,299  1,922
Saiss 1 0.4 5.8 3.0  3,426  1,587
Souss 4 1.7 5.1 3.8  4,175  1,521
Nicaragua Muy Muy 35 11.7 4.8 4.3  1,472  1,000
Terrabona 41 14.6 4.5 4.3  1,467  1,406
El Viejo 65 22.6 4.4 4.9  2,891  1,491
La Libertad 30 10.3 4.8 4.7  2,342  2,216
El Cuá 42 14.0 4.9 4.7  3,670  3,241
Mexico Sierra SM. 24 13.7 4.1 2.8  1,776  2,621
T. Bajas 13 9.0 3.8 2.7  3,187  2,712
Tequis. 50 13.7 4.1 2.8  2,820  3,247
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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pared with the average individual’s daily food needs, estimated by the World 
Health Organization (WHO) at 2,450 kcal per adult person per day.22 
The cost of the kilocalorie varies from one country to the next and among 
regions in the same country (table 3.5): from $0.10 PPP to $0.49 PPP for 1,000 
Table 3.5 First Quintile Total Income in $PPP and Kilocalories
  
Price of 
1,000 kcal
in $PPP
Q1 Total income per EqA per day Kcal
available/ 
daily 
needs
Main
consumed 
staples
  in $PPP in kcal
Country Region Mean Index Mean Index 
Mali Tominian 0.12 0.21 100  1,730 100 0.7 Millet sorghum
Diéma 0.12 0.26 123  2,132 123 0.9 Millet sorghum
Koutiala 0.11 0.39 188  3,557 206 1.5 Millet sorgham 
Maize
Macina 0.19 0.36 171  1,870 108 0.8 Rice
Senegal Casamance 0.15 0.18 86  1,197 69 0.5 Rice
Mekhé 1 0.16 0.25 120  1,556 90 0.6 Rice
Nioro 0.15 0.34 164  2,268 131 0.9 Rice
Haut Delta 0.16 0.30 144  1,863 108 0.8 Rice
Mekhé 2 0.15 0.56 271  3,755 217 1.5 Rice
Bas Delta 0.15 0.72 349  4,825 279 2.0 Rice
Madagascar Antsirabe 2 0.23 0.38 183  1,647 95 0.7 Rice
Alaotra 1 0.21 0.49 235  2,319 134 0.9 Rice
Morondava 0.20 0.53 253  2,626 152 1.1 Rice
Itasy 0.25 0.64 309  2,564 148 1.0 Rice
Antsirabe 1 0.23 0.57 274  2,471 143 1.0 Rice
Alaotra 2 0.21 0.64 308  3,041 176 1.2 Rice
Kenya Bungoma 0.44 0.20 98  462 27 0.2 Maize
Nyando 0.49 0.16 78  329 19 0.1 Maize
Nakuru N. 0.34 0.92 441  2,693 156 1.1 Maize
Morocco Chaouia 0.18 0.58 281  3,241 187 1.3 Wheat
Saiss 0.16 0.61 296  3,841 222 1.6 Wheat
Souss 0.21 0.77 372  3,679 213 1.5 Wheat
Nicaragua Muy Muy 0.18 0.36 176  2,026 117 0.8 Maize
Terrabona 0.20 0.40 194  2,013 116 0.8 Maize
El Viejo 0.20 0.64 311  3,222 186 1.3 Maize
La Libertad 0.19 0.79 382  4,174 241 1.7 Maize
El Cuá 0.18 0.88 426  4,912 284 2.0 Maize
Mexico Sierra SM. 0.10 1.49 720  14,942 864 6.1 Maize
T. Bajas 0.10 2.25 1,086  22,549 1,304 9.2 Maize
Tequis. 0.10 2.18 1,050  21,795 1,260 8.9 Maize
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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kcal of corn in Mexico and in Nyando, Kenya, respectively. The cost of a kilo-
calorie depends on the type of cereal cultivated in the region and the overall 
environment of the value chain. Mali’s dry cereals (millet, sorghum, maize), 
mostly consumed in rainfed areas, are notably less expensive than rice ($0.11 
PPP versus $0.19 for 1,000 kcal). But rice costs in Senegal are less than in other 
countries ($0.15 PPP), with little regional variation. These low costs are the 
result of strong market competition between imported broken rice and local 
rice. Similarly, Mexico’s least expensive kilocalorie is the result of the permanent 
pressure of cheap imports from the United States and from government sup-
port for large commercial farmers (through credit mechanisms and technical 
assistance for the acquisition and use of technical packages); this support helps 
them compete against imported corn and leads to relatively good overall pro-
ductivity at the national level. 
Table 3.5 offers a new vision of the dire reality of the fi rst quintile households 
and helps explain how poor rural households try to adapt to such low overall 
income levels in $PPP.23
Fourteen of the 27 surveyed zones in which the daily Q1 income is below the 
$1 PPP poverty line (that is, all countries except Mexico) would theoretically 
be able to satisfy their very basic food needs. In the other 13 zones, the situa-
tion of the poorest is most critical and confi rms a strong food insecurity. All 
the poorest regions in every SSA surveyed country are characterized by a very 
high household vulnerability. The case of Bungoma and Nyando in Kenya is 
particularly awful and exacerbated by the high cost of maize in western Kenya. 
Muy Muy and Terrabona in Nicaragua also show high vulnerability. Moving 
back to the full sample (table 3.6), in 11 of the 19 SSA surveyed zones, 10 per-
cent or more of the households are unable to reach the 2,450 kcal threshold; 
in three zones (Casamance, Antsirabe 2, and Nyando) more than 20 percent of 
households are in this position.
In conclusion, the kcal approach is a useful complement to the comparison 
on a monetary basis. It helps explain the apparent nonviability of low-income 
households and confi rms the dire state of the poorest households. Food inse-
curity persists and is a major reality in several regions. This is confi rmed by the 
perceptions of heads of households regarding their own food security situa-
tion: 23 percent to 40 percent of households in Mali, 15 percent to 43 percent 
in Senegal, and over 40 percent in some regions in Madagascar (Antsirabe) 
and Nicaragua (El Viejo) say their food security has deteriorated over the past 
fi ve years, in quality as well as quantity (fi gure 3.11). This perception may have 
been exacerbated by the start of the food price crisis during the surveyed year 
(end of 2007–early 2008) and may have worsened in the following months. It 
corroborates the harsh reality of many rural households in numerous surveyed 
regions.
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 Livelihood Strategies
In the face of such diffi cult situations in many of the surveyed regions, how 
do rural households choose livelihood strategies likely to help them meet their 
needs and build a future for their children? 
Table 3.6 Household Income Distribution Expressed in Kilocalories
percent
 Classes of total income in kcal per EqA per day
Country Region < = 2,450 2,451–4,900 > = 4,900
Mali Tominian 19 41 40
Diéma 12 24 64
Koutiala 5 10 86
Macina 14 25 60
Senegal Casamance 22 22 56
Mekhé 1 17 15 68
Nioro 12 25 63
Haut Delta 13 31 56
Mekhé 2 4 9 87
Bas Delta 4 4 92
Madagascar Antsirabe 2 29 41 31
Alaotra 1 11 38 51
Morondava 6 28 65
Itasy 6 38 56
Antsirabe 1 8 27 65
Alaotra 2 3 19 77
Kenya Bungoma 15 14 71
Nyando 22 21 57
Nakuru N. 1 1 97
Morocco Chaouia 7 7 86
Saiss 8 4 87
Souss 8 5 87
Nicaragua Muy Muy 12 13 75
Terrabona 13 13 74
El Viejo 8 6 85
La Libertad 5 8 88
El Cuá 3 8 89
Mexico Sierra SM 0 0 100
T Bajas 0 0 100
Tequis. 1 1 98
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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Figure 3.11 Heads of Households’ Perception of Their Food Security 
Source: RuralStruc surveys. 
Note: Results not available for Mexico.
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The WDR08, with its focus on exit pathways out of rural poverty, provides 
a helpful framework for discussion of the RuralStruc program’s results. Using 
the approach developed by the RIGA project (see chapter 1), the WDR08 iden-
tifi es four livelihood strategies among rural households (World Bank 2007, 
75): (1) farm-oriented households derive most of their income from farming 
activities;24 (2) labor-oriented households sustain their livelihoods from wage 
labor in agriculture, in the rural nonfarm economy, or from nonagricultural 
self-employment; (3) migration-oriented households choose to leave the rural 
sector entirely or depend on transfers from members who have migrated or on 
public transfers; and (4) diversifi ed households combine income from the other 
three strategies. 
Following the WDR08 Typology
Using these defi nitions,25 table 3.7 and its companion fi gure (fi gure 3.12) dis-
play the survey results based on the WDR08 categories and provide an overview 
of how rural households are distributed among the four livelihood strategies. 
The large share of the farm-oriented category confi rms the role of agriculture 
and on-farm incomes in the surveyed regions. In 18 of the 30 regions, on-farm 
income represents the major source of livelihood. In 12 regions it is the main 
strategy for more than 50 percent of the interviewed households; in 4 regions 
(Koutiala and Macina in Mali, Saïss in Morocco, and El Cuá in Nicaragua), it 
sustains 80 percent of households. In Kenya and Senegal, farm orientation does 
not appear as a generalized pattern, and Mexico is confi rmed as a unique case. 
As noted earlier, only one region is off-farm-oriented: Tequisquiapan is mas-
sively engaged in labor activities (80 percent), which corroborates the low num-
ber of households still engaged in on-farm activities. In the other regions, the 
off-farm orientation barely exceeds 30 percent, except for Mekhé 1 in Senegal, 
Nyando in Kenya, and El Viejo in Nicaragua, where a third of the households are 
labor-oriented. Migrations never appear as a strong pattern, even in countries 
such as Morocco, Nicaragua, and Mexico, where many households are tradi-
tionally engaged in migrations.26 Few households are migration-oriented: Only 
Diéma in Mali, Chaouïa and Souss in Morocco, and Muy Muy and Terrabona 
in Nicaragua show migration of 7 percent to 8 percent. 
Household specialization mainly occurs for farming. On the other extreme, 
the diversifi cation category is well represented in all the surveyed zones and 
leads in 12 regions, with a maximum of 84 percent in Sotavento’s Sierra (Mex-
ico). However, the importance of diversifi cation can be overstated; it is highly 
sensitive to the selected threshold of 75 percent of income, which tends to polar-
ize the survey results. Additionally, Davis et al. (2007) consider this threshold 
as a specialization level rather than an orientation. To test the sensitivity of the 
threshold, the sample was broken down on the basis of a 60 percent limit (see 
table 3.7). The 15 percent difference strongly modifi es the overall pattern: The 
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Figure  3.12 Livelihood Strategies in the Surveyed Regions Using WDR08 Typology
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Table 3.7 Livelihood Strategies in the Surveyed Regions Using WDR08 Typology
percent
  
No.
Typology WDR08—threshold 75% Typology WDR08—threshold 60%
Country Region
Farm-
oriented 
Labor-
oriented 
Migration-
oriented Diversifi ed 
Farm-
oriented 
Labor-
oriented 
Migration-
oriented Diversifi ed 
Mali Tominian 155 55.5 0.6 1.3 42.6 72.3 1.9 4.5 21.3
Diéma 148 44.6 1.4 8.1 45.9 60.1 2.7 14.2 23.0
Koutiala 153 85.6 0.0 0.7 13.7 92.8 1.3 0.7 5.2
Macina 154 81.2 0.6 0.6 17.5 88.3 2.6 0.6 8.4
Senegal Casamance 239 51.5 9.2 0.0 39.3 63.6 16.3 1.7 18.4
Mekhe 1 111 15.3 27.0 0.0 57.7 25.2 46.8 3.6 24.3
Nioro 252 21.0 19.0 2.0 57.9 33.3 37.7 2.8 26.2
Haut Delta 61 41.0 18.0 1.6 39.3 52.5 26.2 3.3 18.0
Mekhe 2 113 17.7 10.6 1.8 69.9 31.0 37.2 2.7 29.2
Bas Delta 121 21.5 9.1 0.8 68.6 36.4 37.2 2.5 24.0
Madagascar Antsirabe 2 303 29.7 2.3 0.3 67.7 61.4 11.6 0.3 26.7
Alaotra 1 385 41.8 13.8 0.5 43.9 55.3 26.2 1.3 17.1
Morondava 506 63.2 2.6 0.6 33.6 79.6 6.7 0.8 12.8
Itasy 503 40.2 3.0 0.4 56.5 59.2 14.5 1.2 25.0
Antsirabe 1 206 65.0 2.4 0.0 32.5 82.0 6.3 0.0 11.7
Alaotra 2 115 60.9 7.8 0.0 31.3 67.0 19.1 3.5 10.4
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Kenya Bungoma 299 44.1 14.7 0.0 41.1 52.8 30.8 0.0 16.4
Nyando 285 24.6 25.6 1.1 48.8 33.7 43.9 1.8 20.7
Nakuru N. 289 17.6 17.0 0.0 65.4 29.8 46.0 0.3 23.9
Morocco Chaouia 228 44.3 17.1 7.0 31.6 52.6 25.4 11.0 11.0
Saiss 261 80.5 2.3 3.8 13.4 84.3 3.8 5.4 6.5
Souss 240 44.6 22.5 8.8 24.2 50.0 28.8 10.4 10.8
Nicaragua Muy Muy 299 51.2 20.7 7.0 21.1 55.5 28.8 8.7 7.0
Terrabona 281 57.3 16.0 6.8 19.9 61.6 21.7 8.5 8.2
El Viejo 288 43.1 29.5 4.9 22.6 45.1 37.8 5.9 11.1
La Libertad 290 57.2 18.6 0.3 23.8 63.4 26.2 1.0 9.3
El Cuá 300 85.3 2.7 0.0 12.0 90.3 4.7 0.0 5.0
Mexico Sierra SM. 175 8.0 7.4 0.6 84.0 14.3 34.9 1.7 49.1
T. Bajas 145 20.0 13.1 2.1 64.8 32.4 22.1 4.1 41.4
Tequis. 364 4.1 62.6 3.8 29.4 5.2 86.3 5.2 3.3
  7,269         
Madagascar  1993 (*) 2,653 59.4 9.5 1.4 29.6     
Nicaragua  2001 (*) 1,839 18.9 48.2 0.9 32.0     
Sources: RuralStruc surveys, adapted from WDR08 (World Bank 2007); *RIGA results in Davis et al. 2007, 162.
Note: The primary strategy is shaded.
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share of the diversifi ed group is halved everywhere except in the Sotavento, 
which attests to the resilience of its diversifi ed orientation. In some regions 
(Antsirabe 1, Alaotra 2, Chaouia, Muy Muy, Tequisquiapan), the category’s 
importance is reduced threefold or more. The diversifi ed category remains 
dominant only in the two Sotavento zones; the transfer of households mainly 
benefi ts the farm-oriented group (in Mali and Madagascar) and the labor-
oriented group (Kenya and Senegal). The labor orientation of Tequisquiapan’s 
households is strongly increased (86 percent). 
If the program’s results are compared with those of the RIGA project for 
Nicaragua and Madagascar—the only two common case studies (but with dif-
ferent years of reference, 2001 and 1993, respectively)—signifi cant differences 
emerge, notably in Nicaragua (see table 3.7), where the share of labor-oriented 
households according to RIGA is 48 percent, instead of a maximum of 30 per-
cent in the RuralStruc study. On the other hand, the share of farm-oriented 
households is much lower: 19 percent for RIGA compared with 43 percent 
to 85 percent for the RuralStruc surveys. The results are not so markedly dif-
ferent in the case of Madagascar, even though the reference period spans 15 
years. One probable explanation for these differences is that RIGA’s fi ndings are 
based on aggregated national results, whereas RuralStruc data illustrate regional 
situations. Although the survey methodologies, level of analysis, and years of 
reference differ, these gaps illustrate the diffi culty of establishing comparable 
measurements of income across countries, which was clearly indicated by the 
WDR08 (World Bank 2007, box 3.2).
Moving Forward
This typology of livelihood strategies helps explain the confi guration of the 
studied regional economies. So far, it confi rms the domination of farm-oriented 
households and the more limited role of alternative strategies based on off-farm 
activities or migration. It also serves as a reminder that the alternatives to farm-
ing are quite restricted and illustrates the limitations of local opportunities, 
which do not necessarily appear when data are aggregated at the national level.
As the WDR08 illustrates, it is diffi cult to ascertain the effectiveness of these 
livelihood strategies as pathways out of poverty. The lack of dynamic data, the 
high heterogeneity among households, and the small number of households 
per type of strategy at the regional level prevent any discussion of income levels 
per livelihood strategy.27
The application of the WDR typology to the wide range of situations in the 
RuralStruc program leads to two large groupings of households: One is strongly 
specialized in on-farm activities and the other is more diversifi ed, without a sig-
nifi cant specialization in any one of the off-farm activities. But, in fact, little is 
known about the characteristics of these activities. What constitutes “on-farm” 
and “off-farm” in the surveyed regions? Defi ning these characteristics is the 
objective of the next two chapters. 
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Notes
 1. Annex 3 in the appendix posted at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ruralstruc
presents a brief overview of the main characteristics of these regions. 
 2. The program defi nes a farm household as a household directly engaged in agricul-
tural activities in the broad sense and earning incomes, in cash or in kind, from these 
activities, whatever the level of productive assets and their ownership (for example, 
owned, rented, or lent land). See chapter 4 for the defi nition of household activities.
 3. The valley of San Juan has four cities of 25,000–55,000 inhabitants, including 
 Tequisquiapan (27,000).
 4. The threshold of 50,000 inhabitants comes from the WDR09 agglomeration index 
and was used as one of the variables for the regression work based on the survey 
results (see annex 5 in the appendix posted at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/rural 
struc). It was not possible to generate equivalent maps for the three non-SSA coun-
tries, but their degree of urbanization and their infrastructure networks would have 
resulted in a dark-gray–black color for most of the surveyed regions.
 5. This calculation is made on the full regional sample, including all the households 
(with farms and without farms), and is based on the share of the regional means 
corresponding to the regional structure of incomes (see chapter 6 for a discussion of 
the calculation of means). Off-farm activities are detailed in chapter 4; they include 
agricultural wage and nonagricultural wage employment, self-employment, public 
and private transfers, and rents.
 6. In every country, regions have been sorted from left to right, from the poorest to the 
richest in relative terms. This pattern appears clearly in fi gure 3.4.
 7. To allow for comparison, household incomes per capita aggregated at the regional 
level were converted from local currency units (LCUs) into international dollars at 
purchasing power parity ($PPP) for the year 2007, which is the year of reference 
of the collected information (see annex 1 in the appendix posted at http://www
.worldbank.org/afr/ruralstruc). The same conversion into international dollars was 
applied to GDP per capita and domestic poverty lines initially expressed in LCUs.
 8. The estimated total income per household is an aggregate of monetary incomes and 
incomes in kind (self-consumption) valued at the market price (see annex 1 in the 
appendix posted at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ruralstruc). 
 9. This income gap is strengthened by the selection of the surveyed regions, as the 
southern part of the country is more broadly affected by rural poverty and charac-
terized by smaller farm structures.
10.   Annex 4 in the appendix posted at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ruralstruc shows 
the domestic poverty lines for each country. However, national defi nitions of pov-
erty are often infl uenced by political considerations, and the large variety of thresh-
old types do not facilitate the overall discussion. Eleven of the 19 surveyed regions 
and subregions in Sub-Saharan Africa are below domestic poverty lines (the excep-
tions are Kenya and Madagascar, where the poverty thresholds are very low).
11.   The fi gure recorded in Morocco is striking because the relative homogeneity among 
regions is in stark contrast with the huge heterogeneity within regions (among the 
highest of the seven countries) as expressed by the Gini indexes. The presence of 
some high-income households, whose earnings come mostly from rents (hous-
ing), obviously affects the sample’s means and explains this pattern of apparent 
homogeneity, which is undermined by the income distribution (RS 2 Morocco, 
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151). The intraregional heterogeneity also results from the defi nition of the surveyed 
regions—particularly in Saïss and Souss—and from the national team decision to 
group plain and mountain localities. In Souss, the identifi cation of a subregion for 
Taliouine in the mountain area could have been an option.
12.   More broadly, and perhaps unsurprisingly, Gini indexes tend to be higher in the 
richest surveyed regions in every country except Mali, where the richest region—
Macina—is internally equal, which refl ects the homogeneity of land assets and pro-
duction techniques in the irrigation scheme of Offi ce du Niger, where the surveys 
were conducted.
13.   This evolution has similarities with the debated Kuznets’ curve, which has been con-
tradicted by new evidence (see Bourguignon and Morrisson 1998; Deininger and 
Squire 1998). However, the discussion here is limited to rural areas and not overall 
country results, and this evolution in inequality sheds light on the process of rural 
transformation (see chapter 6).
14.   Inequalities, rural poverty, and growing discontent about the consequences of 
NAFTA led to a strong social movement initiated in 2002 by rural producers orga-
nizations and named ¡El campo no aguanta mas! (The countryside can’t stand it 
anymore!). See Sánchez Albarrán (2007) and Puricelli (2010).
15.   Morocco is the only country where the ex ante classifi cation is fully respected.
16.   This feature is illustrated by the descriptive statistics of Q5 presented in annex 4 in 
the appendix posted at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ruralstruc.
17.   See annex 1 in the appendix posted at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ruralstruc.
18.   The mean dependency ratio observed in Nakuru North is consistent with other 
panel data, which also show ratios around 0.60 (RS 2 Kenya, 79), and it matches 
national statistics. A possible explanation is the demographic characteristics of the 
city of Nakuru, which is exceptionally youthful: 55 percent of the population is less 
than 20 years old and 75 percent is less than 30 years old (Republic of Kenya 2005). 
In addition, only 55 percent of Nakuru North households have children, which 
could be explained by the permanent migration of young people to host families in 
the city.
19.   Population growth rates have fallen in Nicaragua since the mid-1990s. However, 
rural areas show a specifi c pattern related to the consequences of the civil war (fewer 
male adults) and long-term migration (long-term migrants are not counted in the 
household number of persons present on which the ratio is calculated). The latter is 
applicable to the Sierra de Santa Marta, which also has higher birth rates character-
istic of indigenous populations. 
20.   In Nicaragua, although the share of households without a farm is smaller than in 
Souss and Mexico , the results of a comparison between farm and nonfarm house-
holds vary depending on the type of ratio (mean or median). The median incomes 
of nonfarm households are higher than those of farm households, but the average 
income for farm households is higher than that of nonfarm households. These dis-
torted results mean that there are a small number of specialized and better-endowed 
farmers.
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21.   The case of Nyando appears exceptional. Panel data from the Tegemeo Institute 
confi rm a rapid increase in female-headed families, 80 percent of whom are widows. 
AIDS is the most likely explanation.
22.   The adopted methodology and conversion table are presented in annex 1 in the 
appendix posted at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ruralstruc.
23.   The table also shows new income gaps among regions. Using Tominian—the poorest 
region of the RuralStruc sample—as a baseline (index 100), the income conversion 
into kilocalories modifi es the scale between the richest and poorest regions: Exclud-
ing the Mexican zones, where the kcal cost is very specifi c, the largest gap between 
rich and poor is nearly halved (2.8 to 1.0 instead of 4.4 to 1.0).
24.   The WDR08 actually identifi es fi ve strategies. It splits the farm-oriented category 
into subsistence farming and market-oriented farming. The farm-oriented group is 
discussed further in chapter 5 with the program’s results on market insertion.
25.   The threshold for each group is 75 percent of total income. Farm-oriented house-
holds rely on farm production (all types); labor-oriented households rely on wages 
(all types) and nonfarm self-employment; and migration-oriented households earn 
their income from transfers (public and private) and other nonlabor sources, such 
as rents. In diversifi ed households, none of these income sources contributes more 
than 75 percent of total income.
26.   For a discussion of the diffi culties of capturing remittances, see chapter 4.
27.   “A household’s income structure does not tell whether it is engaged in a successful 
income strategy. Each of the strategies can become a pathway out of poverty, but 
many households do not manage to improve their situation over time, refl ecting the 
marked heterogeneity in each of the activities and the fact that income varies widely 
for each of the strategies” (World Bank 2007, 77).

Chapter 4
Not surprisingly, in the regions surveyed as part of the RuralStruc program, 
farming activities are extremely prevalent. However, each region is also home 
to a large amount of off-farm economic activity. This observation raises two 
questions. First, what are the characteristics of these rural off-farm activi-
ties? Second, what determines the extent and progression of their develop-
ment? These questions serve as starting points for a discussion of the second 
hypothesis (H2) of the RuralStruc program, concerning the adaptation of rural 
households to challenges presented by their changing environment. Are these 
processes of adaptation new and have they led to a reshaping of rural areas? Or 
are they similar to historical paths of structural transformation? Above all, do 
they contribute to the improvement of rural livelihoods? In other words, is the 
much-praised rural nonfarm economy (RNFE) the best answer for dealing with 
recurring rural poverty?
The results obtained from the surveys provide a rather nuanced picture of 
the changes currently under way. They show very different types of diversifi ca-
tion that are strongly related to the unique opportunities in each region. After 
reviewing the literature on diversifi cation, this chapter addresses the various 
types of off-farm activities in which RuralStruc households engage: wage labor 
(agricultural and nonagricultural), self-employment, transfers, and rents. 
The Question of Rural Diversifi cation
It is necessary to review the existing debate on rural diversifi cation before pro-
posing a classifi cation of rural activities and incomes. A careful defi nition of 
categories of activities is critical to avoid any misunderstanding or bias in the 
analyses.
A Brief Overview of Rural Diversifi cation and the Related Debate
An important research trend has highlighted the observation that rural house-
holds in developing countries increasingly derive their incomes from nonagri-
Exploring Off-Farm Diversifi cation 
and the Rural Nonfarm Economy
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cultural activities and transfers. A recent review of this literature (Haggblade, 
Hazell, and Reardon 2007) describes the multifaceted characteristics of the rural 
nonfarm economy. Haggblade (2007) stresses that the long-standing debate on 
RNFE involves four perspectives, all of which are rooted in development eco-
nomics. The RNFE can be considered through the lens of agricultural growth 
linkages, its contribution to employment, its role in regional development, or its 
essential contribution to household income strategies. The RuralStruc program 
used the last perspective. 
The increasing diversifi cation at the rural household level results from both 
push (negative) and pull (positive) factors. On the pull side, a major driver is the 
new employment opportunities that derive from improved connections among 
rural areas, markets, and cities; a consequence of overall economic development 
and improvements in transportation and communication infrastructure as a 
whole (for example, cell phones and associated new services, such as cash trans-
fer systems). But diversifi cation also stems, on the push side, from more diffi cult 
farming conditions. These can be related to demographic growth, which can 
lead to growing pressure on natural resources (smaller landholdings and over-
used and degraded land) and can result in reduced agricultural incomes. They 
also stem from the many changes in institutional and economic environments 
related to liberalization policies and globalization that have occurred since the 
1980s. New market opportunities have developed from these changes in the 
environment. However, the end of price regulation, the removal of subsidies 
(particularly for inputs), and the withdrawal of public-funded technical sup-
port have also created a more unstable and often more diffi cult environment 
for farm households. And the diffi culties are exacerbated in remote areas, where 
market imperfections are more numerous (missing markets, high transaction 
costs) and provision of public goods is insuffi cient. 
In the face of all these changes, along with the growing costs of many services 
(particularly education and health in Sub-Saharan Africa), many rural house-
holds are dealing with a need for more cash and more stable incomes. Under 
intense fi nancial stress, they engage in risk management or coping strategies in 
which they seek additional income outside of agriculture.1 As summarized by 
Barrett and Reardon, “diversifi cation is the norm. Very few people collect all 
their income from any one source, hold all their wealth in the form of any single 
asset, or use their assets in just one activity” (2000, 1–2).
The importance of rural diversifi cation is a strongly debated issue. The 
widely differing results in the literature arise from signifi cant differences in the 
defi nition of activities, the objective of the study (for example, income versus 
employment estimates), and the type of data used (second or fi rsthand, and 
collection methods). The results also refl ect the huge heterogeneity of income 
structures among countries, among regions within countries, and among 
households of the same region, as well as the scarcity of information on rural 
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incomes. Compiling information from very diverse sources into aggregated data 
sets is a common feature of the literature on the RNFE (see chapter 1). 
On the basis of many references, Haggblade, Hazell, and Reardon (2010) say 
that nonfarm activities account for about 30 percent of full-time rural employ-
ment in Asia and Latin America, 20 percent in West Asia and North Africa, and 
only 10 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa. However, when they refer to income 
data, which include revenues from seasonal and part-time activities, the esti-
mated fi gures are signifi cantly higher: 50 percent for Asia and Latin America, 
and 35 percent for Africa. All the data suggest that the old vision of rural econo-
mies focused solely on agriculture no longer fully refl ects reality.2 
How to Classify Rural Activities and Incomes
Discussion on the diversifi cation of livelihoods is diffi cult because there are a 
number of parallel debates about the RNFE, not all of which take the household 
perpective (with reference to Haggblade’s four perpectives). But even if one 
manages to keep all of these discussions straight, studying livelihood diversifi ca-
tion is complicated by a lack of agreement on the defi nition of different types 
of activities and incomes.  
Barrett and Reardon (2000) use a three-way classifi cation for the economic 
activities of a rural household. They distinguish the sector (primary, secondary, 
tertiary), function (self- or wage employment), and location (local or elsewhere) 
of each activity. In this classifi cation, the common defi nition of the RNFE includes 
all activities other than agricultural activities; that is, all secondary, tertiary, and 
nonagricultural primary activities, whatever the location and function. 
To fi ne-tune the discussion, Davis et al. (2007) divided rural activities into six 
categories: (1) crop production, (2) livestock production, (3) agricultural wage 
employment, (4) nonagricultural wage employment, (5) nonagricultural self-
employment, and (6) transfers (private and public). The fi rst three categories 
are considered “agricultural” activities, while the last three are “nonagricultural” 
activities. Further, the fi rst two categories are “on-farm” activities, while categories 
4 and 5 are “nonfarm” activities. Agricultural wage labor is always considered an 
“off-farm” activity, but that term can be misleading: Sometimes it is used exclu-
sively to apply to agricultural wage labor, and other times it is used to refer to all 
activities that are not conducted on a household’s farm (activities 3 through 6).
Transfers are a separate category because they are not an income-generating 
activity but rather an income source. Money is transferred from household 
members who live elsewhere (typically in the form of remittances), from other 
households (donations), or from public or nongovernmental bodies (typically 
subsidies or social grants). The program also considered the specifi c case of 
rents, which are typically generated by rental revenues (from physical assets) 
or securities.
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The RuralStruc program chose an income classifi cation taxonomy that takes 
the perspective of the household rather than the activity, because its purpose 
and objectives are to identify patterns that express the complex livelihood strat-
egies adopted by rural households. Consequently, the “off-farm” group includes 
all activities conducted and incomes generated away from the family farm, 
regardless of the sector or function. This includes agricultural wage employ-
ment and all other nonagricultural activities and incomes. The off-farm group 
is larger than the RNFE by the amount of agricultural wage labor.3
Thus, on-farm income includes crop and livestock production; on-farm 
processing of products;4 and earnings from hunting, fi shing, and gathering of 
natural resources.5 Off-farm income corresponds to wage employment (agri-
cultural and nonagricultural), self-employment, public and private transfers, 
and rents (fi gure 4.1).
A wide range of household strategies correspond to many possible combina-
tions of these activities and incomes. Off-farm diversifi cation does not mean the 
complete abandonment of crop and livestock production. The specifi c blend 
of activities in a household depends on existing assets and returns, and on the 
opportunities presented by the economic environment in terms of investment 
options and risk. Labor and capital can be reallocated locally to other activities 
when alternatives exist, or to other places when factor displacement is the only 
option.
Figure 4.1 Classification of Activities and Incomes of Rural Households
Source: Authors.
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The Reality of the Off-Farm Economy in the 
Surveyed Regions
The RuralStruc sample illustrates a large variety of livelihood strategies that 
combine different activities and sources of income. The importance of off-farm 
sources at the aggregate level will be discussed fi rst, and an analysis of specifi c 
sources of income will follow.
Importance and Nature of Off-Farm Activities and Incomes
In the surveyed regions off-farm sources of income are widespread and share 
two main characteristics: their low returns and their failure to conform to pat-
terns in terms of type or distribution.
Widespread Development but Low Returns. While agriculture remains the 
backbone of rural livelihoods in most of the surveyed regions (as shown in 
chapter 3), off-farm activities exist everywhere and provide a substantial com-
plement to on-farm income or, in some cases, progressively replace it. Figure 4.2 
shows the participation rates of surveyed rural households in off-farm activi-
ties by distinguishing among strictly farm households (with no off-farm activities 
Figure 4.2 Participation in Off-Farm Activities in the Surveyed Regions (% of households)
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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or income), farm households combining both types of incomes (on- and off-
farm), and nonfarm households (those without a farm and therefore with no 
on-farm income).
In the SSA regions, the level of participation of rural households (almost all 
of which are farm households) in off-farm activities is extremely high (between 
80 percent and 95 percent). In fact, it is higher than the levels observed in the 
non-SSA regions that have patterns of on-farm specialization. Specialization 
is particularly evident in Morocco and Nicaragua, where a signifi cant share of 
households rely exclusively on farming activities (notably 50 percent in Saïss 
and Terrabona, and 75 percent in El Cuá). The three Mexican regions are 
unique. In Tequisquiapan, many households are no longer engaged in farming 
at all, while the Sotavento zones are still highly diversifi ed.
Translated into earnings, off-farm activities’ contribution to overall house-
hold incomes varies strongly by region, as shown in fi gure 4.3. Contrary to the 
results presented by Reardon et al. (2007), a work that compiled 40 studies in 
Africa and Latin America, the differences between SSA and non-SSA regions are 
less important than the differences observed within each group of countries, 
and SSA regions do not appear to be less diversifi ed than non-SSA regions.
The paradox highlighted by this chart is the gap between the value of off-
farm income and its share of overall household income. In the non-SSA regions, 
the value and the share follow the same trend, while in the SSA regions—with 
the exception of Nakuru North, Kenya—very low earnings from off-farm activi-
ties contribute a large share of total household income. This pattern, which is 
especially obvious in Senegal, relates to the high level of poverty discussed in 
chapter 3 and the limited availability of diversifi cation strategies, a topic that 
will be explored further. 
At the cross-national level, off-farm activities generate low incomes in SSA 
regions, where they provide the average household with less than $400 PPP per 
EqA per year (in Mali, Madagascar, and Casamance in Senegal, that number 
dips below $200 PPP). The exceptions to this pattern are the Bas Delta (Sen-
egal) and Nakuru North (Kenya), where the value of off-farm incomes is higher 
and refl ects more dynamic regional economies. This dynamism cannot be read 
simply as proximity to a city. In other regions in Kenya and Senegal, connection 
to a city is not enough to foster good returns from diversifi cation; for example, 
Nyando in Kenya is quite close to Kisumu, which is larger than Nakuru (see fi g-
ure 3.2 in chapter 3). In non-SSA countries, with the exception of agricultural-
based regions, the value of off-farm incomes is higher (from $600 PPP to $1,600 
PPP per EqA). Tequisquiapan ($2,600 PPP), where 70 percent of households do 
not engage in on-farm activities at all, is a unique case; it illustrates the situa-
tion of wealthier regions, where the role of agriculture has signifi cantly dimin-
ished but the overall welfare of rural households is not necessarily better than 
in regions that are more focused on agriculture (see chapter 3). 
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Fi gure 4.3 Average Regional Value and Share of Off-Farm Income in the Surveyed Regions 
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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Heterogeneity of Off-Farm Sources. A signifi cant dissimilarity appears among 
surveyed regions when off-farm income is further broken down into differ-
ent sources. The breakdown reveals diverse situations and strategies, and high-
lights the opportunities and constraints of the local environment that shape 
economic alternatives. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of the surveyed house-
Table 4.1 Main Off-Farm Activities and Incomes  
% of average off-farm income
Country Region Top off-farm 2nd off-farm 3rd off-farm
Mali Tominian Remit (48%) Self Emp (37%) Non Ag Wage (7%)
Diéma Remit (86%) Self Emp (11%) Ag Wage (3%)
Koutiala Self Emp (63%) Remit (20%) Non Ag Wage (7%)
Macina Self Emp (43%) Remit (22%) Ag Wage (17%)
Senegal Casamance Self Emp (69%) Remit (20%) Non Ag Wage (10%)
Mekhé 1 Self Emp (69%) Remit (19%) Non Ag Wage (12%)
Nioro Self Emp (77%) Remit (13%) Non Ag Wage (8%)
Haut Delta Self Emp (76%) Non Ag Wage (15%) Remit (9%)
Mekhé 2 Self Emp (68%) Non Ag Wage (19%) Remit (13%)
Bas Delta Self Emp (58%) Non Ag Wage (22%) Rents (13%)
Madagascar Antsirabe 2 Self Emp (67%) Ag Wage (21%) Remit (7%)
Alaotra 1 Self Emp (52%) Rents (19%) Ag Wage (18%)
Morondava Self Emp (50%) Ag Wage (24%) Non Ag Wage (16%)
Itasy Self Emp (53%) Ag Wage (25%) Non Ag Wage (12%)
Antsirabe 1 Self Emp (62%) Ag Wage (26%) Non Ag Wage (6%)
Alaotra 2 Self Emp (57%) Rents (23%) Ag Wage (16%)
Kenya Bungoma Non Ag Wage (54%) Self Emp (38%) Ag Wage (5%)
Nyando Non Ag Wage (56%) Self Emp (31%) Ag Wage (8%)
Nakuru N. Self Emp (72%) Non Ag Wage (24%) Rents (2%)
Morocco Chaouia Rents (30%) Remit (23%) Self Emp (22%)
Saiss Rents (47%) Remit (15%) Self Emp (15%)
Souss Rents (40%) Self Emp (24%) Non Ag Wage (14%)
Nicaragua Muy Muy Ag Wage (37%) Remit (30%) Non Age Wage (17%)
Terrabona Remit (32%) Non Ag Wage (31%) Self Emp (27%)
El Viejo Ag Wage (58%) Remit (19%) Non Ag Wage (17%)
La Libertad Ag Wage (67%) Self Emp (20%) Non Ag Wage (7%)
El Cuá Non Ag Wage (28%) Ag Wage (26%) Self Emp (23%)
Mexico Sierra SM Self Emp (38%) Public Transfers (32%) Ag Wage (15%)
T. Bajas Public Transfers (32%) Self Emp (30%) Ag Wage (15%)
Tequis. Non Ag Wage (47%) Ag Wage (24%) Self Emp (21%)
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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holds according to their main off-farm activities and the contribution of those 
activities to overall off-farm income. At the regional level, two major trends can 
be identifi ed in terms of types and combinations of off-farm incomes.
The fi rst trend is related to regional wealth levels: The diversity of off-farm 
incomes rises in richer regions. Households in non-SSA regions engage in a 
broader variety of off-farm activities. Their main off-farm income sources are 
more balanced, and the three largest sources generally contribute 75 percent to 
80 percent of overall off-farm income (with a few exceptions). In SSA regions, 
however, the primary activity most often contributes the major share of off-
farm income, with the three main sources frequently accounting for 90 percent 
to 95 percent of the total.
The other major trend is the importance of self-employment in SSA regions 
and the decreasing importance of this activity in richer regions. Self-employ-
ment is the top off-farm activity in 15 of 19 SSA regions but in only 1 of 11 
non-SSA regions (2, if the specifi c case of rents in Morocco is excluded—see 
section on Other Off-Farm Incomes below). In most western African regions, 
a combination of self-employment and migration dominates off-farm strate-
gies, while in Kenya and Madagascar, self-employment pairs with, respectively, 
nonagricultural and agricultural wage labor.
Characteristics of Off-Farm Activities
To explore the diversifi cation options available to households, this section and 
the next will review the scope and importance of each category of off-farm 
income. While there is not enough evidence to draw conclusions about the 
absolute level of effectiveness of each type of activity as a pathway out of pov-
erty, comparisons can be made between diversifi cation patterns observed in 
different regions and intermediary conclusions can be drawn about the extent 
of opportunities for diversifi cation out of agriculture.
The discussion centers on the level of development of each activity (the share 
of households involved) and the returns households earn from them (earn-
ings per economically active person or EAP).6 The survey was not suffi ciently 
detailed to identify the specifi c economic activity of each EAP in the household; 
thus, for a given household, total earnings from each activity were divided by 
total number of EAPs. This approach likely understates the returns from each 
activity, so the indicator must be regarded as a proxy.7
Agricultural Wage Employment: A Common Activity but Rarely an Exit 
Option. A general discussion of the relationship between farm structures and 
the importance of wage labor is necessary before reviewing its characteristics 
in the surveyed regions. 
Agricultural Wage Labor and Farm Structures. In developing countries, because 
of the high share of agriculture in employment, agricultural wage labor is a 
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common feature and a well-developed option for rural households seeking 
additional income. The development of wage employment in agriculture, how-
ever, varies sharply according to local labor demand, which depends on the 
degree of differentiation among farm structures. The existence of larger farms 
that are unable to meet all their own labor needs is generally a prerequisite 
for the availability of agricultural wage employment. The cultivation of certain 
labor-intensive products, for which full mechanization is not an option (typi-
cally horticulture and tree crops), can also be a strong driver of labor demand.8
In the regions studied by RuralStruc, particularly those in SSA but also the 
surveyed regions of Morocco, Nicaragua, and Mexico, family farms dominate. 
The program defi nes family-based farming as “a form of production character-
ized by a particular kind of link between economic activity and family structure, 
one where this relationship infl uences the choice of activities, organization of 
family labor, management of the factors of production and transfer of prop-
erty” (Bélières et al. 2002, p. 3). This defi nition makes it clear that within these 
family-based structures, most agricultural labor is provided by the members of 
the household who are not directly paid for their work. However, family farms 
can also make use of an external workforce when they are unable to meet all 
their own labor needs; for example, during peak activity periods. External labor 
can consist of both local mutual aid groups (relatives and other members of 
the community who work on a reciprocal basis without any monetary com-
pensation) and paid workers—either casual laborers or permanent agricultural 
employees.9
Labor demand rises with the emergence of larger family farms or the devel-
opment of managerial or large-scale entrepreneurial farms that rely on an exter-
nal workforce. This type of farm differentiation is generally limited in Sub-
Saharan African countries, where the majority of farms are small-scale units 
with few assets. It is more prevalent in other regions.
The RuralStruc sample shows different levels of farm differentiation. Farm 
sizes10 are bigger in the two Latin American countries, mainly in Nicaragua, 
where the average farm operates on 15–20 hectares (Ha).11 SSA countries show 
smaller acreages, particularly Kenya and Madagascar, where the means are 
around 1 Ha. Some surveyed regions of the highlands in Madagascar have even 
smaller farms, a consequence of the hilly landscape and, above all, of growing 
populations cultivating a limited amount of arable land.12 The case of the two 
West African countries is unique. There, larger family farms have developed, 
but family structures are also bigger (as discussed in chapter 3) and tend to 
include several households on the same farm.13 This is why fi gure 4.4 displays 
the distribution of plot sizes in the sample by hectare per family worker (EAP). 
Figures on average regional farm sizes would be misleading. Extremes are nota-
bly important in Nicaragua, where land inequalities are high. For example, in La 
Libertad, a remote livestock region in the agricultural frontier, 20 percent of the 
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Source: RuralStruc surveys.
Note: See box plot definition in figure 3.10, page 99.
Figure 4.4 Distribution of Farm Size per Family Worker (EAP)
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richest households own large-scale latifundia (agricultural estates)that account 
for 53 percent of the total land in the region. In El Viejo, a region in the Pacifi c 
plains that is known for unequal land distribution and land confl icts, as well 
as for being heavily engaged in the production of export crops such as sesame 
and sugar cane, 6 percent of the surveyed households are landless. A similar 
situation exists in Alaotra, in Madagascar, where 10 percent of surveyed house-
holds do not have access to land.14 (They are mainly families that migrated to 
the region to benefi t from agricultural labor opportunities.) In Morocco, land 
access can also be an issue, especially in regions with vast acreages of govern-
ment agricultural development schemes. These very differentiated situations 
are not common in SSA, where land access is mainly based on customary land 
tenure rights. 
However, whatever the farm structure, some demand for farm labor always 
exists, at least during the peak season (generally harvest but also transplanting 
in the case of irrigated rice).15 The major constraint when farm differentiation 
is limited is that labor supply increases for all during the dry season, when 
labor demand is scarce, and labor shortages are frequent at harvest time. This 
situation explains the development of mutual aid groups and stimulates short-
term migrations from other regions with different cropping seasons or different 
levels of available labor. Such is the case of migrations from the bassin arachidier 
to the Senegal River Delta in Senegal, and of similar migrations in Morocco for 
the wheat harvest and in El Cuá, Nicaragua, for the coffee harvest. More broadly, 
the cyclical imbalances between labor supply and demand refl ect the prevalence 
of structural underemployment, which is characteristic of many rural areas in 
developing countries.
Extent and Characteristics of Agricultural Wage Labor. In the surveyed regions, 
agricultural wage labor is relatively common. A quarter of the interviewed 
households earn agricultural wages, and the proportion is almost 40 percent 
in the more fully differentiated regions of Mexico and Nicaragua. Malagasy 
households, many of which are landless poor, also are more heavily engaged in 
agricultural wage labor (46 percent of households). 
There is, however, a bias related to the survey methodology. The focus on 
households prevents a full capture of the importance of agricultural wage labor: 
Wages earned in agriculture by households’ members during short-term migra-
tions in other regions are posted in the transfer category, and wages locally paid 
to migrants have to be counted on the migrant household’s side. These limita-
tions surely result in an underestimation of the local weight of agricultural 
wages. 
Behind these overall fi gures are two major facts. The fi rst, perhaps unsur-
prising, observation is that wage work in agriculture mainly engages the poor-
est households in each region, and its frequency decreases as overall income 
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rises.16 The inverse relationship between agricultural wage employment and 
overall household wealth is clearly illustrated by the share of agricultural wages 
in income per quintile.17 Agricultural wages account for between 20 percent and 
30 percent of overall income for households in the bottom two quintiles, then 
its weight decreases sharply. An exception is Nicaragua, where the shares remain 
high until quintile 4 (in Muy Muy, El Viejo, and La Libertad).18 
Agricultural wage work is a major source of income for the poorest house-
holds of the fi rst quintiles, notably in the regions where landless households 
exist.19 In some extreme cases, households rent their land to larger and better-
off farmers or agrobusinesses; because they lack the necessary means to develop 
their own plots, they end up as agricultural workers on their own land. This 
situation was observed particularly in Souss (RS 2 Morocco). 
The second observation is the low level of earnings related to agricultural 
wages. Figure 4.5 illustrates the differences in labor prices between SSA and 
non-SSA surveyed regions. The offi cial minimum wage is $3–$6 PPP per day in 
SSA and $8–$10 PPP in non-SSA countries.20 The agricultural wages observed 
during the surveys, mainly paid informally, are lower, with a few exceptions in 
regions facing strong pressure (temporary or not) on the labor market. This 
is the case in regions with important demand peaks—like the rice-producing 
regions of Mali, Madagascar, and the Delta in Senegal—and of regions with a 
signifi cant number of large-scale farms or agribusinesses in horticulture (Souss, 
El Viejo, Tequisquiapan) or livestock (La Libertad and Tequisquiapan).
The main issue is that in many regions, especially poorer ones, these local 
labor prices mainly refer to the peak season, when the available extra labor force 
of family farms is limited; during the off-season, there is no labor demand at 
all. Reported wages are daily prices for casual labor and cannot be converted to 
monthly or yearly rates.21 Paradoxically, when interregional migrations exist—
like those in the Delta region in Senegal and in El Cuá, Nicaragua—the benefi ts 
of this temporary labor demand are reaped by migrant workers coming from 
other regions. As a consequence, the average income earned from agricultural 
employment is very limited in the SSA surveyed regions (between $200 and 
$300 PPP per EAP per year) and even more insignifi cant in Mali. Incomes above 
$1,000 PPP (equivalent to $2.7 PPP per day) appear only in some of the pre-
viously mentioned regions of Morocco, Nicaragua, and Mexico, where more 
permanent labor opportunities exist. 
These fi gures, as well as the small number of households engaged in agricul-
tural labor, confi rm the limited contribution of agricultural wages to income 
diversifi cation and to poverty alleviation (Reardon et al. 2007). Even in Tequis-
quiapan, where the reported average daily agricultural wage is $18 PPP (thanks 
to the substantial development of agribusiness), returns averaged over the course 
of a year are low; in this case, around $6 PPP per EAP per day. Days in which 
an agricultural laborer could possibly earn $18 are severely limited in number.
130 
 
STRU
C
TU
RA
L TRA
N
SFO
RM
ATIO
N
 A
N
D
 RU
RA
L C
H
A
N
G
E REV
ISITED
F igure 4.5 Potential and Actual Returns from Agricultural Employment in the Surveyed Regions 
Sources: RuralStruc surveys; communication with RuralStruc teams; local regulations.
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The main conclusion about agricultural employment is the lack of strong 
remunerative opportunities. Agricultural jobs are overwhelmingly temporary 
and, above all, provide a very limited return when averaged over a year. They 
are a limited complement for many rural households (a quarter of the sample), 
even though they are an imperative for the poorest, who have very few options. 
Only permanent jobs can make a difference and create an opportunity to escape 
poverty, but they are too scarce and too poorly paid to provide a sustainable 
solution for many. 
Nonagricultural Wage Employment: Limited to Specifi c Regional Settings. The 
development of nonagricultural wage labor in general is a critical process in the 
standard model of structural transformation, and many developing countries 
that are engaged in economic transition show signifi cant shares of waged activi-
ties in the production of nonagricultural goods and services. However, patterns 
of nonagricultural wage employment depend on national and regional eco-
nomic characteristics, as well as the region’s stage in the diversifi cation process.
Here again it is worth mentioning methodological issues related to the 
characteristics of nonagricultural wage employment as a category. Its defi ni-
tion is quite vague, because it corresponds to all salaried activities that are not 
strictly related to the production stage of agriculture. This very broad defi nition 
includes extractive activities (mining, quarrying); off-farm processing activi-
ties in agribusinesses (cleaning, grading, industrial processing, and packaging); 
manufacturing (intermediate or fi nal goods); construction; and all kind of ser-
vices, public or private, in education, health, information, transportation, child 
care, security, and so on. All these activities include both skilled and unskilled 
jobs and can be developed with very different types of businesses in terms of 
size, capital, and management. 
The breadth of the category, as well as the importance of the informal sector 
and small businesses in most developing countries, means that distinguishing 
self-employment from nonagricultural wage employment can be diffi cult. It 
raises questions about certain types of jobs, which, although nominally waged, 
are mostly carried out in small workshops or small businesses at the micro 
level—for example, taxi driving or apprenticeship—and are therefore diffi cult 
to analyze when included in the same group as formal offi ce work or industrial 
work. The category is heterogeneous, and this must be kept in mind when com-
paring very diverse economic and institutional contexts. 
In the RuralStruc regions, about 25 percent of the surveyed households were 
engaged in agricultural wage labor, but nonagricultural wage employment only 
involved 15 percent of them, and strong differences were observed among 
regions (fi gure 4.6). 
In terms of participation, Kenya and Mexico stand out, with 40 percent of 
households involved in nonagricultural wage labor, while Madagascar and, 
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Fig ure 4.6 Participation in and Returns from Nonagricultural Wage Employment in the Surveyed Regions
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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above all, Mali lag far behind. Even in Mexico and Kenya, disparities are impor-
tant. In Tequisquiapan and Nyando, 57 percent of households participate in 
nonagricultural waged activities; in Bungoma and Nakuru, 34 percent; and in 
the two Sotavento subzones, only 21 percent. In Senegal, the Bas Delta and the 
north of the bassin arachidier (Mekhé) report fi gures of 20 percent and 25 per-
cent, respectively. Souss, Terrabona, and El Viejo, in Morocco and Nicaragua, 
attain 15 percent, the sample average. 
This situation is challenging and raises a question about the determinants 
of nonagricultural wage employment. As usual, there are micro- and meso/
macro-levels of explanation for the observed differences among households. At 
the micro-level, as broadly reported in the literature,22 the capability of house-
holds to seize local job opportunities mainly depends on their skills; this is 
shown by the positive and signifi cant correlation between level of education 
and participation in nonagricultural wage labor.23 Table 4.2 illustrates the vast 
differences among RuralStruc countries when it comes to education. Interest-
ingly, a household’s income quintile seems to have no effect on its participation 
in nonagricultural wage labor. Households in every income group engage in this 
type of labor, and the correlation between nonagricultural wage participation 
and total income level can even be negative. 
Table 4.2 Educational Level of the Surveyed Households
country average in %
  
No
education
Primary
school
started
Primary
school
fi nished
Secondary
school
started
Secondary
school
fi nished or
university
level
he
ad
 o
f h
ou
se
ho
ld
Mali 84 10 2 4 0
Senegal 79 16 3 2 0
Madagascar 18 56 7 18 1
Kenya 0 68 14 8 9
Morocco 50 15 22 10 3
Nicaragua 39  4 52 5 1
Mexico 24 38 22 1 15
hi
gh
es
t l
ev
el
 in
 th
e 
ho
us
eh
ol
d
Mali 40 20 33 7 0
Senegal 17 40 25 14 4
Madagascar 6 34 8 28 24
Kenya 0 26 28 26 20
Morocco 7  4 42 39 9
Nicaragua 0  0 8 56 36
Mexico n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
134  STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND RURAL CHANGE REVISITED
At the meso- and macro-levels, beyond the few jobs related to education, 
health, and local administration (primary school teachers, medical assistants, 
civil servants), the opportunities for nonagricultural employment depend on 
regional dynamics. These dynamics encompass natural assets, population and 
population growth, the quality of infrastructure and provision of public goods, 
density and access to cities (illustrated in chapter 3 in the fi gure 3.3 maps), 
and the presence of leading economic sectors that enhance economic growth 
and generate labor demand. Local effects can be huge and can distort regional 
results if surveyed rural households are in the range of a factory that provides 
hundreds of jobs for its neighborhood. 
In the RuralStruc surveys, manufacturing related to the apparel industry 
exists in Terrabona in Nicaragua as a result of the development of free trade 
zones (see box 4.1). But it is most prevalent in Tequisquiapan, Mexico, where a 
long tradition of maquiladoras, stimulated by NAFTA, has led to small produc-
tion units spreading into the countryside (see box 4.2). The jobs provided by 
these factories are relatively well paid and have a strong impact on local wealth. 
BOX 4.1
Free Trade Zones and Nonagricultural Wage Labor in 
Nicaragua
In Nicaragua, the number of factories operating in free trade zones (FTZs) has increased 
considerably since the 1990s. The fi rst industrial park, Las Mercedes, opened in 1976 
with 11 factories. Today, the FTZ system consists of a dozen industrial parks with about 
50 fi rms, mainly from Taiwan and the United States. The vast majority produce apparel 
for export, mostly to the United States. The sector has been very dynamic in terms of 
job creation: The number of jobs has increased from 1,003 in 1992 to 38,792 in 2001 
to around 70,000 today. Fifteen thousand new jobs are expected in the next three to 
fi ve years. It is estimated that 55 percent of the workers are young women with low 
education levels.
Factory work is highly concentrated in the Matagalpa and Managua zones, and 
benefi ts the nearby rural areas (Corral and Reardon 2001). In the RuralStruc surveys, it 
is mainly found in Terrabona, where the annual salaries generated by jobs in FTZs range 
from $2,500 to $4,500 PPP per capita. This is in line with estimates in other studies, 
which place monthly salaries at a maximum of US$500/month in 2009. In January 
2010, the government of Nicaragua, labor unions, and the private sector signed an 
agreement that will set salary adjustments in the FTZ for the next three years. The 
objective is to protect jobs and offer predictability, so investors can develop fi nancial 
plans for their fi rms. This agreement, known as the Social-Labor Consensus Agreement 
by the Free Zone’s Tripartite Labor Commission, establishes minimum wage increases 
over the next three years of 8 percent, 9 percent, and 10 percent. 
Sources: RuralStruc surveys; RS 2 Nicaragua.
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 BOX 4.2
The Maquilas of the Textile Sector in La Fuente, 
Tequisquiapan, Mexico 
The village of La Fuente in the municipio of Tequisquiapan is a good illustration of the 
process of “densifi cation” and diversifi cation of the rural economy in the south of 
the Querétaro state. With 3,884 inhabitants (2005 census), La Fuente is 18 km from 
 Tequisquiapan (population 26,858) and 24 km from San Juan del Rio, a city of 210,000 
that is connected by interstate highway to Querétaro and Mexico City. In spite of its 
urbanized environment, La Fuente remains signifi cantly involved in agricultural activi-
ties, with 24.3 percent of the local value added coming from agriculture in 2000, while 
agriculture’s share dropped to 3.5 percent in Tequisquiapan. Three maquilas operate in 
the village, with workforces of 150, 100, and 80. All workers are La Fuente residents or 
come from nearby villages. The large majority are women.
The two largest factories specialize in ropa barata (cheap clothing)—basic apparel 
for export—and have been suffering over the past years from intense competition with 
China. The third factory, Lecuria La Fuente, specializes in fi ne lingerie for the upper seg-
ment of the domestic market and sells its products under the Vanity brand to high-end 
boutiques like Liverpool and Palacio de Hierro. This market positioning and the higher 
skill tasks required have so far protected the company from foreign competitors. The 
business was founded by two people, including the director, a textile engineer who 
was born in the village. The land for the factory was bought from an ejidatario—a local 
resident who benefi ted from property rights associated with the ejido system (collec-
tive land distributed under agrarian reform). 
The fabric is directly imported from South Korea and Japan, and is cut by laser 
before being sewn together into lingerie. This is highly specialized work (it takes 10 
months to train a worker) and thus is well paid. Labor contracts are based on a price per 
minute and minutes per piece, and workers are paid according to their yield above or 
below the average time needed to sew a piece. The standard contract for a permanent 
worker provides a monthly wage of Mexican $2,400 ($330 PPP), plus social security and 
benefi ts. A good worker can earn 30 percent more: M$3,120 or $427 PPP; $5,130 PPP 
per year. Short-term (weekly) contracts are offered during peak production times. These 
contracts are offered to trained reserves and are better paid (+30 percent), at M$800 
per week but without benefi ts. The wages can be compared with M$500/week for 
farm workers or, most often, M$120–$140/day ($16–$19 PPP) for casual work.
The RuralStruc program surveyed 49 households in La Fuente. Only 14 had a farm 
(see table below). Despite the availability of well-paid nonagricultural jobs, farm house-
holds earn more, on average, than nonfarm households ($13,645 PPP compared with 
$8,286 PPP). This is broadly explained by the multi-activity pattern of the farm house-
holds, in which members are also engaged in off-farm activities, mainly agricultural 
and nonagricultural wage labor (usually practiced by women). Half of the sample’s 
households earn agricultural wages, and half receive nonagricultural wages; 15 per-
cent earn both. Fifty-fi ve percent of the households in La Fuente have an average 
annual income per EqA greater than $2,000 PPP; 10 percent have an income greater 
than $5,000 PPP.
(box continues on next page)
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In Souss, Morocco, the development of services related to the tourism 
industry in the nearby city of Agadir and the coastal resorts offers some limited 
opportunities. In the two other regions in Morocco, nonagricultural employ-
ment is still primarily related to processing and marketing agricultural prod-
ucts, and to construction and services. 
In Senegal, Bas Delta benefi ts from a connection to the city of Saint-Louis, 
and the location of Mekhé on the major highway between Saint-Louis and 
Dakar helps explain the relatively higher participation of surveyed households 
there in nonagricultural wage employment. Nioro and, above all, Casamance 
are farther from the dense area of economic activity around the coast (even 
though they are close to population centers), and Casamance is on the other 
side of The Gambia. However, as noted in chapter 3, differences in opportuni-
ties and market access do not signifi cantly affect overall household incomes.
Perhaps the most paradoxical situation is in Kenya, one of the most urban-
ized countries of Sub-Saharan Africa and a place where the urbanization process 
is still booming (see box 3.2). However, urban growth has not been accompanied 
by industrialization (the lack of which is a major feature of urbanization in SSA), 
so nonagricultural employment comes mainly from low-skill and often tempo-
rary jobs in the agroprocessing industry (sugar cane plants, canning), construc-
tion, and handicrafts, and in low-paid services (trade, transport, catering).
As a consequence of the various patterns among regions and countries, 
major differences are observed in households’ participation in, and earnings 
from, nonagricultural employment. Income earned from these activities is lim-
ited in the surveyed regions, with a striking difference between SSA and non-
SSA regions. In SSA regions, the average returns are in the range of $500 PPP 
per EAP per year; while in Morocco, Nicaragua, and Mexico, returns are near 
$1,500 PPP/EAP/year. Nakuru and Tequisquiapan deserve special attention. In 
Nakuru, returns average around $1,500 PPP, much closer to levels observed in 
Nicaragua and Morocco than to levels in the rest of Kenya. In Tequisquiapan, 
remuneration for nonagricultural wage labor can reach $2,500 PPP/EAP/year, 
well above any other opportunities observed in the RuralStruc surveys.
The two cases of Nakuru and Tequisquiapan—and, more broadly, Kenya 
and Mexico—illustrate the discussion on the importance of economic settings 
Box Table 4.2.1 Level and Structure of Income in La Fuente 
Total income
(mean in $PPP) Means of share of total income (%)
Households No. HH EqA
On-
farm
Ag.
wages
Non-Ag
wages
Self-
empl.
Public
transfers Remitt. Rents
Without farm 35  8,286 2,542  0 34 39 20 2 4  1
With farm 14 13,645 3,800 28 22 25  6 7 0 13
Sources: RuralStruc interviews, January 2008; RuralStruc surveys; RS 2 Mexico.
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in identifying options for nonagricultural wage labor. In Nakuru North, where 
about 34 percent of households are engaged in nonagricultural wage labor, the 
proximity of the city and nearby local tourism assets (Nakuru national park) 
give some household members access to jobs in public administration, edu-
cation (teachers), trade and transportation (the city is on the main Kenyan 
transport corridor), and the tourism industry. However, in Nyando, more than 
half the households are engaged in nonagricultural wage employment (20 per-
cent more than in Nakuru), and their earnings are lower. Nyando’s workers are 
employed in poorly paid jobs at sugar plants or in petty services. The difference 
in the type of nonagricultural wage labor available is decisive. In Mexico, the 
higher returns in Tequisquiapan are a direct result of the well-paid and some-
times highly specialized jobs available in the maquilas. 
The difference in the type of employment available and the level of income 
obtained from this work is confi rmed by the distribution of annual household 
earnings by level of income (fi gure 4.7). In Kenya, more than 50 percent of 
households earn less than $2,000 PPP, and only 5 percent make more than 
$10,000, because nonagricultural wage jobs are very low paying. In Tequisquia-
pan, households earn more money from nonagricultural wage labor. Twenty-
fi ve percent of households involved in these activities earn more than $10,000 
 Figure 4.7 Distribution of Households per Level of Nonagricultural Income, Kenya and Mexico
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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PPP, which is possible with two household members working in a maquiladora 
(see box 4.2) or through participation in higher skilled jobs. 
Overall, nonagricultural wage labor appears to be a limited option, its avail-
ability highly dependent on the characteristics of the regional economy. Oppor-
tunities, when they exist, most often come in the form of low-skilled and low-
paying jobs; the rare exception is manufacturing jobs. Without a signifi cant 
amount of further economic diversifi cation (which is not necessarily related 
to urbanization, as exemplifi ed by Kenya), this option is not available to the 
majority of households in either the short or medium term.
Self-Employment: A Prevalent Catch-All Strategy. As noted earlier in this chap-
ter, self-employment is the most common off-farm income in most of the sur-
veyed regions and the main diversifi cation option in the poorest ones. In wage 
employment, the worker is a “labor taker”; with self-employment, the worker 
is a “labor maker,” seizing opportunities to develop activities depending on his 
or her skills and capital. 
As a consequence, self-employment covers a broad range of trade and handi-
work activities, including those that rely on the transformation, transport, dis-
tribution, and sale of local natural and agricultural products (farm products, 
wood, forestry products, and charcoal); the transport and trade of manufac-
tured goods for the local rural market (small hardware shops); handicrafts (pot-
tery, basket making, jewelry, tailoring, shoemaking); and services ( hairdressing, 
eateries, letter writing, or repairs to farm equipment, vehicles, TVs, and other 
appliances). 
This diversity is illustrated in fi gure 4.8, which lists the activities engaged in 
by the surveyed households in Senegal. It shows the number of active persons 
(EAP) engaged in each of the main categories of self-employment by gender. 
The returns from these self-employment activities are highly dependent on 
the purchasing power of customers, which directly relates to the regional level 
of wealth. Returns from self-employment activities are as diverse as the array 
of activities themselves. When the self-employment activity does not involve 
specialized equipment or a unique skill, returns tend to be close to the local 
labor price. 
There is a strong heterogeneity among surveyed regions with regard to the 
share of households participating in self-employment. The survey also observed 
a high level of variance in the returns from self-employment at the household 
level. As shown in fi gure 4.9, these characteristics evolve in opposite directions 
and illustrate two kinds of situations. 
The fi rst situation occurs in regions with medium to high participation in 
self-employment (35 percent–80 percent) but low returns from these activi-
ties. This includes most of the SSA regions as well as those of the Sotavento in 
Mexico, where the level of engagement in self-employment is the highest in the 
survey. In these regions, the average annual return from self-employment is 
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around $500 PPP/EAP; in the bassin arachidier and the Delta in Senegal, and in 
the Sotavento in Mexico, the return reaches $750 PPP/EAP/year.
The second situation occurs in regions with a low or very low level of partici-
pation in self-employment (5 percent–15 percent). This is the case in Morocco 
and Nicaragua, and to a certain extent in Tequisquiapan, where rural house-
holds are little engaged in self-employment because they have other opportu-
nities, such as wage labor and migration. The returns from self-employment 
in these regions are much higher—on average, around $1,500 PPP/EAP/year. 
Souss and Tequisquiapan have even higher returns ($2,500–$3,000 PPP/EAP/
year), although these results mainly refl ect their wealthier regional contexts. 
Nakuru in Kenya is a unique case, in which the levels of returns from self-
employment rival those observed in Morocco and Nicaragua. However, Nak-
uru is widely stratifi ed in terms of self-employment earnings: Although many 
households are engaged in this activity (77 percent), a limited number have very 
high returns, pulling up the regional average.24
Behind this diversity, two major patterns appear. The fi rst corresponds to 
a sort of “positive diversifi cation,” in which self-employment contributes sig-
nifi cantly to household income. It is generally a full-time activity—a micro-
business with some equipment—which explains why households with more 
or better assets—or the ability to make a signifi cant initial investment owing 
to their fi nancial, social, or human capital—are more likely to take advantage 
of opportunities shaped by the local market. Of the entire survey sample, 41 
percent of households are engaged in self-employment but only 13 percent 
earn more than $5,000 PPP per year from this activity.25 These households 
are not necessarily located in regions broadly engaged in self-employment: 
 Figure 4.8 Self-Employment Activities in Senegal
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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 Figure 4.9 Self-Employment Returns in the Surveyed Regions
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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58 percent of Moroccan and 27 percent of Nicaraguan households that have 
self- employment activity are in this group, compared with 22 percent in Mexico 
and Kenya, and only 13 percent in Senegal.
The second pattern illustrates a more “neutral diversifi cation,” in which the 
poorest and most marginalized households develop coping or survival strategies 
by accessing minor self-employment activities with very low returns. These activ-
ities most often complement their on-farm incomes but pay far too little to serve 
as a viable poverty exit option. A full 51 percent of surveyed households engaged 
in self-employment earn less than $1,000 PPP per year, or $2.7 PPP per day. 
A fi nal result is that self-employment activities are not limited to places that 
offer no permanent waged activities outside agriculture (which is the conven-
tional wisdom on the issue). The diversity of the regional situations shows that 
both coping strategies in poor rural areas with limited options and positive 
diversifi cation strategies in richer and diversifi ed regions are possible. Fur-
ther, self-employment incomes benefi t substantially from dynamic economic 
environments. 
Other Off-Farm Income: A Substantial Complement
Off-farm income is not generated only through local activities implemented 
by the household members; it is also generated by activities implemented in 
 distant locations by migrant workers who send a portion of their earnings 
home. These remittances play a very signifi cant role in several surveyed regions. 
They constitute the major part of the “private transfers” income category, which 
can also include gifts or donations from other households, although these are 
much rarer. 
Public transfers are another off-farm income group—they refer to subsidies 
from the central state or local government (support to economic activities or 
social groups), as well as grants from NGOs or other local communities. In the 
RuralStruc surveys, public transfers are mainly observed and only signifi cant 
in Mexico.26 
The other category of non-activity-generated off-farm income is rents. This 
includes rental revenues from physical assets (land, equipment, and housing), 
and would have included securities income if any had been observed. Between 
5 percent and 10 percent of the surveyed households reported rental revenues, 
with the exception of households in Kenya, where the number is much higher 
(40 percent). But revenues from rentals are very low: 45 percent of households 
with rental revenues earn less than $100 PPP per year from them.27 
Migrations: Different Patterns for Different Regions. Rural households have 
always developed livelihood strategies that combine fi xed and mobile assets, 
where assets consist of both physical and human capital (Augustins 1989). 
Today, millions of people move every year to another region, to a city, or across 
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borders and oceans, seeking to reduce the gap between their own position and 
that of others in wealthier places (Black, Natali, and Skinner 2005). Adopting 
a more structural and historical perspective, migration is frequently about the 
intersectoral movement of labor and results from differences in returns to labor 
among economic sectors, notably between agriculture and the rest of the econ-
omy (Larson and Mundlak 1997). These labor migrations have been one of the 
most powerful drivers of economic transformation (see chapter 2). 
Often, migrations are not permanent or do not include the entire household, 
or both. This intermediate type of movement creates situations in which trans-
fers of goods and cash between different geographical settings and between dif-
ferent household members are frequent. Thus, the development of temporary 
migrations (which can be long term), facilitated by improved conditions of 
transportation, has resulted in a signifi cant increase in private transfers, espe-
cially international remittances, whose role in economic development has been 
much discussed over the past decade. 
However, the global picture can be misleading. Not only do patterns of 
mobility differ broadly across regions—as illustrated by the RuralStruc coun-
tries (see box 4.3)—but the impact of remittances varies depending on whether 
BOX 4.3
Patterns of International Migration in the RuralStruc 
Countries 
Patterns of international migration depend on geography and national trajectories. 
Mexicans, Moroccans, and Nicaraguans have taken advantage of the geographic posi-
tions of their countries which border higher income neighbors; About 10 percent of 
the population of each country lives abroad. This option is less feasible in Sub-Saharan 
African countries, except in Mali, which has about 11 percent of its population living 
abroad. Kenya and Madagascar have extremely low rates of emigration.
Box Table 4.3.1 Importance of International Migrations among RuralStruc Countries
Mali Senegal Madagascar Kenya Morocco Nicaragua Mexico
Stocks of emigrants in 
2005 (millions) 1.2 0.5 0.2 0.4 2.7 0.7 11.5
Population in 2005 
(millions) 11.4 11.7 17 33.4 29.9 5.6 104.3
Emigrants/Population (%) 10.6 4.0 0.9 1.3 9.1 12.2 11.0
Remittances in 2005 
(millions $US) 175 511  16  494 4.724 600 21.802
Remittances (% GDP) 3.9 6.7 0.4 3.4 9.4 13.3 3.5
Remittances 
($US/migrants) 144 1,103 106 1,156 1,738 878 1,895
Sources: Ratha and Shaw 2007; WDI.
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a micro- or macro-level analysis is undertaken. At the macro level, private trans-
fers from abroad can weigh heavily on national accounts, but the impact of 
these monies at the regional or household level can be very different. This is 
particularly true in rural areas, where the role of migrations has often been 
The destination of migrants greatly affects the returns earned from migration. In Mexico 
and Morocco, where the overwhelming majority of migrants work in OECD countries, 
the average return per migrant is high (near $2,000). At the other extreme is Mali: The 
Kayes region in the west of the country near the Senegalese border has a long tradition 
of emigration to France, but 90 percent of Malian migrants stay in West Africa, mainly 
in Côte d’Ivoire, and their returns are less than 10 percent of those earned by Mexican 
and Moroccan migrants. Nicaragua and Senegal illustrate an in termediate position: 
About half of their migrants work in rich countries, while the other half work in neigh-
boring countries (Costa Rica for Nicaragua, The Gambia and Mauritania for Senegal), 
with a proportional impact on the level of remittances sent. In Senegal, transfers have 
increased steadily since 2005.
Box Table 4.3.2 Destination of Migration Flows among RuralStruc Countries 
  Migrants’ country of origin (% in 2005)
  Mali Senegal Madagascar Kenya Morocco Nicaragua Mexico
to
 d
ev
el
op
ed
 c
ou
nt
rie
s
Canada 1  1 5 1 1  
France 4 20 54  29   
Israel     8   
Italy  15 1  11 1  
Netherlands     6   
Réunion   17  0   
Spain 1 5   25 1  
United Kingdom   1 34 1   
United States  3 1 11 2 36 90
Others 1 3 3 7 9 1 2
Subtotal 7 46 78 57 92 40 92
to
 d
ev
el
op
in
g 
co
un
tri
es
Burkina Faso 25       
Comoros   14     
Costa Rica      49  
Gambia, The 1 27      
Côte d’Ivoire 41       
Mauritania 1 9      
Nigeria 9 1      
Tanzania    26    
Uganda    8    
Others 16 18 8 9 9 11 8
Subtotal 93 55 22 43 9 60 8
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sources: Ratha and Shaw 2007; WDI.
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overstated. As noted by Reardon et al. (2007), both the literature and the con-
ventional wisdom among policy makers tend to emphasize the importance of 
migrant remittances, but many fi eld studies suggest that the share of households 
involved in migrations is actually relatively low. 
The discussion of the impact of migration is complicated by the diffi culty of 
capturing the various characteristics of mobility; for example, domestic or inter-
national, short-term or long-term. The importance of different types of migra-
tion varies from country to country and results in different patterns of migra-
tion. It is also diffi cult to estimate the amount of remittances because of their 
irregularity, the fact that they arrive through many different channels,28 and the 
fact that some respondents are reluctant to provide information about them.29 
In the RuralStruc regions, all kinds of migrations are a common feature: 
domestic or international, long- or short-term.30 Twenty-four percent of the 
surveyed households have experience in this area; the core range is 15 percent 
to 40 percent. The exceptions are Alaotra in Madagascar, La Libertad and El Cuá 
in Nicaragua, and the Sotavento in Mexico, where the number of households 
engaged in migration drop below 10 percent. On the opposite end, Tominian 
and Diéma in Mali and Nioro in Senegal exceed 60 percent (see fi gure 4.10). 
The determinants of migration are many and relate to push-pull factors in 
individual regions. The economic situation of the household, lack of opportu-
nities at the local or national level, visions of a distant Eldorado, and exogenous 
obstacles that limit possible migration routes combine to shape individual or 
collective decisions. Migration is often a choice at the household rather than 
individual level; sometimes, for international migrations, it is a decision of the 
community as a whole. Therefore, migration often relies on the ability of certain 
groups to create and maintain bonds of solidarity with diaspora members. 
When it comes to international migration, the decision to migrate is often 
not enough. The voyage abroad can be long and costly, particularly when the 
destination is one of the rich countries, where regulations are increasingly 
adverse. Because of travel and other associated costs, households with members 
who engage in international migration are likely better off. Not only does it cost 
money to migrate, the family may have to wait for many months or years before 
the migrant is able to send his or her fi rst remittance. 
Households with international migrants are also likely to be more skilled and 
to have better social networks, both of which facilitate the success of migrations. 
Income and human and social capital—the key determinants of international 
migration—combine to present unique, customized opportunities to house-
holds. Any one determinant on its own does not show a clear relationship with 
successful migration—all three are important.
Remittances are the top off-farm income in only 3 of the 30 surveyed regions 
(Tominian and Diéma in Mali, Terrabona in Nicaragua). They are ranked as 
the second largest off-farm income source in nine others, including regions in 
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Figur e 4.10 Importance of Migration per Surveyed Region
Source: RuralStruc surveys. 
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Senegal, Morocco, and Nicaragua (see table 4.1). However, even in regions where 
migration is important, earnings per migrant are very diverse (fi gure 4.10). 
A core group of regions displays earnings between $1,000 PPP and $2,000 
PPP (Diéma, Mekhé 1, and Bas Delta, all the surveyed zones in Morocco, and 
Mexico), while Kenya and Madagascar show evidence of very low transfers. The 
fi ve surveyed regions of Nicaragua, where average returns are above $2,500 PPP, 
stand out.31 In comparison, the earnings of Mexican migrants seem surpris-
ingly low, given what is known about the development of migrations in that 
country.32
From this very diverse picture, three main patterns of migration can be iden-
tifi ed based on the regional importance and duration of migrations, and the 
main destinations of migrants (fi gure 4.11). They correspond to 23 of the 30 
surveyed regions, and their major characteristics are presented in table 4.3. 
The fi rst pattern corresponds to international long-term migrations, mostly 
toward OECD countries (Diéma, Souss, and Saïss, Tequisquiapan). The second 
pattern illustrates migrations to neighboring countries. It is exemplifi ed by the 
specifi c case of Nicaragua, with short-term migrations to Costa Rica and El 
Salvador, where migrants are engaged in waged activities, mainly in agricul-
ture (export crops) and services (especially construction, housecleaning, and 
security). One explanation for the higher returns observed in Nicaragua is that 
Figure 4.11 Migrants’ Destination by Surveyed Region 
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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migrants maintain closer links with their households because of the proxim-
ity of their destinations. Migrants often return home after several months and 
carry the main part of their income with them in cash, which is not the case for 
long-term migrants, who organize transfers on a more irregular basis. The third 
pattern corresponds to internal migrations—to the capital city or other major 
cities, or to other rural regions. These migrations are heavily weighted toward 
short-term work—as shown by Tominian and Koutiala in Mali and by Terra-
bona in Nicaragua—but they can also be long term. In the poorest regions and 
for the poorest households (for example, in Kenya, Madagascar, and Mali), these 
migrations do not just aim to generate income. They help decrease the number 
of mouths to feed during the intercrop season, when on-farm family labor is not 
needed and the labor surplus is massive (RS 2 Mali). Or, more durably, they are 
a radical way to reduce household expenses.33 These migrants, who may work as 
servants or doing odd jobs, often earn very little money and simply fi nd a way 
to sustain their most basic needs.
 The seven remaining surveyed regions (the six Senegalese regions plus 
Macina) present a very mixed picture in terms of the destination of migrations 
(see fi gure 4.11). They illustrate strong combinations of all available migratory 
options. This situation is exemplifi ed by the bassin arachidier in Senegal, where 
the migration pattern provides further evidence of a regional catch-all strategy 
in terms of activities and incomes. Good connections to Dakar, Thiès, and Saint-
Louis offer multiple opportunities that help households cope with the deep cri-
sis in the groundnut sector. Nevertheless, this strategy of engaging in multiple 
activities—characterized by the accumulation of petits boulots (odd jobs) in the 
village, in the nearby small town, in the capital city, or, for some households, 
abroad—offers only a partial answer and does not provide an exit option out 
of poverty, as evidenced by the low level of incomes in the region (see box 4.4).
Table 4.3 Main Migration Patterns among the Surveyed Regions
% of households with migrants
>50 30–50 10–30 <10
>
50
%
 o
f m
ig
ra
nt
s 
by
 d
es
tin
at
io
n Abroad Diema Saïss Terrabona La Libertad 
Souss Tequisquiapan
Muy Muy  
Capital city Tominian    
Other regions Koutiala Chaouia El Viejo El Cuá
Antsirabe 2 Kenya (all) Tierras Bajas
  Madagascar 
(others)
Sierra SM
  Alaotra 1 & 2
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
Notes:  = >40% of migrants are short term.
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Two primary conclusions emerge from this discussion of surveyed house-
holds’ involvement in and earnings from migrations. The fi rst is the over-
whelming importance of geography. Places that are near high-income countries 
(Mexico, Morocco) or with easy access to dynamic middle-income countries 
(Nicaragua) have a clear advantage, because cost and diffi culty of access are less 
of a constraint and workers can fi nd better-paying jobs. Although it is not an 
absolute barrier (as illustrated by Senegal and Mali), distance complicates the 
picture, particularly when it is large and there is no ground transportation (the 
cases of Kenya and, above all, Madagascar are revealing).
The second conclusion refers to an emerging pattern that progressively 
reshapes many rural economies. Better transportation and communication 
everywhere have increased the opportunities for connections to a wide array of 
locations—nearby cities, regional and national capitals, locations outside the 
home country—which in turn lead to family networks connecting members of 
the same household who are working in these different places and for different 
periods of time. These networks correspond to new composite multilocalized 
systems, which redefi ne country-to-city links. In these “archipelago models,” 
the household remains fi rmly based in the countryside and inserted in its rural 
environment (economically, socially, and culturally), with a decision center (the 
head of the household) that manages income streams from household members 
 BOX 4.4
Migrating to Dakar to Sell Phone Cards: An Illusory Pathway 
out of Poverty
A good example of the petits boulots in which many Senegalese households engage is 
the sale of mobile phone cards—a proliferating activity in all African cities. Many young 
people who have migrated from rural areas try their luck at Dakar’s traffi c lights for a 
couple of months. 
Figures help explain the reality of this kind of work. These peddlers earn CFA75 
(0.28 PPP) for every CFA1,000 phone card sold (a 7.5 percent margin), or CFA900 for a 
CFA10,000 phone card (9 percent). They can make CFA525 a day ($2) by selling seven 
CFA1,000 phone cards, knowing that selling a CFA10,000 card is a rare event. On this 
meager income, vendors must pay for meals and a place to sleep. The price of a basic 
place to spend the night is about CFA30,000 per month, so a worker must reach a 
sales target of 400 phone cards a month and the competition is harsh. These costs can 
be mitigated to a certain extent—sharing a room with many others or even sleeping in 
the street—but with this type of work, it is a challenge to cover one’s costs, with little 
opportunity to bring any cash back to the village. 
Source: RuralStruc interviews, October 2009.
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who live and work in different locations (like islands coordinated with their 
capital).34 Although these family networks can facilitate permanent migration 
and exit from the countryside, they are most often a way of “leaving to stay.”35 
By combining multiple livelihood strategies, households adjust to their evolving 
environments and maintain their affi liation with the local community, even if 
some members must leave to enable this to happen.
Public Transfers: Specifi c to Mexico. In the surveyed regions, public transfers 
are signifi cant only in Mexico. As an upper-middle-income economy with a 
strong fi scal base, the Mexican state has implemented a well-developed pub-
lic support system targeted toward rural areas (Léonard and Losch 2009). The 
transfer programs mainly focus on poverty alleviation, with social safety nets 
that target specifi c groups (for example, Oportunidades for the poorest) and 
subsidies to the agricultural sector through several programs (Procampo for 
production, Aserca for marketing, and Alianza for investment). Procampo ben-
efi ts all farms, regardless of wealth level—the support a farm receives depends 
on the size of its area under cultivation. However, the other two programs are 
for large farms or agrobusinesses. These transfers have played a signifi cant role, 
and their multiplier effect on incomes has been confi rmed through research 
(Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Davis 2001). They have been complemented over the 
past few years by new programs related to decentralization (for example, Ramo 
033 or “remote area” programs) and environmental protection, which mainly 
benefi t local governments and communities.
More than 15 public programs were observed in the income structures of the 
surveyed households. Most of the farm households were involved in the Pro-
campo program, which explains why 80 percent of households are involved with 
public transfers in the two Sotavento zones, while only 32 percent are involved in 
Tequisquiapan, where very few households have farms. However, these transfers 
may not be accurately targeted. In the Sotavento, they represent 12 percent to 
20 percent of household income in all quintiles, which indicates a disconnect 
between the level of income and the allocation received (see box 4.5).
Off-Farm Diversifi cation and Rural Transformation
Broadly, the literature suggests that diversifi cation is the norm among develop-
ing countries’ rural economies and that it leads to the emergence of vibrant 
rural nonfarm economies. However, the RuralStruc results provide a more 
nuanced picture. The survey results show that although diversifi cation is pres-
ent everywhere, its characteristics are dramatically different and vary signifi -
cantly among regions. 
Differences among and within regions refl ect the strong heterogeneity 
of the studied situations. One major distinction between SSA and non-SSA 
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B OX 4.5
Unequal Access to Public Transfers in Mexico’s 
Sotavento Region
In the Tierras Bajas and Sierra de Santa Marta surveyed zones of Mexico, respectively, 
public transfers are the fi rst and second sources of off-farm incomes. They represent 32 
percent of total off-farm income and constitute on average 15 percent of total income 
(RS 2 Mexico–Sotavento, 25).
As refl ected in the fi gure below, one of the most striking survey results in these 
regions is the inequality of the distribution of public subsidies with regard to both social 
groups and geographic areas. The richest households benefi t from a level of public 
transfers that is seven times higher than that received by the poorest households and 
50 percent higher than the sum of the subsidies received by the households of the three 
lowest quintiles. This inequality has also a strong spatial dimension: In Tierras Bajas, 
where three-quarters of the richest households surveyed in the Sotavento are located, 
the average level of public transfers is regionally higher ($1,797 PPP) than in the moun-
tain area ($1,329 PPP). Above all, subsidy levels are strongly correlated with incomes. 
Instead of smoothing income inequalities and compensating for differences in asset 
provision, it appears that public transfers, in fact, contribute to accelerated differen-
tiation with a “transition” toward a specialization in agriculture on bigger farms and 
attendant measures (safety nets) for other households. 
Box Figure 4.5.1 Public Transfers by Surveyed Zone and Level of Household Income 
Source: Adapted from RS 2 Mexico. 
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 countries refl ects their different levels of economic development. This distinc-
tion does not refer to households’ levels of participation in off-farm activities, 
which are quite similar; rather, it refers to the specifi cs of diversifi cation—the 
type of activity and its economic returns. 
Two types of diversifi cation appear in the RuralStruc sample. In the Sub-
Saharan African countries, diversifi cation mainly represents coping strategies—
a response to strong and persistent poverty. On-farm activities dominate and are 
accompanied by a structural underemployment that refl ects the seasonality of 
agriculture, the lack of overall economic diversifi cation, and limited job oppor-
tunities. Off-farm activities mainly correspond to low-return self-employment, 
while opportunities for waged labor (in agriculture and even more in other 
sectors) are scarce, low-paying (refl ecting the situation of the labor market), 
and mostly temporary. As a result, off-farm incomes have a very low value and 
constitute only a partial response to poverty, even if they can contribute signifi -
cantly to overall household income in regions facing diffi cult agricultural situa-
tions, such as the bassin arachidier in Senegal. Some households in every region 
obtain better returns: those that can fi nd permanent nonagricultural jobs (for 
which an education is a strong asset) or that can develop specifi c types of self-
employed activities (here, skills and existing income can make the difference). 
But these exceptions do not change the overall picture. 
In non-SSA countries, where the level of wealth is higher and the economy 
more diversifi ed, off-farm activities are more lucrative. They refl ect a more 
positive diversifi cation and often represent a full-time activity. This means 
that some households (or household members) specialize in off-farm activities 
while other households (or members) specialize in agriculture. This is clearly 
illustrated in the surveyed regions in Nicaragua and Morocco, and in Tequi-
squiapan, Mexico, where the number of households combining on-farm and 
off-farm activities is dramatically lower than in SSA.
The RuralStruc observations suggest that the characteristics of off-farm 
diversifi cation to some extent mirror the process of economic transition as a 
whole: an incipient low-return diversifi cation in the early stages of structural 
transformation and a more mature diversifi cation at later stages that consoli-
dates the process of change. 
Three fi nal interesting and cross-cutting outcomes deserve mention. The 
fi rst is a result of the surveys that partially contradicts the conventional wis-
dom that says urbanization and demographic density can propel economic 
growth by themselves. The poor economic results obtained from the surveyed 
households in the dense coastal area of Senegal and in western Kenya show that 
although urbanization and density can facilitate and expedite the process of 
rural transformation, their characteristics (for example, the quality of densifi -
cation) are important, as well as the characteristics of the economy as a whole, 
notably its diversifi cation and productivity. 
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The second outcome relates to the diffi culty of capturing the entire pro-
cess of economic diversifi cation. Because the surveys targeted rural households 
(households in areas defi ned as rural), they missed households that migrated 
into urban settings during the process of transformation. These new urban 
households were able to access better services and living conditions, engage in 
more off-farm activities, and in some cases even keep their farms—a situation 
observed in the Mexican survey. This methodological bias means that the dis-
tinction between rural boroughs and small cities is at least somewhat theoretical 
and that a major challenge for information systems is to capture the reality of 
the rural-urban continuum, which evolves through the process of densifi cation. 
This issue also highlights the somewhat ephemeral nature of the rural nonfarm 
economy. The RNFE tends to grow and at the same time be dissolved into the 
urbanization process, as off-farm specializers migrate to urban areas and cities 
“move to the country”—a consequence of increasing demographic densities 
and the territorial development of cities related to the urban growth process. 
The third outcome concerns what is learned from migrations. Although it is 
diffi cult to capture information on the amount of transfers, the surveys show 
that 24 percent of the households interviewed are engaged in migration, a level 
that is somewhat low but consistent with many rural studies. The surveys also 
show that the economic returns from migration are related to the destination 
of migrants, which is itself strongly infl uenced by geography, particularly by the 
proximity of high-income countries. In addition to the direct income benefi t 
of migration in the form of remittances, a “network effect” can provide indirect 
returns. The survey results point to the development of archipelago systems, 
in which a household earns income from members in various locations. These 
workers can be spread along a geographic continuum from rural to peri-urban 
to urban, and can be located in other regions of the country or even abroad. But 
they all remain part of the same household. This type of organization, facili-
tated by improvements in transportation and communication infrastructure, 
allows for greater diversifi cation and risk management, and improves the eco-
nomic prospects of households. 
If characteristics of the historical pathways of structural transformation are 
present, the development of these new kinds of links could modify the modali-
ties of rural transformation by fostering additional opportunities. But they 
require access to services and adequate provision of public goods—in addi-
tion to infrastructure—to strengthen rural-urban linkages and create effi cient 
density.
Notes
 1. Ellis (1998) explains the common confusion between risk strategies and coping 
behavior: Risk management is an ex ante strategy to anticipate failure, while coping 
is the ex post response to a crisis. Ellis notes, however, that coping can also cor-
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respond to the emergence of new livelihood patterns resulting from distress and 
crisis.
 2. For a general approach, see Barrett and Swallow (2005), Ellis (2000, 2004), and 
Wiggins and Davis (2003); for regional issues, see Reardon, Berdegue, and Escobar 
(2001) on Latin America, and Barrett, Reardon, and Webb (2001) and Bryceson 
(1999, 2002) on Africa.
 3. This is the defi nition of off-farm adopted by, among others, Barrett and Reardon 
(2000), Davis et al. (2007), and Haggblade, Hazell, and Reardon (2010).
 4. Many authors include agroprocessing as a whole in rural nonfarm activities (see 
Haggblade, Hazell, and Reardon, 2010). The program considers that the on-farm 
processing of raw products should be included in on-farm activities, as in most 
cases it directly contributes to adding value to farm outputs. This is particularly 
true in SSA, where processing often concerns the products of the family farm itself. 
When products are processed by agro-industries or small-scale independent enter-
prises, labor earnings are obviously off-farm and considered as nonagricultural wage 
employment or self-employment.
 5. Occasional hunting, fi shing, and gathering are not agricultural activities per se 
but, as common rural practices based on the use of natural resources, they can be 
included in on-farm income.
 6. Annex 4 in the appendix posted at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ruralstruc shows 
these results by surveyed region.
 7. The program chose to use this proxy rather than confi ning the analysis of off-farm 
activities to the household level, because it allows differences in the number of EAPs 
per household to be taken into account.
 8. On agricultural wage labor related to horticulture, see McCulloch and Ota (2002) 
on Kenya and Maertens and Swinnen (2007) on Senegal.
 9. Agricultural wages can be fully paid in cash or partly or fully in kind, for example, a 
quantity of the product, meals, and/or housing on the farm for permanent employ-
ees. Agricultural workers are often casual laborers, which complicates the estimation 
of annual values of agricultural wages.
10.  The variable here is “land used”; that is, the farm area used by the household, 
whether owned or not, for crops and breeding, including fallow land (see annex 4 in 
the appendix posted at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ruralstruc).
11.  Farm structures in Mexico refl ect the impact of the agrarian reform, even if strong 
disparities remain at the national level. The surveyed regions are, however, char-
acterized by small to medium farms. The average size of the surveyed farms in the 
Sotavento region is around 10 Ha in the lowlands and 6 Ha in the mountains; in 
Tequisquiapan, they are smaller (2 Ha) and coexist with several agribusinesses that 
hire jornaleros (laborers).
12.  In Madagascar, between the last two censuses (1985 and 2005), the national average 
size of farms dropped from 1.2 Ha to 0.86 Ha (RS 1 Madagascar).
13.  The economically active population (EAP) per household is between six and nine 
persons in the surveyed regions of Mali and Senegal, which is two or three times as 
many persons as in other regions (see annex 4 in the appendix posted at http://www
.worldbank.org/afr/ruralstruc).
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14.  In addition to Alaotra and El Viejo, other surveyed regions with signifi cant landless 
households are Tequisquiapan (19 percent), Souss (10 percent), and Sotavento (7 
percent). In the survey, landless households were defi ned as households engaged in 
agriculture through agricultural wage employment but without any access to farm-
land, regardless of the type of tenure.
15.  Peaks of labor occur for all major regional productions: in the rice-growing regions 
of Madagascar (Alaotra, Itasy), Mali (Macina), and Senegal (Bas Delta); for horti-
culture in Madagascar (Itasy and Antsirabe) and Morocco (Souss and Saïss); for 
pineapple in the Tierras Bajas of Sotavento in Mexico (although maize is strongly 
mechanized); for cotton in Koutiala (Mali); for coffee in El Cuá (Nicaragua); and for 
sugar cane in El Viejo (Nicaragua) and Nyando and Bungoma (Kenya).
16.  There is a negative correlation between the share of agricultural wages in the overall 
household income and the level of total income. The result is slightly negative for 
the overall sample (Pearson = –0,068) and higher for the non-SSA regions (Pear-
son = –0,24). Similarly, the level of agricultural wages decreases with farm size, 
which indicates better assets and possibly better-off households but also a better 
employment rate for family labor. The correlations between total farm size (land 
used) and the value of agricultural wages are signifi cant: –0,114** in Madagascar; 
–0,096** in Kenya; –0,112** in Morocco; –0,059* in Nicaragua; and –0,059* in 
Mexico (*signifi cant at the 0.05 level; **signifi cant at the 0.01 level).
17.  The shares of agricultural wage labor in the overall income are displayed per quintile 
and surveyed region in chapter 6, fi gure 6.1.
18.  The cases of Mali and Senegal are again unique. Even if household members some-
times engage in agricultural wage labor, it is very occasional and the amounts earned 
are small (a few percent of the total income for all quintiles). This limited develop-
ment of wage labor is explained by the importance of the family workforce, which 
limits the demand for external labor.
19.  Agricultural wages of landless households account for about 50 percent of their 
overall income in Alaotra, 65 percent in Souss and Tequisquiapan, 75 percent in 
Sotavento, and more than 90 percent in Nicaragua.
20.  The fi gures correspond to minimum national wages in Mali and Mexico, and to 
minimum rural wages in the other countries.
21.  In the Senegal River Delta, Les Grands Moulins du Sénégal, a subsidiary of La 
Compagnie Fruitière, is one of the very few agribusinesses engaged in horticulture 
production for export (mainly production of cherry tomatoes in greenhouses). The 
company employs 1,200 temporary workers over a period of four months and 80 
permanent workers. The wage for the temporary workers is FCFA 50,000 per month 
($193 PPP), which is quite similar to the $8 PPP daily agricultural wage observed in 
the Bas Delta region (for a standard 22-day work month). But if the earnings of these 
lucky few, who accrue all their wages over the course of four months, were averaged 
over a year, the daily rate would be $2.1 PPP (RuralStruc interviews, March 2008).
22.  See, for instance, Reardon, Berdegué, and Escobar (2001) and de Janvry and Sadou-
let (2001).
23.  The Pearson correlations between the level of education of the most educated mem-
ber in each household and the level of nonagricultural wages is positively signifi -
cant in every country, but particularly in the SSA countries: Mali (0,286**), Senegal 
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(0,225**), Madagascar (0,220**), Kenya (0,286**), Morocco (0,083*), Nicaragua 
(0,194**), and Mexico (0,194**) (*signifi cant at the 0.05 level; **signifi cant at the 
0.01 level).
24.  Forty percent of the households earn less than $500 PPP/EAP/year, a number closer 
to the other SSA averages (61 percent earn less than $1,000 PPP/EAP/year).
25.  This threshold is somewhat arbitrary. It corresponds to $14 PPP per day. Twenty-
two percent of the households earn more than $3,000, and 4 percent earn more than 
$10,000. 
26.  Other transfers were observed, mainly in Tominian, Mali (support from a religious 
charity to poor families), and in some villages of Madagascar. They are marginal.
27.  The exception here is Morocco, where 19 households in the survey have rental rev-
enues above $10,000 PPP per year, which mainly correspond to urban rentals in 
the regional cities. These outliers affect the regional averages and explain why rents 
appear as the fi rst source of off-farm income in Morocco, which is a major distor-
tion. The exclusion of these households from the sample was considered, but because 
they were part of the rural reality, it was decided that they should be included (RS 2 
Morocco, 40).
28.  Offi cial banking and cash-transfer channels are an important vehicle, but signifi cant 
fl ows are transferred from abroad through informal networks.
29.  This is particularly the case in Mexico, where it is increasingly diffi cult to capture 
information about remittances, because many respondents refuse to answer. This 
reluctance is mainly related to illegal migration, which (even though it is over-
whelmingly developed) is under offi cial scrutiny and to fears linked to the criminal-
ization of money transfers. RuralStruc surveyors encountered this problem.
30.  For the survey, long-term migrants were defi ned as persons who are geographically 
distant from the household for more than six months in a year and who send (or do 
not send) remittances, whatever the amount.
31.  The high returns in El Cuá and La Libertad (more than $4,000 PPP per migrant) 
must be put in perspective with the very small number of households involved (5 
percent) and the migrants’ destinations: mostly the United States and Spain. 
32.  Even though the Sotavento is not a traditional emigration zone, short- and long-term 
migrations to the irrigated perimeters of the Pacifi c coast have developed. The earn-
ings declared during the survey were mainly related to long-term migration. Their lim-
ited amount is fully related to the diffi culties presented above about survey conditions. 
33.  The Pearson correlations between the number of members of the household present 
and the total number of migrants are positively signifi cant in Mali (0,390**), Senegal 
(0,144**), and Madagascar (0,168**). (**Correlation is signifi cant at the 0.01 level.)
34.  The archipelago model was initially developed in Andean studies in the 1970s to 
describe the multiple settlements of households across varied ecological landscapes 
related to the altitude (see Van Buren 1996). It has been applied to the new patterns 
of rural economies characterized by the importance of short- and long-term migra-
tions, notably in Mexico. See Quesnel and Del Rey (2005), Léonard, Quesnel, and 
Del Rey (2004), Del Rey (2008), and Gastellu and Marchal (1997). At the same time, 
the concept was also used to qualify the spatial dynamics of globalization (Veltz 
1996; Viard 1998). 
35.  This is the evocative title of Cortes’s book (2000) on Bolivian peasant communities. 

Chapter 5
A major fi nding of the RuralStruc surveys, discussed in chapter 3, was the 
persistent importance of on-farm activities in rural livelihoods. In almost all 
the regions surveyed, between 90 percent and 100 percent of rural households 
have a farm; the major exception is Tequisquiapan in Mexico. The share of 
households’ on-farm incomes is signifi cant in every region, although it varies 
according to the importance of the off-farm diversifi cation processes described 
in chapter 4. 
A core objective of the program, refl ected in its fi rst hypothesis (H1), was 
to investigate the extent to which the restructuring of agrifood markets linked 
to liberalization and globalization has led to the emergence of modern value 
chains and to assess the persistence of more traditional products and market 
organization patterns. A related question concerned the development of spe-
cialization in agriculture—one of the WDR08’s possible exit pathways out of 
rural poverty—through increasing vertical integration. 
The so-called “supermarket revolution” and new integration processes 
along globalized value chains have affected developing countries to very differ-
ent degrees. These differences are directly related to the integration of national 
markets and their connection to the global economy, and thus to the overall 
process of economic transition. For this reason, upheaval in agrifood markets 
(often a focus in the literature) can be somewhat of a straw man. It tends to 
ignore the fact that large areas of the rural world remain unconnected, and it 
overemphasizes integration dynamics, which play out only gradually. Owing to 
the wide range of situations represented in the RuralStruc countries, signifi cant 
variations were expected among them. However, the fi ndings suggest that new 
integration patterns remain quite limited across the sample, and the program’s 
investigation of on-farm activities became something of an elusive quest for a 
new agriculture. Of course, the selection of countries affects the results, and 
although the Mexican surveyed regions have clearly evolved signifi cantly, the 
overall picture remains gray—marked everywhere by the extent and conse-
quences of rural poverty. 
Searching for New Patterns of 
On-Farm Specialization
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After a brief overview of the general characteristics and consequences of 
the global restructuring of agrifood markets, this chapter focuses on the main 
features of on-farm activities in the surveyed regions, notably the importance 
of self-consumption and commercialization. It reviews the different patterns 
of crop specialization or diversifi cation and fi nishes with an assessment of the 
ongoing processes of market integration. 
The Big Restructuring1 
The process of agricultural liberalization has been occurring over a long period 
and is not yet complete. Starting in the early 1980s, agriculture was subjected to 
the same process of state withdrawal that affected other economic sectors but 
at a slower pace, (owing to the fact that governments perceived it as a strate-
gic sector).2 This process continues today through the diffi cult and seemingly 
never-ending WTO Doha Round (see chapter 1). The liberalization of interna-
tional markets is particularly diffi cult when it comes to the question of market 
access and public supports, but changes in domestic markets have been more 
radical. The dismantling of regulatory bodies and public companies and the 
subsequent wave of privatization have led to the entrance of new players (often 
with strong international connections) into the market, the gradual dissemina-
tion of new rules, progressive new balances of power, and the emergence of a 
new food regime.3
Ongoing Processes of Change 
Changes in the market environment occur at both the national level and the 
international level. Changes at these two levels combine to create new rules of 
the game for local stakeholders that affect their room to maneuver.
Domestic Market Liberalization. At the national level, the main changes are 
related to state withdrawal and the privatization process, which was accompa-
nied by the implementation of new regulations.
Before Liberalization. In all the RuralStruc countries, as in many developing 
countries, agricultural markets before liberalization were characterized by a 
dual system with asymmetric levels of state intervention. On the one hand, 
most domestic staple markets and commodity exports were controlled and 
highly regulated via marketing boards, state-run industries, administrative 
commodity pricing, and fi xed wholesale and retail prices for many basic food 
products. Most of these public bodies were monopsonies, especially for major 
export products and sometimes for staples (with some cases of associated 
monopolies). The structures were initially created to (1) promote growth in 
the agriculture sector, because according to the development paradigm, capital 
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accumulation in agriculture was the fi rst stage in the development process; (2) 
stabilize producer prices (and incomes) over the course of a single crop season 
and reduce price variability between seasons, with the objective of reducing 
risks; (3) increase farm gate prices and improve farmers’ investment incentives 
by reducing the number of intermediaries along the commodity chains; and (4) 
facilitate exports by managing the entirety of the national agricultural supply. 
On the other hand, a few traditional nonstaple markets (mostly fresh prod-
ucts, such as fruit, vegetables, and dairy) were almost free, with little or no 
state intervention or price regulation. Spot transactions involving many small, 
nonspecialized, and unorganized buyers and sellers characterized these markets. 
Few, if any, grades or standards existed; poor market information systems pre-
vailed; and informal contracts, largely enforced through social networks, were 
the norm (Fafchamps 2004). 
Because of the weakness of the private sector, states also intervened in pro-
cessing, mainly through parastatals. This often occurred in key industries in 
the traditional export sector, such as groundnuts, palm oil, tea, coffee, cocoa, 
and sugar. Many industrial crops were produced by public, vertically integrated 
fi rms aiming for economies of scale. State control was justifi ed by the need to 
process quickly because of perishability and by stringent quality requirements 
for export products such as palm oil and tea.
Withdrawal of the State. In the 1980s and 1990s, market-oriented agricultural 
policy reforms were a centerpiece of liberalization in developing countries. 
They were often implemented in the context of structural adjustment programs 
designed to restore fi scal and current account balances, to reduce or eliminate 
price distortions, to facilitate effi cient price transmission, and to stimulate 
investment and production (Akiyama et al. 2003; Barrett and Mutambatsere 
2005). These reforms were justifi ed by the fact that the state-run structures—
such as marketing boards, development agencies, and public enterprises—were 
no longer meeting their original objectives and were perceived as symbols of 
state ineffi ciency. More broadly, state withdrawal was a prerequisite for moving 
toward full market liberalization. Thus, the fi rst steps in reforming agricultural 
markets were the dismantling and privatization of these state-run structures, 
as well as the reduction of tariffs and export taxes, consumer subsidies, and 
producer price controls. 
Tables 5.1 and 5.2 present some examples of the dismantling of former pub-
lic bodies in RuralStruc countries.4 These restructuring processes occurred over 
an extended period—from the end of the 1970s to the end of the 1990s. The 
starting point, scope, and pace of liberalization were country-specifi c, which 
explains the large variations among countries.
New Market Regulation. State withdrawal from agricultural markets and the 
dismantling of parastatals and regulatory systems generated a new economic 
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and institutional environment at the national level. These changes had sev-
eral consequences that can be summarized by two related features. First, value 
chains rapidly became market driven and dependent on supply and demand 
variations. Many private actors emerged, but many were later eliminated in the 
intense competition that followed state withdrawal. One condition for survival 
was to increase alliances with foreign capital, a phenomenon that, in a context 
characterized by many fragmented producers and larger but fewer marketing 
agents or processors, exacerbated asymmetries and allowed the later groups to 
progressively control the value chains. The result was a process of concentration 
and the emergence of big players who greatly transformed market dynamics.
Second, as a result of the removal of regulations and price management, 
uncertainty and transaction costs increased for private actors in this increas-
ingly competitive environment. Trade and processing companies responded 
by securing their supplies through the implementation of contracts with pro-
ducers, producer organizations, and buying agents. Some of these companies 
engaged in even closer integration by buying local subsidiaries or organizing 
supply networks that in return offered specifi c support to producers. All of this 
changed the rules of the game.
Table 5.1 Market Reforms in Non-Sub-Saharan RuralStruc Countries
 Before liberalization After liberalization
 Morocco   
ONICL State marketing board: full control 
on marketing of grains through 
fi xed prices (especially wheat), and 
strictly controlled imports
1988–96: progressive liberalization 
of the grain market
Ofﬁ ce National Interprofessionnel 
des Céréales et Légumineuses
Quotas subsist for the “national 
fl our”
OCE State marketing board: monopoly 
on exports for citrus, horticultural 
products, canned foods etc.
1985: end of the monopoly and 
liberalization of exportsOfﬁ ce de Commercialisation et 
d’Exportation
 Nicaragua   
ENABAS State marketing agency: monopoly 
on staples commercialization and 
export crops such as peanuts, 
sesame and soy
1984: elimination of price 
differential for basic grains
Empresa Nacional de Alimentos 
Básicos
1990: full liberalization of staple 
commercialization
 Mexico   
CONASUPO State-run enterprise: monopoly on 
imports, supervision of exports, and 
domestic market supply for staples 
with controlled prices
1989: end of marketing monopoly 
on imports and on domestic 
market for all staples but maize 
and beans
Compañía Nacional de 
Subsistencias Populares
1999: end of market intervention 
for maize and beans
INMECAFE State marketing board: support to 
farm production, processing and 
marketing, and monopoly on 
coffee exports
1993: dismantling of the board 
and liberalizationInstituto Mexicano del café
Source: RuralStruc country reports, Phases 1 and 2.
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Table 5.2 Market Reforms in Sub-Saharan RuralStruc Countries
 Before liberalization After liberalization
 Mali   
OPAM State marketing board: monopoly 
on commercialization of grains
1986: end of the monopoly
Ofﬁ ce des Produits Agricoles du 
Mali
1989: liberalization of imports and 
domestic commercialization 
Offi ce du Niger Parastatal: management of water, 
land, and irrigation infrastructure 
in the Offi ce area; monopoly on 
marketing and processing of rice
1994: end of intervention on rice 
(except for extension) 
CMDT Semipublic company (40% to the 
French DAGRIS, now Geocoton): 
inputs supply, extension, market-
ing, and processing of cotton 
seed, supply of cotton fi ber to the 
domestic public textile industry 
(COMATEX) and exports
On-going liberalization since 2004
Compagnie Malienne de Dével-
oppement des Textiles
 Senegal
ONCAD State marketing board: monopoly 
on commercialization of domestic 
agricultural products (groundnut, 
grains) and imports, and supervi-
sion of producers’ cooperatives 
1979: liquidation 
Ofﬁ ce national de commercialisation 
et d’assistance au développement
1991: liberalization of local market 
and imports of rice
SONACOS State-run enterprise: processor for 
groundnut oil
2006: privatization
Société nationale de commercialisa-
tion des oléagineux du Sénégal
 Madagascar   
BCSR
Bureau de Commercialisation et de 
Stabilisation du Riz
State marketing board: full monop-
oly on rice
1983–86: end of monopoly on 
domestic commercialization of rice 
1990: privatization of imports
1991: end of the buffer stock
HASYMA Semipublic company (36% the 
French DAGRIS, now Geocoton): 
inputs supply, extension, marketing, 
and processing of cotton seed, sup-
ply of cotton fi ber to the domestic 
public textile industry and exports
2004: privatization (90% of the 
capital held by DAGRIS)Hasy Malagasy
 Kenya   
NCPB State marketing board: monopoly 
on grain marketing (domestic mar-
ket and exports)
1991–95: privatization and 
liberalization of marketingNational Cereals and Produce Board
KCC
Kenya Cooperative Creameries
Cooperative company: monopoly 
on processing and sales of dairy 
products in all urban areas
1992: end of monopoly
1999: collapse as a consequence 
of new competition
2000: buyout and creation of KCC 
Holdings
2003: takeover by the 
government and “revitalization.” 
Creation of new KCC
(table continues on next page)
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The New Agrifood Markets. The major changes in the domestic markets took 
place in the context of other major restructuring processes in international 
agrifood markets. These processes are the result of the liberalization dynamics 
described above and of new patterns in food demand that emerged in response 
to globalization (see fi gure 5.1). 
The main consequence of this evolution, which started in the 1980s, is a 
trend toward increasing levels of integration that feed and consolidate the ongo-
ing restructuring of domestic markets. The main attributes of these processes of 
integration are the development of standards and closer relationships between 
producers and buyers. Of course, these changes develop at very different rates 
in different countries. The aim of the following section is to provide a frame of 
reference to understand the changes that are under way.
New Patterns in Agrifood Demand. The major trends on the demand side can 
be summarized as follows: (1) the world’s population is becoming increasingly 
urban; (2) growing incomes result in quickly evolving diets, with more protein 
and high-value foods (meat and dairy, fruits and vegetables) instead of staples; 
(3) until the current period of increasing food prices, structurally decreasing 
prices stimulated agrifood market dynamics; and (4) an increasingly integrated 
world trade environment and improved transportation systems have spurred 
the convergence of dietary patterns and food preferences (FAO 2004).
As a consequence of these simultaneous changes, consumer-driven value 
chains (for fruits, vegetables, meat, dairy products, and fi sh and seafood prod-
ucts) grew rapidly. Telecommunications facilitated long-range commerce, and 
changes in shipping and storage technologies in the mid- to late 1980s allowed 
fresh produce (apples, strawberries, and asparagus, for example) to be shipped 
from Southern Hemisphere producers to Northern Hemisphere consumers. 
The expanding demand for and trade in perishable products and high-value 
foods brought about a need for more safety standards.5 This change is evident 
CBK State marketing board: monopoly 
on collection, processing, and 
exports of coffee
2001: end of monopoly. Now 
advisory role only.The Coffee Board of Kenya
TBK State marketing board: regulation 
of the tea industry (production, 
research, processing, trade, and 
promotion on domestic and 
international markets)
No change
The Tea Board of Kenya
KTDA Public development agency: 
management of production 
through provision of inputs, 
extension, collection, processing, 
and marketing of tea
2000: privatization. Now Kenya 
Tea Development Authority with 
technical support to the industry.
Kenya Tea Development Authority
Source: RuralStruc country reports, Phases 1 and 2. 
Table 5.2 (continued)
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 Figure 5.1 New Patterns and Trends in the Agrifood Systems Resulting from Liberalization 
and Globalization
Source: Authors.
New patterns
in agrifood market regulation
Centralized
administrated
system
Price control
Many producers vs
state monopolies
Free market system
supply/demand
Market-driven price
Many producers vs
private oligopolies
Less price distortion
More uncertainty or
transaction costs
Quality requirements
Development of norms
and standards
Competition among big players
Need of increasing market share
Urbanization (+)
Incomes (+)
New diets
fresh products:
F&V, dairy, meat 
New market
segments such as
niche markets
Organic, fair, ethical
Transport revolution
Tariffs decrease
Fair trade and supply
Disconnected
production and
consumption places
Market deregulation
and privatization
FDI investments (+)
Integration and
concentration (+)
New patterns
in agrifood market demand
Need for contracts and
increasing integration
New patterns of factors and
product mobility
in the growing attention paid to the risks associated with agricultural inputs 
(residues from pesticides, veterinary medicines, and so on) and microbiological 
contamination. The implementation of stricter food safety and quality stan-
dards in the high-income countries has had a strong impact on the evolution 
of supply chains. Exporters and retailers, in particular, use new kinds of pro-
duction and marketing contracts, and technical and fi nancial assistance can be 
provided to strengthen the new linkages.
The shift of markets from supply driven to demand driven in a context of 
increasing incomes (at the aggregate level) has also transformed relationships 
among commodity chain stakeholders. Today, consumers in rich countries are 
increasingly looking for safety and for information on how products are grown 
and traded, to ensure socially fair and sustainable agricultural practices. This 
growth in consumer awareness has progressively supported a range of alterna-
tive initiatives in international, national, and local agrifood systems, and has 
fueled changes in retail patterns as fair trade, organic, and other alternative 
foods have entered mainstream venues. With the emergence of these niche 
markets, new standards and controls have been established parallel to the 
implementation of more generic certifi cation structures. For instance, efforts 
are made to protect the integrity of organic standards to further differentiate 
organic foods and to promote different forms of short supply chains for local 
community development.6 
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Contracts, in their various forms and with varying degrees of obligation, 
usually reduce risks for the buyer and seller. They have appeared in response to 
the removal of the controlled marketing systems as a possible way to guarantee 
standards and requirements for the purchaser. For the producer, selling under 
contract arrangements is less risky if the requirements for the product are high 
and its characteristics are complex. Also, it is often the only way to access certain 
markets. For this reason, contracts have progressively spread to emerging fresh 
product chains and niche markets, where product attributes are clearly defi ned 
in terms of norms and standards, and where the fi nal value of production allows 
for the coverage of specifi c costs of contracts (selection, negotiation, monitor-
ing, and enforcement). 
New Actors and New Patterns of Factor Mobility and Trade. Since the 1980s, 
increasing long-distance trade and foreign direct investment (FDI), facilitated 
by liberalization policies and the implementation of free trade agreements 
(FTAs), have broadly modifi ed the scope of agricultural production and mar-
keting. They are the consequence of a more open international economy result-
ing from economic liberalization and progress in technology: on the software 
side, the Internet for fi nance and information; on the hardware side, shipping, 
storage, and processing. These factors have all greatly increased the effi ciency 
of international trade and domestic marketing, and have paved the way for 
major investments by new players everywhere, particularly in processing and 
retailing since the 1990s (Barrett and Mutambatsere 2005). A handful of verti-
cally integrated transnational corporations and strategic alliances among major 
companies have increasingly gained control over specifi c national markets (box 
5.1) and over global trade, processing, and retailing of food products (Vorley 
2003). The “supermarket revolution” (box 5.2) is an example of the tremendous 
development of these processes.  
The differences among countries can be explained by socioeconomic factors 
related to consumers’ demand for supermarket services, product diversity, and 
quality. Among these factors are income level and urbanization, correlated with 
the opportunity cost of time (especially that of women); reduction in transac-
tion costs through improvements in roads and transport; and development 
and ownership of refrigerators. These demand-side factors are necessary but 
not suffi cient to explain the very rapid spread of supermarkets in the 1990s and 
2000s in developing countries, most of which had a very small supermarket 
sector before 1990. Supply-side factors, combined with the overall objective of 
governments throughout the developing world to modernize the retail sector, 
were also extremely important, especially the infl ux of retail foreign investment 
(as countries liberalized the rules for FDI) and improvements in procurement 
systems. The RuralStruc countries are good examples of this evolution (see 
box 5.6).
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 BOX 5 . 1
Restructuring the Mexican Maize Industry
Mexico is a good example of a country in which extensive restructuring has occurred 
in the agricultural sector. It began at the end of the 1980s with the termination of a 
state-run company’s monopoly on marketing (Conasupo—see table 5.1) (Yunes Naude 
2003), price deregulation, and the implementation of NAFTA in 1993 (Appendini 
2001). During this process, the maize sector received preferential treatment because of 
the crop’s importance as the main component of Mexican diets; its weight in the agri-
cultural sector; and its social, cultural, and political status. First, producers were offered 
transitional, nondistortive targeted support through a subsidy based on plot size (Pro-
campo); this subsidy was set to expire in 2008. Second, the domestic value chain was 
protected from a surge of NAFTA-related imports through a transitional quota system. 
U.S. imports would be limited to an annual duty-free quota of 2.5 million tons, subject 
to a 3 percent annual increase. Imports beyond 2.5 million tons were to be taxed at a 
rate of 215 percent. This quota system was also planned to be progressively dismantled 
by 2008 (Lederman, Maloney, and Servén 2005). 
These policy changes led to strong processes of concentration. Mexico’s large com-
mercial maize farms benefi ted from numerous public supports. One was the Procampo 
subsidy, which awarded more funds to farms with larger acreage under cultivation. 
Although this program was designed with a cap on subsidy amounts, it resulted in a 
situation in which Mexico’s large maize farms (only 10 percent of the total) were cap-
turing 53 percent of Procampo’s resources by 2003. Large farms also benefi ted from 
programs designed to support their modernization and connection to markets. The 
Aserca and Alianza programs targeted farms with the best prospects for productivity 
growth with large subsidies for marketing and investment. Over time, the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s budget shifted in favor of the latter programs. While Procampo repre-
sented 70 percent of its budget during President Zedillo’s term (1995–2000), it fell to 
50 percent under President Fox’s administration (2001–06), with the difference going 
to fund Alianza and Aserca (Zahniser and Coyle 2004).
The concentration of production led to shifts in the geography of the sector (RS 2 
Mexico, 36). Previously, Mexico’s 2 million smallholders—mostly located in the central 
and southern regions—had dominated the national market. In the past 20 years, the 
300,000 large commercial farms have grown to occupy 23 percent of the land under 
cultivation while supplying 35 percent of the market. Most are located in the north-
west (especially Sinaloa), where irrigation is widespread and productivity can be up 
to 9.8 tons/Ha (compared with 1.4 tons/Ha for smallholders elsewhere). On the pro-
cessing side, state withdrawal, privatization, the end of fi xed tortilla prices, and sup-
ports to the industrial fl our industry led to an erosion of the artisanal tortilla sector. A 
powerful oligopoly of industrial millers came to control 52 percent of the fl our supply 
(SAGARPA 2007) and leveraged this control to vertically integrate tortilla producers 
through licensing systems (Léonard 2010). Today, two major groups supply the indus-
trial fl our market: Maseca (75 percent) and Minsa (15 percent). 
(box continued on next page)
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 BOX 5 .2
The Supermarket Revolution
The penetration of modern food retailing varies among developing countries. Reardon 
and Timmer (2007) describe the process this way:
Experiencing supermarket-sector “take-off” in developing countries in the 
early to mid-1990s, the fi rst wave included much of South America, East Asia out-
side China, and South Africa—areas where the average share of supermarkets in 
food retail went from roughly only 10–20% circa 1990 to 50–60% on average by 
the early 2000s. The second wave includes parts of Southeast Asia, Central Amer-
ica, and Mexico, where the share went from circa 5–10% in 1990 to 30–50% by 
the early 2000s, with the take-off occurring in the mid- to late 1990s. The third 
wave includes countries where the supermarket revolution take-off started only in 
the late 1990s or early 2000s, reaching about 10–20% of national food retail by 
circa 2003; they include some of Africa and some countries in Central and South 
America (such as Nicaragua, Peru, and Bolivia), Southeast Asia, and China, India, 
and Russia. Sub-Saharan Africa presents a very diverse picture, with only South 
Africa fi rmly in the fi rst wave of supermarket penetration but the rest either in the 
early phase of the third wave take-off of diffusion or in what may be a pending—
but not yet started—take-off of supermarket diffusion. (p. 284)
The dominant position of the industrial producers was strengthened by their involve-
ment in importing yellow corn from the United States, and they benefi ted greatly from 
the government’s decision to only sporadically enforce the quota restrictions and import 
duties described above (Wise 2009). Imports of maize increased from 1.3 million tons in 
1992 to 8.8 million tons in 2008, well beyond the allowances created under the quota 
system. More than half of these maize imports (which are 95 percent–98 percent yellow 
corn) are controlled by seven companies (De Ita 2008). These include the two major 
millers—Maseca (in which ADM holds a 25 percent equity stake) and Minsa (associ-
ated with Corn Products International, which took control of the Arancia corn-refi ning 
company in 1998)—as well as Cargill-Continental; three major companies involved in 
the poultry and feed production industries (Bachoco, Pilgrim’s Pride, and Purina); and 
Diconsa, a state-owned company spun off from the former Conasupo, which is still 
charged with supplying basic food products to marginalized rural communities.
The incorporation of yellow corn (traditionally used for feed) into fl our production 
is a dramatic change that is modifying the structure of the Mexican maize market 
and consumption patterns (tortillas are traditionally produced with white maize). It is 
directly resulting in domestic producer prices that are well below the international ref-
erence price, while fi nal tortilla prices have continued to rise (Appendini 2008).
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Expected Consequences of Restructuring for Farming
All these changes in agrifood markets have upstream consequences at the pro-
ducer level. However, questions remain about the strength, depth, and pace of 
this global restructuring for farming.
In theory, global markets present an opportunity for suppliers—valuable 
new consumers and products year round—as far as they are able to connect. 
Contractualization is often seen as a tool to facilitate smallholder integration 
into these new markets, increasing and stabilizing their incomes. The WDR08 
supports this view and argues that contractualization and development of agri-
cultural entrepreneurship is one way for smallholders in developing countries 
to escape from poverty. It is true that smallholders are constrained by capital 
and liquidity diffi culties, as well as lack of access and capacity to adopt techno-
logical innovations. Contract farming with supermarkets, processors, or export 
agents could help them overcome these constraints. This perspective has fos-
tered a renewed interest in the donor community in value-chain approaches, 
leading to an extensive literature as well as new programs and projects.7 
However, as previously mentioned and noted by Reardon and Timmer 
(2007), among others, contractualization implies increasing requirements in 
terms of norms and standards, sometimes including specifi cations for how the 
product should be grown, harvested, transported, processed, and stored. Thus, 
contracts and the new markets with which they can connect farmers are an 
opportunity only for producers who can meet the requirements. For others, 
the increasing contractualization of supply chains carries a substantial risk of 
marginalization, particularly when the overall economic and institutional envi-
ronment is not favorable for the large majority of producers—the situation in 
many countries, especially in Africa (Gibbon and Ponte 2005). This growing 
contractualization and associated marginalization will have a clear impact on 
farm structures. The core issue is to understand the development of these pro-
cesses of differentiation and to be able to anticipate their positive and negative 
effects. 
The Regoverning Markets research program (box 5.3) addressed these ques-
tions. The program found an initial increase in the participation of smallhold-
ers in modern value chains, frequently followed by their progressive marginal-
ization as larger producers enter the market and are able to provide more supply 
with the required quality (Vorley, Fearne, and Ray 2007; Reardon and Huang 
2008). This progressive differentiation among producers is exacerbated by the 
practices of major retailers and by supermarket procurement systems. As super-
markets and major retailers try to facilitate the adoption of their specifi cations 
and reduce their transaction costs, they often choose to work with a reduced 
number of suppliers that can provide high volumes and high quality. 
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Thanks to the Regoverning Markets program, more is known about the 
characteristics and modalities of value chain integration and contractualization 
development, but little is known about the extent of these processes. How far 
did these new forms of market integration trickle down in various developing 
countries in which the pace of change has differed? What numbers are at stake? 
How many farmers are engaged in these new value chains?
Agricultural and customs statistics provide data on high-value products and 
exports, but data are not available on the number of producers participating 
in the different types of value chains, which is a recurring obstacle in assessing 
these new developments. RuralStruc teams were unsuccessful in their attempts 
to collect accurate data on value chain participants during the Phase 1 sector 
reviews, but the few numbers gathered suggest that in every country thousands 
of farmers are engaged in these new value chains while hundreds of thousands 
(or even millions) remain involved in more traditional agriculture. The now-
famous success story of the development of horticulture in Kenya is a good 
illustration of the potential and limitations of high-value exports (see box 5.4).
An Elusive New Agriculture 
The processes of change under way in agrifood systems and their consequences 
in terms of the increasing integration of agriculture obviously occur at  different 
 BOX 5 .3
Regoverning Markets 
Regoverning Markets was a multipartner collaborative research program (2005–07) 
that aimed to analyze the growing concentration in the processing and retail sectors 
of national and regional agrifood systems and its effects on rural livelihoods and com-
munities in middle- and low-income countries. The goal of the program was to provide 
strategic advice and guidance to the public sector, agrifood chain actors, civil society 
organizations, and development agencies to help them anticipate and manage the 
effects of changes in local and regional markets.
The program focused on agrifood market restructuring to assess its upstream 
effects on the various segments of the value chain: retail (especially supermarkets), pro-
cessing, wholesale, and farming. It compared country/product pairs at different stages 
of restructuring, using farm household surveys and commodity chain analyses. House-
hold surveys were conducted with a focus on selected products in high-value chains, 
mainly fresh products such as fruits, vegetables, and dairy.
Source: http://www.regoverningmarkets.org.
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 BOX 5 .4
The Kenyan Success Story in Horticultural Exports: 
How Many and Whom?
Over the past two decades, horticultural products (fruits, vegetables, and cut fl owers) 
have become the largest category in world agricultural trade; they account for 20 percent 
of global agricultural exports. In SSA, horticulture exports have developed rapidly, but 
production remains localized in a few key regions. Kenya is a famous example. It is the 
second-largest horticultural exporter on the subcontinent after South Africa, the second-
largest developing-country exporter of fl owers after Colombia, and the  second-largest 
supplier of vegetables to the EU after Morocco. Horticulture has become Kenya’s second-
largest commodity export sector, after tea (English, Jaffee, and Okello 2006). 
This is an indisputable success story in terms of market share, export earnings, and 
growth, although some fears exist about its impact on water resources. It is useful to 
examine the development of these horticulture exports in the context of the structure 
of the Kenyan agricultural sector as a whole. Although information is scarce because 
there are no statistics, it is possible to build a generalized picture from targeted surveys 
and interviews with major stakeholders, notably exporters. 
Several authors report that, in the early 1990s, the majority of horticulture exports 
were produced by smallholders (Harris 1992 and Jaffee 1994, among others). However, 
Dolan and Humphrey (2000) estimated that, by the late 1990s, when horticulture exports 
were much larger, 40 percent came from the exporters’ own estates or leased land; 42 
percent came from large commercial farms; and only 18 percent came from smallholders, 
who had diffi culty meeting the safety and quality requirements of international buyers. 
Jaffee (2003) offered more optimistic fi gures on smallholder engagement, with small-
holders’ share of the export market at 27 percent for fresh vegetables and 85 percent for 
fresh fruit, for an overall sector share of 47 percent. These estimates refl ect a situation in 
which the majority of export growth occurred outside smallholder agriculture.
Estimating the number of smallholders involved in the industry is equally diffi cult. 
According to the last national survey—the 1994 Welfare Monitoring Survey—the num-
ber of farms in the country was estimated at 3.4 million, and fewer than 20,000 small-
holders were engaged in horticultural exports (Jaffee 1995; Asfaw, Mithofer, and Waibel 
2007). English, Jaffee, and Okello (2006) estimated the total employment generated by 
the horticultural export industry in a range of 120,000–150,000 jobs in 2003, with a 
third in the cut fl ower industry, where smallholders are not involved. The other two-thirds 
are in fruits and vegetables, where employment is split among smallholder farms (40,000 
jobs), processing plants (10,000), and the large estates and packhouses (50,000). 
This analysis indicates that although the sector offers important macro-level returns 
and opportunities for tens of thousands of households (whom McCulloch and Ota 
showed to be richer than the average household in their area), one must keep in 
mind the size of the overall farming sector and the dynamics of the labor market. In 
2010, there were 840,000 labor market entrants—650,000 in the rural sector alone 
(box continues on next page)
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speeds, depending on local and national characteristics. The RuralStruc coun-
tries are no exception, and the surveyed regions illustrate a large diversity of 
situations.
The most striking results of the fi eldwork are the continued high share of 
staple crops in the farm production of surveyed households—even in regions 
that are involved in export crops—and the high proportion of self-consump-
tion. The latter is not a surprise per se, as a large share of agricultural produc-
tion in developing countries consists of self-consumed staple crops. However, 
in the ex ante “winning” regions of the survey, one could have expected results 
showing deeper levels of crop diversifi cation and connection to markets. This 
is not the case: Even in the most integrated regions of the sample, agricultural 
production patterns are still relatively domestic-oriented and traditional.8
This section reviews the patterns of agricultural production observed and 
discusses the extent of crop diversifi cation and conditions of market integration.
Characteristics of On-Farm Income 
On-farm incomes are earned from a wide range of on-farm activities, the char-
acteristics of which are related to agro-ecological conditions, the specifi c pat-
terns of agrarian systems, and the local market environment. 
Overview. On-farm income can be divided into four main types of rural 
incomes (see fi gure 4.1): crops; livestock; income from hunting, fi shing, and 
gathering; and income from on-farm transformation processes, such as the 
transformation of milk into cheese. Figure 5.2 shows that crop production gen-
erates the main share of on-farm income and dominates regional output every-
where. Its dominance is challenged only in La Libertad in Nicaragua, Chaouia 
in Morocco, and Nakuru North in Kenya, where livestock accounts for around 
50 percent of on-farm income. 
The fi gure also shows that the surveyed farm households do not rely so 
much on natural resources for income generation.9 The main activities in this 
category are fi shing in the Offi ce du Niger zone in Mali (Macina), in Lake Vic-
toria in Kenya (Nyando), and along the Pacifi c coast in Nicaragua (El Viejo); 
and gathering fruits in Tominian and Koutiala (Mali). Processing of on-farm 
products remains surprisingly limited. Where it does occur, processing concerns 
(see chapter 2). Muendo and Tschirley (2004) showed that in Kenya, over 90 percent 
of smallholder farmers in nonarid regions produce horticultural products, mostly for 
domestic consumption, and that fruits and vegetables for the domestic market account 
for over 90 percent of total horticultural output by volume. This overall perspective is 
a useful reminder of the challenges that remain despite the impact of horticultural 
exports on Kenya’s economy, as well as the potential for growth in other production 
sectors, which could also benefi t from policy makers’ attention and support.
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F igure 5.2 Overall Structure of On-Farm Income
% per surveyed region
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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Table 5.3 Categories of Products Used for Data Analysis
Staples Rice, maize, wheat and durum, other cereals (millet, sorghum, fonio, barley), 
cassava, potato, other staples (peas and beans—niebe, voandzou, chick peas, 
lentils, etc.), soy
Traditional commodities Cotton, groundnut, sesame, coffee, sugar cane
Fruits and vegetables Olive, citrus, other fruits, green beans, tomato, onion, other vegetables
Livestock products  Milk, other livestock products (butter, meat, etc.), live animals
Others Forage, others (coconut, herbs and spices, etc.), other subproducts (sweet 
 potato, cassava, groundnut leaves, etc.)
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
livestock products (mostly low-quality cheese production) and initial process-
ing of coffee in Nicaragua, cheese and olive oil in Morocco (Saïss), and ground-
nut paste in Senegal.
To further analyze agricultural production, fi ve main categories of products 
(see table 5.3) were designed by summarizing more than 30 products identi-
fi ed during the surveys. This kind of grouping exercise is always complicated, 
especially when it includes different regions and their different consumption 
patterns, as the use of products varies.10 
Figure 5.3 displays the overall structure of households’ gross farm product 
across the regions.11 The striking result is the large share of staple food crops. 
Ninety percent of the farm households in the sample are engaged in staple pro-
duction (98 percent in SSA and 76 percent in non-SSA regions). In 18 of the 
30 surveyed zones, staple production is more than 50 percent of the gross farm 
product; it sometimes reaches 80 percent. The main exceptions are Morocco 
and, partially, Kenya and Senegal. Generally, staple production concerns one 
main type of product, usually cereals. The term refers to rice throughout Mada-
gascar, in Macina (Mali), and in Senegal’s Delta and Casamance; millet and sor-
ghum in the three other regions of Mali and in the bassin arachidier in Senegal; 
wheat in Morocco; and maize in Kenya, Mexico, and Nicaragua. Cereal produc-
tion is mainly rainfed, but in some cases farmers have developed irrigated rice 
(Madagascar, Senegal, and Mali) and maize (Mexico).12
Beans are the second staple crop in Nicaragua; in Antsirabe (Madagascar), 
potatoes are an important share of staple food production. Although the potato 
value chain originally developed in response to urban demand, the product 
has progressively transformed local consumption patterns and is now widely 
self-consumed as well as sold. Roots, tubers, and plantains are grown in most 
regions, except in Morocco. In Senegal, cassava developed in the bassin arachi-
dier and is one of the major diversifi cation options in response to the deteriora-
tion of the groundnut sector.
Livestock are present in all the surveyed regions, and commercialization of 
live animals is the rule. This is particularly true in Mali, one of the main cattle 
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Fi gure 5.3 Main Farm Products per Surveyed Region
% of gross farm product 
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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providers for the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea. Some regional spe-
cialization in livestock products exists, particularly in dairy. Nicaragua’s “milky 
way” (Muy Muy) produces fresh milk and dairy products, and La Libertad has 
a traditional on-farm, low-quality processed cheese industry (industrial pro-
cessing units are not used owing to infrastructure constraints). Nakuru North 
in Kenya, Antsirabe in Madagascar, and the Saïss region in Morocco have dairy 
belts that have led to the development of agro-industries. Casamance in Senegal 
also engages in some processing and trades these products locally. Marketing 
patterns for livestock products and the development of agro-industry can be 
explained by the quality of infrastructure available in each region. This deter-
mines what can be sold (for example, fresh refrigerated milk for processors and 
supermarkets that supply cities versus homemade low-quality cheese for local 
rural markets in Nicaragua), as well as the strength of reachable local demand 
(proximity and access to cities). 
Livestock income, in absolute and relative terms, can be affected by specifi c 
conditions. This was the case of Chaouia in Morocco, where a very bad crop 
season deeply affected cereal yields and obliged many farmers to sell off their 
live cattle and small ruminants.13 Similarly, the signifi cance of livestock in the 
cotton zone of Mali (Koutiala) results from the low price of cotton that affected 
the growers in 2007. Many of the farmers decapitalized and sold their livestock 
to maintain their purchasing power. The good crop season in Macina led to the 
opposite effect: increased investment in livestock. In Mali, and generally in all 
of Sub-Saharan Africa, livestock can be a patrimonial asset—providing draft 
force and supplying manure for crop production—as well as the embodiment 
of fi nancial savings that are stored to use in diffi cult times.
Horticulture is a common activity—vegetables are grown everywhere for 
domestic consumption. In many of the surveyed regions, however, specializa-
tion in horticulture has occurred, encouraged by favorable natural conditions 
and stimulated by urban development, which led to specifi c private invest-
ments. This is especially the case in Saiss and Souss in Morocco, where pro-
duction of fruits and vegetables for export or for the agro-industry (mainly 
fruits and tomatoes) has become a major industry over the past two decades, 
and where processing and exporting companies are fostering development 
through contractual arrangements. The same phenomenon has occurred in 
Nakuru North. Even though the surveyed zone is not located in the region’s 
famous fl ower production area, households are involved in tomato production 
and selling to a canning company. Fruits and other vegetables are also dynamic 
sectors. In the Senegal River valley (Haut Delta), tomato production developed 
in response to the presence of a processing plant that provides the local market 
with tomato paste. The fact that many of the surveyed households are located 
in the collection area of the factory explains the high share of horticulture in 
their gross product. The production of fresh foods for cities has developed in 
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Antsirabe and Itasy (Madagascar), where temperate fruits and vegetables (for 
example, peaches, apples, and carrots) can be grown.14 Onion production has 
fl ourished in Saiss (Morocco) and in Offi ce du Niger (Macina, Mali); it supplies 
the domestic and regional markets, and constitutes nearly 20 percent of the 
region’s gross farm product. In Terrabona (Nicaragua), the richest households 
engage in irrigated horticulture production that is mainly sold domestically 
through traditional spot markets but also through more integrated value chains 
(supermarket procurement systems).
The importance of traditional commodities is linked to region-specifi c cir-
cumstances. Their development is mainly related to regional history and results 
from both natural advantages and specifi c interventions by the state or the pri-
vate sector, most often during colonization—a time when foreign powers were 
organizing their own supply from their colonies. Where traditional commodities 
are produced, they have generally played a major role in shaping the region’s 
agricultural complexion, owing to their long-standing economic and sometimes 
political importance, even if this importance has faded over time. This is the case 
for cotton in Koutiala and Casamance, groundnut in the bassin arachidier, cof-
fee in El Cuá and Bungoma, and sugar cane in El Viejo, Nyando, and Bungoma.
Self-Consumption versus Sales. Despite very different regional contexts in 
terms of agro-ecological, agrarian, historical, and institutional conditions, 
the main characteristic of on-farm incomes in the RuralStruc sample is the 
importance of self-consumption.15 It accounts for a large share of gross farm 
product, and variations among regions refl ect differences in market connec-
tions. However, even when self-consumption is important, it does not neces-
sarily imply disconnection from markets. Households have different patterns 
of market engagement: Even if they cannot sell much of their farm output, they 
can sell their labor (see chapter 4) and they are also consumers, buying goods 
(including food) and services. Taking the example of Mali (see table 5.4), even 
in regions with very signifi cant levels of self-consumption, a large percentage of 
households participate in food markets as consumers.16 
Nevertheless, as shown in fi gure 5.4, self-consumption levels stay high in 
many surveyed regions—higher than anticipated considering the methodol-
ogy used to select the regions. The major exception is Mexico (see box 5.5). 
Table 5.4 Malian Households’ Participation in Food Markets
Region HHs with food purchases HHs with staple sales
Tominian 60%  8%
Diéma 64% 53%
Koutiala 58% 77%
Macina 71% 89%
Source: RuralStruc Surveys.
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Figu re 5.4 Share of Self-Consumption
% of gross farm product per household quintile
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The RuralStruc sample also refl ects signifi cant differences among countries and 
regions, and among income levels. 
In richer countries and richer regions, households apparently self-consume 
a smaller share of their output, while the poorest households are more oriented 
toward self-consumption. The differences among quintiles seem to be stron-
gest in Madagascar, Kenya, and Nicaragua, although they are present almost 
everywhere.17
The two main drivers of self-consumption are demand and risk. Demand 
depends mostly on distance to markets and possibilities for integration through 
specifi c value chains. As examples of the demand effect, self-consumption is 
lower in Koutiala because a strong demand for cotton provides opportunities 
to move away from subsistence farming; the same occurs with tomatoes and 
cassava in Haut Delta and Mekhé 2, respectively.
On the other hand, households that consume much of their own output 
often do so because there is little demand for their products, usually because 
they lack a good connection to markets.18 When demand exists, either through 
proximity to a large market or through the presence of a specifi c buyer, self- 
consumption decreases. Demand effects are more likely to appear at the regional 
level because market access does not vary strongly within a region, although dif-
ferences can occur at the subregional level (this is notably the case in remote 
areas of Chaouia or Souss in Morocco, and was the reason for the distinction 
between Antsirabe 1 and 2). 
The second driver is related to risk and level of income. Households with 
very weak incomes face food security challenges (see chapter 3) and adopt risk-
management practices, so they can control their own food supply by producing 
it themselves. This can be called a supply effect. Because of a heightened level 
of risk, households are unwilling to sell their output on the market and conse-
quently self-consume a large portion of it. Supply effects are more likely to arise 
among income quintiles in the same region.
Nicaragua is a good example of a country where differences among house-
hold quintiles dominate the pattern of self-consumption. In low-income quin-
tiles, self-consumption rates often reach 60 percent, and a number of house-
holds (20 percent to 40 percent) are completely uninvolved with agricultural 
markets (that is, their self-consumption rate is 100 percent). Only one region, 
La Libertad, is characterized by physical seclusion and therefore faces transpor-
tation problems, which means that infrastructure is not the major explanation. 
Risk-management strategies seem to be a primary reason for the limited con-
nection to agricultural markets. However, middlemen might have little interest 
in incurring the expenses of collecting the limited quantities produced by very 
small farmers when they can access larger quantities from large farmers—a 
clear argument for collective action on the part of small producers. Specifi c 
local conditions can also shape household strategies. For example, in Terrabona, 
alternative off-farm options (wage labor in agriculture and maquiladoras) allow 
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a dual strategy of self-consumption of farm products and insertion into labor 
markets. Households prefer to grow food for family consumption and earn cash 
from wage labor to meet needs such as schooling, health, and consumer goods.
Regional Patterns of Product Diversifi cation
The previous section discussed types of farm products and the importance of 
self-consumption in the surveyed regions, but what is the degree of specializa-
tion or diversifi cation of farm production? 
Figure 5.5 shows the overall structure of households’ gross farm product 
across regions. It focuses on the main products in each region, showing the 
share of farm output self-consumed and the share of on-farm income that 
comes from selling the two most important products. 
The a nalysis of commercialized products confi rms the strong persistence of 
staples, which are sold by households at all income levels in all regions. Sta-
ples make up over 25 percent of farm output in every region except those in 
Morocco, where the importance of wheat was masked by a bad crop season and 
the subsequent sale of livestock assets. The survey shows that staples are often 
one of the best options available to farm households, even the richest, and sug-
gests a generally low level of opportunity for specialization in higher value crops.
The analysis confi rms the importance of self-consumption at the aggregated 
regional level, especially in poorer regions; however, it also illustrates patterns 
of on-farm diversifi cation. In Sub-Saharan Africa, households in 13 of 19 sur-
veyed regions earn, on average, more than 70 percent of their on-farm income 
through self-consumption alone or through self-consumption plus the sale of 
only one type of product. This is the case in just 2 of the 11 non-SSA regions 
and subregions: the two Sotavento zones in Mexico, where a very specifi c pro-
cess of deep specialization in maize production has developed (box 5.5). Gen-
erally, as wealth increases (moving from the poorest regions on the left to the 
richest regions on the right), the share of self-consumption falls and the share 
of “other products sold” rises.
On-farm diversifi cation varies not only between poorer and richer regions 
but also between poorer and richer households within regions. In 20 of the 30 
surveyed zones, households in the fi fth household quintile are more diversifi ed 
than those in the bottom quintile: Sales of their top three products make up a 
smaller portion of their on-farm income (on average, about 8 percentage points 
less, although the difference can reach 16 percent). The increase in on-farm 
diversifi cation between the poorest and richest quintiles is seen in 10 of 11 non-
SSA zones but only 10 of 19 SSA zones, consistent with the previous observation 
that diversifi cation is less widespread in SSA in general.
On-farm diversifi cation among households within regions is often charac-
terized by the addition of new sales crops rather than by dropping one type of 
production in favor of others. In fact, in 20 of the 30 zones surveyed, the top 
sales crop of households in the fi fth quintile is the same as the top sales crop 
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Figure 5.5 Farm Output Breakdown: Self-Consumption and Main Sales 
Source: RuralStruc surveys. 
Note: Liv = livestock; Liv.P = livestock products
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 BOX 5 .5
The Sotavento Exception: On-Farm Specialization and the 
Collapse of Self-Consumption
In the RuralStruc survey, Sotavento in the state of Veracruz is unique—characterized by 
specialization in maize production, increased integration into marketing channels, and 
dramatic reduction in self-consumption.
The signifi cant development of maize in the 2000s occurred in spite of an adverse 
economic environment. Between 1994 and 2007, real prices of maize fell by 60 per-
cent as a consequence of the major restructuring of the sector—while input prices 
grew by about the same proportion (Léonard and Palma 2002; Zahniser and Coyle 
2004; RS 2 Mexico). Despite these unfavorable circumstances, maize acreage increased 
in the two surveyed Sotavento zones (Tierras Bajas and Sierra de Santa Marta). The 
increase in production was most pronounced in the lowlands—30 percent—while in 
the mountain areas it grew by 6 percent. In Veracruz state as a whole, maize acreage 
fell by 18 percent over the same period. 
This trend has two explanations (RS 2 Mexico—Sotavento). In the lowlands, large 
fl oodplains offered high fertility and allowed economies of scale through mechani-
zation. Large farms developed, but small producers were able to participate in this 
restructured market through producer organizations that gave them access to mech-
anization services, contracts (mostly informal) with buyers or large farms, and the 
incentives offered to the commercial sector by the Aserca and Alianza programs (Brun 
2008). In the Sierra, remoteness restricted opportunities for diversifi cation—both on-
farm and off-farm—and the Procampo program ensured that maize remained the best 
agricultural option. Thus, in both zones, on-farm specialization increased and other 
farm products were abandoned, for example, rice in the lowlands and even beans in 
the Sierra, where they were traditionally intercropped with maize.
The specialization in maize production was accompanied by a collapse in self- 
consumption, notably in Tierras Bajas, where it is now nearly nonexistent. The situation 
is far removed from the traditional food system based on homegrown maize, with 
small plots (la milpa) where local varieties of maize and beans are grown for family 
consumption. Four factors explain it. First, to access public credit and technical support 
via the large enterprises, producers were required to sell all their output to the private 
fi rms. Second, farmers welcomed the opportunity to sell all their output rather than 
store it, because the new hybrid maize varieties were highly vulnerable to rodents after 
harvest. Third, in the Sotavento lowlands, the maize harvest was completely mecha-
nized through services provided by the fi rms. And fourth, in the lowlands, women 
were increasingly engaged in off-farm activities and no longer able to dedicate time to 
making tortillas from farm-grown maize. Thus, in a rapid restructuring of the “maize-
tortilla complex,” farmers sell their hybrid corn and buy industrial maize fl our or pre-
pared tortillas at local markets (Appendini and Gómez, forthcoming). 
The Sotavento exception among the surveyed regions is signifi cant, as it shows the 
potentially strong effect of new marketing channels supported by a combination of 
drivers of change. It also illustrates how quickly production-consumption patterns can 
be radically modifi ed. Finally, it emphasizes the impact of public support programs on 
households’ processes of adaptation.
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of households in the fi rst quintile. It does not seem to be the case that the poor 
are restricted to selling staples while the rich are able to sell commodities or 
high-value products. Of the 20 zones where rich and poor households have the 
same top sales crop, that crop is a staple in 11 cases. Not only is it common to 
see richer households primarily selling staples, it is common to see households 
in the bottom quintile selling livestock or traditional commodities (coffee in El 
Cuá, groundnut in Senegal, cotton in Koutiala).
The same pattern is observed among regions. Contrary to expectations, the 
richest region in a country is not primarily selling a high-value product, while 
poorer regions primarily sell a low-value staple. The possible exceptions are 
Morocco and Nicaragua, where richer regions are more specialized in fruit and 
coffee, respectively.
The types of products grown depend on the unique situation in each region 
in terms of natural resources, public goods, private investments, and the pres-
ence or absence of buyers. When large shifts into sales of different products 
occur, they seem to encompass all households in the region. The differences 
between richer and poorer households tend to be in the diversifi cation of their 
on-farm income sources: Richer households tend to have more on-farm income 
sources, with each source making up a smaller share of total income. A defi n-
ing characteristic of these diversifi cation patterns is heterogeneity. Farmers use 
their individual asset endowments to respond to opportunities arising from the 
natural and economic environments of their region. Staples and certain com-
modities seem to be within reach of all farmers in a given region. But richer 
households, with more assets, can take advantage of more of these opportuni-
ties to increase their levels of diversifi cation.
Even in areas of crop specialization, such as Mexico, the same mechanisms 
are at play. Richer households with better asset endowments can take advantage 
of the opportunities presented by their environment; but in this specifi c case, 
because of unique conditions, it makes more sense to specialize in maize than 
to diversify into other products (box 5.5). However, specialization is an excep-
tion in the RuralStruc surveyed regions—most rich households operate in an 
environment that prompts them to diversify rather than specialize. 
Regional Patterns of Market Integration
The farm production patterns described here refl ect a high prevalence of tra-
ditional forms of commercialization and market integration in the surveyed 
regions. High-value exports, which were supposed to introduce new types of 
marketing arrangements through connection with foreign buyers in higher 
income countries and highly competitive markets, are extremely limited. 
Although the RuralStruc countries are at different stages in their penetra-
tion of modern food retailing systems, they are (with the possible exception 
of Mexico) very far from the supermarket revolution (see box 5.6). And even 
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 BOX 5 .6
Contrasted Development of Modern Food Retailing in the 
RuralStruc Countries
According to the Regoverning Markets program (Reardon and Huang 2008), the Rural-
Struc countries can be classifi ed into three levels of modern food industry develop-
ment: (1) advanced stage countries where more than 40 percent of overall food sales 
are in supermarkets (Mexico); (2) intermediate stage countries where the supermarket’s 
share is between 10 percent and 40 percent of food sales (Nicaragua, Kenya, and 
Morocco); and (3) initial stage countries where supermarkets make up less than 10 per-
cent of sales (Madagascar, Mali, and Senegal). 
Mexico: The development of modern food retailing occurred in three stages. Before 
1980, the development of supermarkets focused on large cities in the north and center 
of the country, and was mainly based on domestic capital, although some chains were 
set up with U.S. capital. In the 1980s, supermarkets began to move from their regional 
bases and started their consolidation through alliances with both domestic and foreign 
capital in a context of intense competition. Beginning in 1990, very rapid expansion 
occurred, impelled by the entry of giant chains from the United States (Walmart) and 
France (Carrefour) (Schwentesius and Gomez 2002). Today, supermarkets make up 55 
percent of modern food retailing; however, the country’s overall average masks strong 
regional disparities and a signifi cant urban-rural divide.
Nicaragua: Supermarkets began developing in the 1990s. Initially only Nicaraguan 
enterprises were involved, then Costa Rican enterprises established a competitive 
supermarket chain and regional enterprises like Hortifruti engaged in wholesaling. In 
the 2000s, Walmart bought up regional supermarkets and intermediary companies 
such as Pali, La Union, Paiz, and Hortifruti. Supermarkets deal today with about 20 
percent of the consumer demand for high-value products (RS 1 Nicaragua, 43–45).
Morocco: Following limited initial development in Casablanca and Rabat in the early 
1960s with Monoprix (France), supermarkets started to grow in the 1990s, led by sev-
eral Moroccan-owned chains, notably Marjane, Label’Vie, and Aswak Assalam. The fi rst 
major foreign investment was made in 2001 when Auchan (France) entered into a joint 
venture with ONA (Omnium Nord Africain), Morocco’s largest consortium of private 
companies, and took control of Marjane and then Acima in 2002 (Codron et al. 2004). 
ONA holds 51 percent of the joint venture, and Auchan holds 49 percent. The number 
of hypermarkets grew from 6 stores in 1993 to 19 in 2007 (RS 1 Morocco, 104).
Kenya: Supermarkets have developed from a tiny niche market only 15 years ago to 
20 percent–30 percent of urban food retail today, and continue to gain prominence 
quickly. The fi rst store outside Nairobi was built by Uchumi in Nakuru in 1993, start-
ing a national competition. The rivalry between the two leading chains—Uchumi and 
Nakumatt—became an important growth driver as a new strategy by one chain forced 
imitation or a counterstrategy by the other (Neven and Reardon 2004). In 2003, there 
were 225 large-format stores in Kenya: 209 supermarkets and 16 hypermarkets.
(box continues on next page)
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where a signifi cant degree of supermarket penetration has occurred, the effects 
on the average family farmer remain limited. The Regoverning Markets research 
project showed that (1) a gap exists between the overall level of penetration of 
supermarkets and the level of penetration into high-value segments of the food 
chain (estimated at only 25 percent in Mexico), and (2) supermarkets tend to 
source the majority of their products from wholesale markets, and sometimes 
from large-scale companies under contract.
Outside of Mexico, the surveyed regions of the RuralStruc countries show 
a more classical picture shaped by long-standing trade systems, mainly based 
on informal arrangements. This occurs for all types of products and stakehold-
ers. However, several value chains have specifi c market structures that lead to 
specifi c organization. 
Traditional Marketing Prevails. “Traditional marketing” refers to the range 
of middlemen and rural intermediaries who connect the countryside with 
national, regional, and international markets (that is, retail systems and export-
ers). They include wholesalers and the agents or brokers19 who work for them, 
as well as independent buyers. This type of marketing gives farmers two 
options, often with imprecise scopes. First, they can sell “spot,” either directly at 
the farm gate or in the village market to a broker or a wholesaler agent. Or they 
can sell on a routine basis to a wholesaler, although this option may not include 
a formal arrangement and may not guarantee a specifi c sales quantity or a better 
price than what could be earned on the spot market. However, the second option 
does refl ect a certain formalization of the commercial transaction over time.
In the surveyed regions, traditional marketing is dominant. Figure 5.6 classi-
fi es the existing methods of commercialization into four main categories: spot 
Madagascar: The share of supermarkets in retailing remains limited, but supermar-
kets have developed in the main cities of the country through three foreign compa-
nies. Before the recent political crisis of early 2009, which particularly affected the 
modern retail sector (looting), the situation was as follows: The South African chain 
Shoprite, operating in Madagascar since 1992, when it bought out local assets of 
the French company Champion, has seven stores (fi ve in Antananarivo, one in Antsir-
abe, and one in Toamasina); Leaderprice (France) has three stores in Antananarivo; 
and Score (bought by the Vindemia group, now a subsidiary of the French Casino) 
has three hypermarkets in Antananarivo and two supermarkets in the other provinces 
(RS 1 Madagascar, 63).
Senegal: Modern food retail is very limited in the country, with only three supermar-
kets in Dakar. Initially created by SCOA (France) under the brand name Score, they have 
been franchised with Casino (France) since 2007.
Mali: There is no signifi cant modern food retail in Mali.
Sources: RS country reports and other references cited.
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 Figure 5.6 Types of Commercialization in the Surveyed Zones
% of the value of sales
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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and wholesaler sales (the two types of traditional marketing), and sales to coop-
eratives and agribusinesses.20 The fi rst two categories account for a large major-
ity of the total value of sales, with very few exceptions. Spot sales at the farm 
gate or the village market account for 100 percent of sales in Tominian, Mali, 
and 95 percent in the bassin arachidier (Senegal) and in Chaouia (Morocco). 
However, commercialization with wholesalers is also signifi cant, particularly 
in Madagascar for rice (Alaotra, where wholesalers are based) and horticulture 
products (Antsirabe 1, in the vicinity of the city of Antsirabe), and in Nicaragua. 
Surprisingly, outside of Mexico, the share sold to cooperatives (a topic on 
which many previous agricultural policies focused) is nonexistent in the large 
majority of the surveyed localities and is anecdotal in the others. In Sotavento, 
new producers’ organizations were created to support the development of maize 
production, but these organizations were assembled primarily as a way to access 
public subsidies (see box 5.5). In Tequisquiapan, farmers sell maize or forage 
to producers’ organizations, which are often under contractual arrangements 
with large cattle enterprises. 
Sales to agribusinesses are more signifi cant in many places, although their 
strength varies from one region to another. Logically, this variability is related 
to the presence or absence of a processor (and, of course, to the production 
of crops that require processing). Thus, the highest shares of sales to agri-
businesses are found in Koutiala, Mali, where all cotton is sold to the ginning 
company CMDT (Compagnie Malienne pour le Développement des Textiles). 
High levels of sales to agribusiness are also observed in the Haut Delta, Senegal, 
where tomatoes are processed by SOCAS (Société de Conserves Alimentaires du 
Sénégal), and in Kenya, where sugar cane is sold to several factories.21 In other 
regions, the importance of commercialization through agribusinesses is lower 
and generally accounts for less than 20 percent of sales. This is the case with 
tomatoes, citrus, and olives in Saïss and Souss (Morocco); tomatoes and dairy 
products in Nakuru North (Kenya); coffee in El Cuá (Nicaragua); rice to rice 
mills in Alaotra 2; and green beans for export in Itasy (Madagascar). 
Underdeveloped Contractualization. The development of contracts is often 
seen as an indicator of increasing integration among economic agents in a 
value chain, so the RuralStruc survey was designed to identify these contractual 
arrangements. However, three caveats are necessary in presenting the survey 
results. First, the program teams selected regions and localities for the survey 
that would illustrate different situations and different stages of integration. 
Consequently, no conclusions can be drawn from the observed differences in 
the number of contracts between regions and subregions. Second, the analysis 
of contractualization cannot accommodate imprecision. The defi nition of types 
of contracts is a core issue, and while formal contracts are usually written con-
tracts, informal contracts can correspond to a wide range of situations in which 
trust between buyer and seller is the main component. Third, to make a state-
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ment about contractualization, one must analyze the level of contracts along 
the entire length of the value chain. This was not possible in the methodology 
of the RuralStruc fi eldwork. 
But even with these caveats, it is obvious that contractualization at the pro-
ducer level is low almost everywhere in the selected regions. Only 539 of the 
households surveyed (7.4 percent of the sample) reported being engaged in at 
least one contractual arrangement (table 5.5).22
This low level of contractualization—especially the lack of formal con-
tracts—is signifi cant. It refl ects the low intensity of the integration processes 
in the surveyed regions and the limited development of high-value chains, 
in which product requirements justify contracts. This situation is not totally 
surprising, even though several “winning” regions had been selected with 
the aim of identifying market dynamics related to higher value products or 
agro-industries.
In some of these regions, contracts with agribusinesses are almost nonexis-
tent. This is particularly true in two regions of Nicaragua (Terrabona and Muy 
Muy), where only a few farmers are directly connected to fruit and vegetable 
integrated value chains (domestic supermarkets such as Walmart/La Union-
Palí or La Colonia) and to dairy chains (supermarkets and processors such as 
Parmalat or Eskimo). However, these cases illustrate an important fi nding: In 
many situations, contractualization is not occurring at the producer-level seg-
ment of the value chain; rather, it is downstream, between the wholesaler or 
cooperative and the processing fi rm or procurement service.
Three types of contractual arrangements and relationships between eco-
nomic agents are generally identifi able in the survey: (1) an informal contract 
resulting from long-standing relationships, mainly with wholesalers; (2) a sup-
ply contract with an agroprocessor; and (3) direct integration into high-value 
chains.
Informal Contracts. Growing urban demand for fresh products has led to the 
development of value chains that are structured by wholesalers and supplied by 
producers with informal agreements. This is especially common if the competi-
tion among middlemen is high and the product is perishable.
For example, the fruit and vegetable sectors in Antsirabe are integrated on 
the basis of informal agreements between individual producers’ or farmers’ 
organizations and brokers who supply urban wholesalers. The producers who 
benefi t from these agreements are generally the biggest producers with the best 
factor endowments (correlations are statistically signifi cant), which allow them 
to reach a surplus. In the bassin arachidier (mainly Mekhé 2, Senegal), cassava 
producers have developed informal contractual agreements with middlemen 
based on transaction routine and reputation. These contracts guarantee the 
fl ow of supply to urban areas, although production is widely dispersed through-
out the region.
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Similarly, in Nicaragua, in response to growing urban demand and the devel-
opment of supermarkets, wholesalers have recently expanded their collection 
area. In some villages in La Libertad, verbal agreements are used to satisfy this 
demand. These agreements provide many advantages for farmers; in particu-
lar, they enjoy the insurance of selling milk daily instead of selling on-farm 
Table 5.5 Formal and Informal Contractual Arrangements in Surveyed Regions
  HH with contract
Type Type of industry and contracting agentsCountry Region No.  %
Mali Tominian 1 0.6   
Diéma 0 0.0   
Koutiala 0 0.0 df Cotton industry (CMDT)
Macina 16 10.4 I Rice industry
Senegal Casamance 11 4.6   
Mekhé 1 26 23.4 I Cassava wholesalers
Nioro 1 0.4   
Haut Delta 54 88.5 F Tomato processor (SOCAS)
Mekhé 2 33 29.2 I Cassava wholesalers
Bas Detla 12 9.9 I Rice industry
Madagascar Antsirabe 2 16 5.3 I Vegetables collectors
Alaotra 1 2 0.5   
Morondava 15 3.0 I  
Itasy 50 9.9 F Green beans processor (Lecofruit) and tobacco
Antsirabe 1 46 22.3 F/I Milk industry (Tiko) and vegetables collectors
Alaotra 2 8 7.0 I Rice industry
Kenya Bungoma 75 25.1 F Sugar industry
Nyando 7 2.5 F Sugar industry
Nakuru North 16 5.5 F/I Milk industry and tomato processing
Morocco Chaouia 1 0.4   
Saiss 20 7.7 F Milk Industry
Souss 1 0.4   
Nicaragua Muy Muy 9 3.0 I Milk industry (Parmalat and Eskimo)
Terrabona 4 1.4   
El Viejo 13 4.5 F/I Sesame and sorghum industry
La Libertad 20 6.9 I Milk collectors
El Cua 47 15.7 I Coffee Industry
Mexico Sierra S. M. 0 0.0 df Producers’ organizations 
Tierras Bajas 6 4.0 F/df Maize Industry and Producers’ organizations 
Tequis. 29 8.0 F Producers’ organizations 
  539 7.4   
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
Note: F = formal; I = informal; df = de facto.
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processed cheese once a week. They also incur lower costs. Usually, the house-
holds that access these informal agreements are those with more land and big-
ger herds (hence, they are capable of producing more milk). On average, they 
own 2.3 times more land and 3 times more cattle (correlations are statistically 
signifi cant).
In the Sotavento region, informal contracts have developed between farmers’ 
and producers’ organizations for the purpose of accessing public transfers and 
offering technical assistance and inputs in exchange for the commercialization 
of products. Although farmers did not report being engaged in contracts, mem-
bership in producers’ organizations often means de facto contracts.
Supply Contracts with Agroprocessors. These contracts are a very old practice, 
initially developed to guarantee supply (and thus profi tability) to industrial 
investments. Several examples exist in the surveyed regions, especially in the 
dairy industry. In Madagascar, privatization of the parastatal monopoly did 
not signifi cantly change the confi guration of the value chain, which is largely 
controlled by Tiko, a private fi rm that plays (or played, until the recent political 
crisis) a central role in the Malagasy dairy industry. Tiko was collecting more 
than 90 percent of the milk marketed in the main production region (Antsir-
abe) and processing most of the dairy products in the country. With Tiko, con-
tracted producers delivered milk to collection centers, where it was required 
to meet quality criteria stipulated in a formal contract. In return, the agro-
industry provided inputs and sometimes cash advances. Producers with larger 
herds are more involved in these integration strategies. Similar patterns exist in 
Saïss and Souss, Morocco, and in Nakuru North, Kenya.
Comparable formal supply contracts also exist with sugar factories in Kenya 
(Bungoma) and with the tomato industry in both Haut Delta (Senegal) and 
Nakuru. This market confi guration—one agroprocessor and many suppliers—
can include situations of monopsony. In these cases, there are no contracts but 
a tacit contractualization resulting from the fact that the producers do not have 
any options other than to sell to the monopsonist. Cotton is a good example: 
75 percent of the family farms in the Koutiala region grow cotton; they have a 
de facto contract with CMDT, even if nothing is actually written. The sector is 
vertically integrated, with the provision of inputs through producers’ organiza-
tions; a system of credit secured by cotton sales; extension services and technical 
support; and fi xed prices, which are negotiated to a certain extent. 23
Contracts Related to High-Value Exports. Contracts with high-value export 
companies are the typical contract cases cited in the literature. However, the 
RuralStruc survey found only two cases of this type of arrangement. The fi rst 
case is Lecofruit in Ifanja, Itasy (Madagascar), a famous example in the litera-
ture, where farmers grow green beans for export (see box 5.7). The other is in 
the coffee region of El Cuá, Nicaragua. In this region, organic coffee is mainly 
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BOX 5 .7
Lecofruit : Malagasy Smallholders Selling on 
European Markets 
Lecofruit (Légumes Condiments et Fruits de Madagascar SA) was established in Mada-
gascar in 1989, when free zones were implemented and promoted by the Malagasy 
state through tax exemptions and other fi scal advantages. Initially, Lecofruit processed 
pickles in partnership with approximately 100 farmers. To develop its export markets, 
the fi rm associated with the French company Segma Maille, which guaranteed regu-
lar outlets for its products in Europe. Lecofruit began to diversify its production, with 
green beans, snow peas, cucumbers, asparagus, and baby vegetables for export to the 
European market. Currently, Lecofruit focuses on production of extra-fi ne green beans: 
The company exported 3,000 tons of products during the 2004–05 season, of which 
70 percent were green beans. Approximately 90 percent were processed and canned 
in the company factory in Antananarivo and sent to Europe by sea. The remaining 10 
percent were fresh green beans and snow peas shipped by air.
In 2007–08, the company branched out to involve 10,000 farmers under contract 
in the production of green beans. Producers are located in the highlands of Madagas-
car, which has a long tradition of fruit and vegetable production. To optimize the costs 
of transporting products to the processing plant in Antananarivo, the company targets 
the growing areas connected to major roads.
Farmers cultivate their own land, which helps overcome the problems of land avail-
ability in the highlands. Production contracts are standardized and individual, although 
producers must belong to a producers’ organization. A contract is limited to an area of 
approximately 1,000m² to ensure that producers will be able to comply with all stages 
of the production until harvest, as production is labor-intensive. Other commitments 
relate to specifi c technical recommendations (preparation of compost, plowing, seed-
ing, and so on) and the need for daily harvest to meet the extra-fi ne size requirement.
Producers receive cash advances and free seeds; costs of fertilizer and pesticides 
are deducted from the fi nal payment when the green beans are delivered. Lecofruit 
provides a “package” of seeds, mineral fertilizers, and pesticides to ensure compliance 
with standards for maximum residue limits in agricultural products exported to the 
European Union. Some sanitary conditions are also stipulated in the contracts, such as 
washing hands with nonperfumed soap before harvesting the beans. Finally, producers 
are required to sell only to Lecofruit. Payment is periodic. The price is set in advance 
by the company and remains unchanged during the season: 630 Ariary/kg for green 
beans in 2007–08 ($0.83 PPP).
Despite the balance of power that favors the processing fi rm, the number of farm-
ers involved in contract farming with Lecofruit has never declined, which indicates 
that they are satisfi ed with the terms. Farmers can generate income and earn cash to 
fi nance their other agricultural activities or meet their needs.
Source: RS 2 Madagascar, 84–85.
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promoted by COMANUR-RL (Cooperativa Multisectorial Alfonso Núñez 
Rodríguez), which sells conventional and organic coffees. Farmers produce 
organic coffee under strict specifi cations for the cooperative at a predetermined 
price, and the cooperative provides technical assistance to its members, includ-
ing access to coffee management and plant materials (new varieties of coffee), 
agricultural inputs (fertilizers and other agrochemicals), and expensive equip-
ment or infrastructure. 
Because of the very limited information and the few cases gathered by the 
surveys, it is diffi cult to draw conclusions about the consequences of contrac-
tualization on household incomes. Moreover, there is a reverse causality issue: 
In general, a low level of household production is one of the biggest barriers 
to participation in contractual agreements. To lower their transaction costs, 
procurement systems and agro-industries prefer to work with large suppliers. 
Thus—with the exception of Madagascar’s green bean producers, whose plot 
areas are restricted by the contracting company—the households that engage in 
contracts tend to be those with the best factor endowments.24
Nevertheless, on the basis of the RuralStruc case studies, one can assume 
that returns to contractualization are limited, with a few exceptions. The survey 
shows that income differences between households with and without contracts 
are most often minimal. The maximum average earned from green bean pro-
duction under contract in Itasy, Madagascar, is very low: $43 PPP per house-
hold per year. Similarly, the tomato producers under contract with SOCAS in 
the Haut Delta in Senegal are not signifi cantly better off than other Senegalese 
households. In many of the surveyed regions, the main advantages of contrac-
tualization are related to access to technical packages, credit, and a secure mar-
keting channel.
On-Farm Specialization and Rural Transformation
On-farm specialization is one of the three exit pathways out of rural poverty. 
Households surveyed by the RuralStruc program are broadly specialized in agri-
culture—on-farm incomes constitute a high proportion of total income—but 
they remain poor. This contradictory assessment, discussed in chapter 3, justi-
fi ed a close examination of the characteristics of rural incomes in general and 
of the observed on-farm specialization.
Although nearly all of SSA households are engaged in farming, most are 
diversifi ed and as such also engage in off-farm activities as a general coping 
strategy. Therefore, total on-farm specialization is rare, although it does occur 
in several regions in Nicaragua and Morocco, where more robust value chains 
can offer secure returns. 
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On average, on-farm incomes are characterized by high levels of self- 
consumption, the importance of staples, and heterogeneous patterns of product 
diversifi cation that develop in response to region-specifi c opportunities. This 
picture is quite far from the “new agriculture” that has been widely discussed in 
the literature, and does not refl ect the increasing processes of integration, new 
players, and new rules that the literature predicts. 
In the surveyed regions, self-consumption is still very signifi cant in response 
to both supply and demand effects. The supply effect corresponds to risk-
management strategies households employ to retain control over their food 
supply—a direct response to incomplete and imperfect markets. The demand 
effect expresses the weak demand for their products owing to poor access to and 
integration with markets. Limited infrastructure can be a major obstacle and 
can be reinforced by weak marketing systems in which middlemen do not have 
incentives to collect limited quantities of low-value products (a consequence of 
low productivity of staple crops), especially in low-density areas where collec-
tion costs are high.
Most private collecting agents operating in the RuralStruc surveyed areas rely 
on informal relationship-based strategies to obtain output from small farmers, 
while agribusinesses generally employ traditional contract farming practices. 
The extent of contractualization is very limited, even among farms that are 
solidly integrated into markets through ongoing relationships with wholesalers 
and other buyers. Furthermore, contractualization rarely occurs at the producer 
level: It is often downstream, between the wholesaler or collection unit and the 
processing fi rm or procurement service.
The share of self-consumption decreases with wealth at both the regional 
and household levels, and the surveyed regions in Sub-Saharan Africa are less 
advanced in this process. The richest SSA households are less diversifi ed than 
their non-SSA counterparts, mainly owing to market environments that offer 
Sub-Saharan Africa fewer opportunities to engage in new value chains. This lack 
of opportunity also explains the persistently high share of staple products in 
households’ production baskets, even when they move away from self-consump-
tion and even when they become richer. Staples are not only the prerogative of 
poor farmers; the development of on-farm product diversifi cation (its extent and 
the types of products involved) depends on a process that encompasses a region 
as a whole. The result tends to be that all households can participate in new value 
chains, with their level of participation determined by their assets (production 
factors, human and social capital). The famous high-value chains focused on 
exports are few and far between. They employ a very small share of the farm-
ers surveyed, and their development depends on existing operators (processors, 
exporters) and their capacity to develop contracts with foreign markets. 
Despite the numerous changes that have occurred in many developing coun-
tries’ agricultural sectors in the past few decades, old agricultural patterns per-
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sist. Full on-farm specialization is limited, and on-farm activities in general are 
characterized by a trend toward product diversifi cation—a way to seize oppor-
tunities and share risks in economic environments that are uncertain.
Notes
 1. The objective here is not to provide an extensive review of the abundant literature 
on global restructuring but to offer a brief summary of the major developments of 
the past three decades. 
 2. Whatever the political regime, agriculture has always been a “state affair” (Coulomb 
et al. 1990). As a last resort, the sector provides for the basic needs of the population 
and government constituents.
 3. For a “genealogy” of food regimes, see Friedmann and McMichael (1989) and McMi-
chael (2009). McMichael suggests the progressive consolidation of a new “corporate 
food regime.”
 4. These tables provide only a few examples per country, although dozens of parastatals 
existed in most countries. See the RuralStruc country reports for more details.
 5. An expanding trade in agricultural products (notably, exports of meat products) has 
also developed between OECD countries and many low- and middle-income coun-
tries; it is often associated with less stringent concerns for health and food safety.
 6. An example of this trend is the emergence of the International Federation of 
Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), which bases certifi cation on issues of 
health, ecology, fairness, and the principle of precaution.
 7. See World Bank (2007). A good description of the applications of these new 
approaches is presented in Webber and Labaste (2010).
 8. As mentioned in chapter 1, the selected countries and regions do not include major 
tropical export commodities areas in which a long-standing connection to markets 
has deeply affected the pattern of the rural economy over an extended period. How-
ever, several surveyed regions are engaged in these export commodities as well as 
in high-value crops. “Traditional” here refers to crops that are not involved in new 
integrated value chains.
 9. Estimating incomes generated by gathering activities is diffi cult because they involve 
small amounts of products that are gathered throughout the year and are often self-
consumed. However, wild fruits, animals, and fi sh often play a core role in the food 
security of rural households. 
10.  This is the case for potatoes, a horticultural product that is self-consumed and can 
be considered a staple in Madagascar, one of only two places in the surveyed regions 
where it is signifi cantly grown (the other is Saiss, Morocco). This is also the case for 
groundnuts, the traditional export of Senegal, which is considered an export even 
though it is increasingly consumed locally as a consequence of the adverse evolution 
of the value chain. Sugar cane is a traditional export commodity, but in Kenya the 
production is mainly sold on the domestic market and is insuffi cient to meet local 
demand.
11. In this chapter, dedicated to on-farm production and commercialization, the survey 
results are displayed as absolute and relative gross farm product per household (total 
value of sales and self-consumption of crops and livestock productions) rather than 
as income. This option refl ects the methodological choices of the program: The 
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breakdown of costs by type of product was impossible in the survey framework—
total costs were applied, respectively, to gross crop product and gross livestock prod-
uct to calculate crop and livestock incomes and then total farm income.
12.  Although traditional irrigated production systems existed in Madagascar, irrigation 
development has benefi ted from public infrastructure through irrigation schemes 
in other countries, notably Senegal and Mali. Irrigated maize in Mexico is mainly 
on large commercial farms. The situation of Sotavento’s Tierras Bajas zone, with its 
natural fl oodplains, is unique.
13.  After a severe drought, the Moroccan production of cereals dropped by 73 percent 
in 2007; it affected most of the regions, notably Chaouia (RS 2 Morocco, 145), and 
livestock sales increased signifi cantly in absolute and relative terms. 
14.  A small (and now famous, because of frequent citation in the literature) green-bean-
production-for-export market has developed in Itasy, closely linked to the presence 
of Lecofruit, an export-oriented processing fi rm (see box 5.7).
15.  Self-consumption includes gifts to family and to social and religious networks. It 
also includes food reserves (see annex 1 in the appendix posted at http://www.world 
bank.org/afr/ruralstruc).
16.  The case of Tominian is amazing: 30 percent to 40 percent of households do not 
participate in food markets at all, either as buyers or sellers.
17.  In Mali, very small differences exist among quintiles. This can be explained by the 
low level of income, even for the richest households, and a preference for maintain-
ing grain reserves because a high level of stocks is a sign that households are better 
off. Also, the 2004–05 crop season was very bad, and many households were still 
replenishing their stocks when the survey was conducted in 2007.
18.  The connection of rural producers to agricultural markets is frequently discussed; 
however, the connection of rural consumers to markets for goods and services can 
also be a stumbling block. When there is little or nothing to buy, there is no incentive 
to sell or to increase output. This “reverse side” of markets is generally ignored in the 
policy debate.
19.  A wholesaler takes possession of the product; a broker does not.
20.  This category refers to agro-industries that transform raw agricultural products to 
semiprocessed products (for example, cotton to cotton fi ber) or processed products 
(for example, tomatoes to tomato paste or canned tomatoes). It also refers to busi-
nesses that clean, grade, and package high-value products, like fruits and vegetables, 
mainly for the export market. 
21.  Sales to agroprocessors can sometimes occur through farmers’ organizations or 
so-called “cooperatives” (actually creations of the agro-industry, which is their sole 
buyer). This is the case with SOCAS in Senegal and CMDT in Mali.
22.  Contractual arrangements listed in table 5.5 include formal written contracts as well 
as informal contracts perceived by the producer as effective.
23.  For a long time, public and semipublic monopsonies such as CMDT were obliged to 
buy all producers’ outputs. After years of negotiation, CMDT was privatized in 2010; 
however, it will not fundamentally change the market pattern and the company will 
be replaced by regional monopsonies.
24.  This seems to be especially the case for land. However, the small number of house-
holds with formal contracts does not allow any conclusion. In Antsirabe 1, where 
the number of contracts in the sample is suffi cient, the T test is signifi cant.
Chapter 6
The previous three chapters provided a detailed analysis of the level of income 
and the characteristics of on-farm and off-farm activities in the surveyed 
regions. The goal was to answer the following questions, which refer to the 
program’s hypotheses. How do farm households adapt to their evolving envi-
ronment? Do they specialize in agriculture as they become more deeply inserted 
into markets (H1)? How do rural households combine activities to create more 
diversifi ed sources of income (H2)? An important question remains, however, 
regarding the links among these specialization and diversifi cation patterns, and 
the level of total income. What does this relationship say about the viability of 
different pathways out of poverty, the overall process of rural transformation, 
and the identifi cation of possible risks of transition dead ends (H3)? 
Chapter 6 explores this relationship. It begins with a review of the deter-
minants of total income, which were not directly addressed in chapter 3. The 
chapter then analyzes regional patterns of income diversifi cation and discusses 
the relationship between income levels and income structures, leading to an 
investigation of regional specialization and diversifi cation. Finally, the chapter 
groups households according to their income-based room to maneuver and 
draws conclusions about the signifi cance of observed rural realities for policy 
making. It concludes with policy options for facilitating rural transformation 
in this context.
Regional Patterns of Income Diversifi cation and 
Specialization
A quantitative analysis of the survey data using regression techniques helps 
to better understand the determinants of rural income and highlights their 
important heterogeneity in terms of asset combinations and environmental 
conditions. However, a more detailed investigation of the regional patterns of 
From Regional Patterns of Rural 
Transformation to Policy Guidelines
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income structures leads to the identifi cation of signifi cant regularities. There is 
a close relationship between income, specialization, and diversifi cation, which 
relates to the dynamics of structural transformation. A better understanding of 
these dynamics provides evidence of poverty traps for most of the regions in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.
Understanding the Regional Level of Income
A household’s level of income per capita depends on an array of factors, includ-
ing the type of economic activities in which it is engaged, the returns from those 
economic activities, the assets available to the household, the size and demo-
graphic structure of the household, and its economic environment. Chapters 
4 and 5 explored the types of activities in which households are engaged and 
found a strong heterogeneity among households and regions, with no evidence 
that any one type of activity was the best option in every case. Thus, the investi-
gation of income determinants presented below does not test the usefulness of 
particular activities. Rather, it focuses on determinants that allow a household 
to take advantage of regional opportunities.
The analysis of the determinants of total income unfolds along four lines 
of inquiry: household characteristics and human capital, assets related to farm 
productivity, environment and market access, and off-farm diversifi cation. To 
pursue this investigation, the RuralStruc program engaged in a series of regres-
sion analyses. A brief overview of their motivation and a summary of key results 
are presented below.1
The regression work primarily took place at the regional level and was con-
ducted in all 30 RuralStruc surveyed zones. The analysis includes only house-
holds with a farm, as including households without a farm would have reduced 
the explanatory power of variables related to farm assets. In each regression, the 
dependent variable is the log of household income per equivalent adult (EqA).2
The program also engaged in regression work at an aggregated level. For 
these specifi cations, all surveyed households in each country were used as 
observations in one catch-all regression, and regional affi liations were not con-
sidered. This additional regression work has the benefi t of capturing the effects 
on wealth of assets or environmental conditions whose distribution varies sig-
nifi cantly among regions (for example, irrigated land in Mali, where Macina 
is very well endowed while other regions are not) but not within them (all 
households in a region are likely to face the same transportation hurdles, but 
households in other regions will face different problems). Tables 6.1 and 6.2 give 
an overview of the results of the analysis and display the signifi cant variables.
Table 6.1 shows many results with many possible interpretations. The regres-
sions have more explanatory power in certain regions, while in others they do 
little to explain the variance in incomes. In general, the regression does better 
in regions with higher shares of on-farm income; for example, the importance 
of self-employment in Senegal is probably why the regression, laden down with 
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variables related to farming, has limited explanatory power. The main results by 
category of variable are discussed below; the diversifi cation index is discussed 
in the next section.
Demographic and Human Capital Variables. The total number of people in a 
household (persons present) is signifi cant in 18 of the 30 regions and is there-
fore one of the most broadly signifi cant variables in the regression. In almost 
every case it is signifi cant with a negative coeffi cient. This implies that in most 
households, an additional household member “costs” more to maintain than he 
or she is able to earn. This is the case everywhere except Koutiala in Mali, where 
the relationship between persons present and income is positive. This implies 
that families in Koutiala may not have enough labor, which makes sense in light 
of the labor requirements of cotton farming. 
Given the prevalence of surplus labor in households (discussed in chapter 4 
and illustrated by the regression results), it is surprising that migrations are 
 signifi cant determinants of income in only fi ve regions. This phenomenon 
has two possible causes. First, as was shown in chapter 4, returns to migration 
depend strongly on the destination of the migrant, which varies signifi cantly 
among countries but less so within them, meaning that an effect is unlikely to 
be captured in within-region or within-country regressions. Second, migra-
tions are less common than expected in the survey.3 Long-term migrants are 
present in only 20 percent of the entire sample of farm households. Short-term 
migrants are even less common, appearing in 10 percent of the sample. The 
regression work refl ects the discussion in chapter 4 about strong barriers to 
migration that make it a nonviable option for many households. 
Conclusions from the education variables are less clear. The educational 
level of the head of the household is less frequently associated with income in 
the countries of North and West Africa (Senegal, Mali, and Morocco) and in 
Mexico. In North and West Africa, this is explained by the overall low levels of 
education (see chapter 4). In Mali, for example, 84 percent of surveyed house-
hold heads have no formal education, although this is changing. The surveys 
show that the most educated person in the household is often not the household 
head. Children are becoming better educated than their parents, implying that 
these regions will benefi t from increased education in years to come.4
Household Assets Related to Productivity. Three important fi ndings relate to 
household assets. The fi rst is the continued supreme importance of land; spe-
cifi cally, how much land is available to the farmer. This is signifi cant in 22 of 
the 30 regions, making it the most commonly signifi cant variable in the survey. 
In seven regions it has the largest coeffi cient of any variable in the regression. 
It is the second largest in fi ve additional regions. The implication of this fi nd-
ing is that, despite all the efforts of the development community over the past 
decades to improve the output of a fi xed-sized plot, the best way for a farmer to 
improve his or her income is to acquire more land. This confi rms a main fi nd-
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ing of chapter 5, that the differentiation processes related to farming that were 
anticipated with increased economic integration have yet to be broadly realized. 
Further confi rmation is provided by the second important fi nding: the 
comparatively broad insignifi cance of the technical package variable.5 It is only 
signifi cant in eight regions, and in two of those regions it enters negatively 
(farmers with the technical package are worse off than those without it). Per-
Table 6.1 Regional Regression Results
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haps more surprisingly, it is only signifi cant among regions in two of the seven 
RuralStruc countries (Madagascar and Kenya). The third important fi nding is 
that the number of livestock owned is broadly and signifi cantly associated with 
income. However, livestock can be an output, a productive asset, a method of 
saving, or a social attribute—these diverse roles complicate the interpretation 
of the livestock variable.
Market Access Variables. Even with the caveat that insertion and integration 
into markets are diffi cult to measure, a main fi nding of the regression work is 
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Table 6.2 Nationally Aggregated Regression Results
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that market integration does not necessarily mean improved incomes: Whether 
it does or does not is context-specifi c. The regression suggests this conclusion 
by examining connections to markets along two axes: (1) distance to markets 
(including a qualitative assessment of transportation quality), and (2) level of 
integration into value chains through the number of households with contracts 
(what constitutes a contract is discussed in chapter 5).
The variable on travel time to markets (c_50,000) produced little in the way 
of patterns to be discerned. Further, the variable about transportation quality 
is signifi cant in the anticipated direction (poor quality associated with lower 
incomes) in only six regions, spread out relatively evenly across RuralStruc 
countries. However, in almost as many regions (fi ve), a negative assessment of 
transportation quality is signifi cantly associated with higher incomes.6 
The regression shows that contracts are signifi cantly associated with income 
in Kenya and Nicaragua. This has nothing to do with the prevalence of con-
tracts: Some farmers in all countries are engaged in contract agriculture, and 
Kenya and Nicaragua are not particularly well endowed. The difference is in 
where the contracts are concentrated on the income spectrum. For instance, in 
the Haut Delta region of Senegal, where over 90 percent of farmers have con-
tracts with the local tomato processor, SOCAS, the few households without a 
contract are actually richer. Those with contracts are heavily dependent on the 
processor. Through this arrangement they receive preferential access to farm 
inputs they can use for other crops, but this is generally not enough to alleviate 
poverty and furthers their dependence on the factory. Whether a contract allows 
farmers to increase their incomes or prevents them from taking advantage of 
more lucrative opportunities depends on the regional context.
Main Conclusions. The conclusions from the regression work so far can be 
summarized under two main results. The fi rst is the persistence of old patterns 
of wealth. In regions where agriculture plays a major role, income still responds 
as it did hundreds of years ago throughout the world. Accessing land and 
increasing the amount of land under cultivation are the best ways to improve 
farm incomes. In addition, depending on economic alternatives and local con-
straints (availability of natural resources and access to resources), population 
dynamics are decisive. As a household’s size increases, income per head falls.
The second result suggests that changes are occurring, but sporadically and 
in a way that does not follow a set pattern. Individual households are respond-
ing to their environments with their asset endowments in the best way they can 
to improve their incomes. Because environment and asset endowments dif-
fer signifi cantly from region to region, so too do households’ strategies. The 
effectiveness of specifi c strategies in terms of income generation also varies 
extensively among regions. This is clear in the regression results. Education is 
signifi cantly associated with incomes in some areas and not in others, without 
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seeming to follow any set pattern. So is the type of draft force used and the qual-
ity of transportation available.
A good illustration of this heterogeneity is provided in table 6.3, which lists 
the three variables most strongly associated with income in each region. The top 
variable is the one with the largest coeffi cient (in absolute value) that is signifi -
cant at least at the 5 percent level. If fewer than three variables are signifi cant at 
the 5 percent level, the variable with the largest coeffi cient that is signifi cant at 
the 10 percent level is used.
The table is straightforward: “Hectares of land used” is a top driver of 
income in half of the RuralStruc regions. This result is driven by the share of 
poor regions (the case of Madagascar is clear) but is also signifi cant in Morocco 
and Mexico. After “Hectares of land used,” no single variable appears as a main 
determinant of income in more than six regions. Additional patterns of signifi -
cance in the chart are indiscernible.
Fine-Tuning the Regional Patterns 
After discussing the consolidated household income structure in the surveyed 
regions using a quintile approach, a diversifi cation index is proposed, the uti-
lization of which helps to investigate the income-diversifi cation relationship.
First Overview. The fi nal line of inquiry into determinants of income in 
the regression involved diversifi cation. But before analyzing the relationship 
between diversifi cation and income, it is useful to look at the overall picture of 
household income sources. Figure 6.1 builds on the analyses in chapters 4 and 
5 and shows income structures by quintile and region.7 This is the fi rst step to 
understanding diversifi cation patterns. The charts show regional income pat-
terns per quintile using on-farm income as a whole and the six types of off-farm 
income discussed in chapter 4: agricultural wages, nonagricultural wages, self-
employment, public transfers, private transfers, and rents.
This overall picture confi rms the important place of on-farm activities 
in regional income structures but also illustrates differences among regions. 
The share of on-farm income is high for most of the quintiles in Mali, Mada-
gascar, Nicaragua, Casamance in Senegal, and Saïss in Morocco. In a number 
of regions, on-farm activities are the dominant income source of the richest 
households. On the other hand, off-farm incomes are very signifi cant in Sen-
egal, Kenya, Mexico, and in Chaouia and Souss in Morocco. Furthermore, the 
confi guration of off-farm incomes varies: Self-employment is a key activity in 
Senegal; nonagricultural wages and self-employment are important in Kenya; 
agricultural wages play a large role in Nicaragua; and Mexico is more broadly 
diversifi ed.
The analysis shows an array of situations and illustrates the heterogeneous 
nature of household diversifi cation patterns among the regions. Even if it is 
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possible to broadly suggest why some regions diversify and others do not (for 
example, comparative advantages, access to markets, urbanization, institutions) 
and why, within each region, some households diversify and others do not 
(assets), the mechanisms that contribute to the many combinations of income 
sources remain unclear.
Characterizing the Trends. To shed more light on this subject, the RuralStruc 
program created an index of household diversifi cation based on the well-known 
Table 6.3 Variables Most Strongly Associated with Income, by Region
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Herfi ndahl-Hirschman index (HHi).8 The index is set between 0 and 1, and 
returns higher values as a household becomes more heavily involved in more 
kinds of activities. Higher values on the diversifi cation index mean more diver-
sifi cation, while lower values mean more specialization.
Figure 6.2, which was constructed using the overall sample, shows the aver-
age level of the diversifi cation index by region and household quintile; in this 
fi gure, trends emerge on three levels: among countries, among regions in the 
same country (regional effects), and among income quintiles in the same region 
(quintile effects).
Country Level. At the country level, there is a signifi cant drop in the diversifi ca-
tion index moving from SSA into non-SSA regions. In Morocco, Nicaragua, and 
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Figure 6.1 Income Structure by Quintile in the Surveyed Regions
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Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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Figure 6.2 Diversification Index (1-HHi) per Region and Quintile
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Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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Tequisquiapan, the average value of the index hovers in the vicinity of 0.15 to 
0.2. In most of the other survey regions (including 16 of the 19 SSA regions), 
diversifi cation indexes are around 0.3. 
The exceptions are few and noteworthy. The lower level of household diver-
sifi cation is observed in Sub-Saharan Africa, in Koutiala and Macina (Mali) and 
Morondava (Madagascar). These low levels are the result of specifi c regional 
situations that will be discussed further. The higher level of diversifi cation is 
observed outside Sub-Saharan Africa in the two zones of the Mexican Sotavento 
(Tierras Bajas and Sierra Santa Marta), and is largely a result of the way the 
index is constructed.9 Even with the presence of these exceptions, household 
diversifi cation tends to fall as country incomes increase.
Regional Level. Patterns also emerge among regions in the same country, 
although these regional effects do not follow any specifi c trend. Some regions 
tend toward diversifi cation with rising incomes: In Senegal, the Bas Delta is 
signifi cantly more diversifi ed than Casamance; and in Kenya, Nakuru North is 
more diversifi ed than Nyando. But the opposite situation also exists, as exempli-
fi ed by Mali and Mexico. 
Local characteristics are fully at play. For example, the higher household 
specialization in the two richer regions of Mali (Koutiala and Macina) refl ects 
long-standing government attention to the cotton industry in Koutiala and 
to rice in the Offi ce du Niger irrigation scheme in Macina. In Mexico, Sierra 
Santa Marta households have a signifi cantly higher diversifi cation score than 
those in Tierras Bajas and Tequisquiapan. In the Sierra, households are unable 
to specialize in maize (like their neighbors in the lowlands) or in off-farm 
activities (like households in Tequisquiapan) (see fi gure 6.1). This situation 
stems partly from isolation, agro-ecological characteristics (mountains versus 
fl oodplains), and lack of access to technical packages and large maize buyers, 
but also from smaller plot sizes and the lower land productivity of mountain-
ous terrain. 
Household Level. However, regional effects are less pronounced than intrare-
gional quintile effects. Although richer quintiles are more diversifi ed in some 
regions and more specialized in others, in most regions the change from quin-
tile to quintile is important. Clearly, a strong relationship exists between income 
and diversifi cation. 
First, the direction of the quintile effect (that is, whether richer households 
tend to be more specialized or more diversifi ed) appears to be the same for 
regions in the same country (with a few notable exceptions, such as Morondava 
in Madagascar, Casamance in Senegal, and El Cuá in Nicaragua). Second, a pre-
liminary attempt to classify regions by the nature of the relationship between 
diversifi cation levels and household quintiles yields additional results. Although 
these relationships are diverse, 11 regions exhibit a pattern that could roughly 
be described as an inverted U (this is the most common pattern). These regions 
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are characterized by a situation in which at lower income levels (quintiles 1–3), 
as households become richer they also become more diversifi ed, but above 
quintile 3 or 4 they begin to specialize again.10 
The Diversifi cation-Income Relationship. A closer look at the relationship between 
diversifi cation and income requires the consideration of the full distribution of 
households, masked in the previous analysis by the quintile averages. These aver-
ages are particularly distorted by the large jump in income that characterizes the 
gap between the 4th and 5th quintiles in every region (see chapter 3).
Plotting all households in a region on a graph with axes representing income 
and diversifi cation and conducting second order polynomial regressions con-
fi rm and strengthen the classifi cation identifi ed above: 22 of the 30 surveyed 
regions display an inverted U pattern.11 Among the 8 regions challenging the 
inverted U, 7 show a U shape and one has a downward slope (box 6.1). 
The persistence of the inverted U pattern suggests that households prefer to 
specialize. This is, after all, what those with the most resources choose to do. If 
households prefer to specialize but at poorer levels do not do so, it must mean 
that they cannot. Thus, the implication of an inverted U pattern is that poor 
households diversify as a way of earning more money to meet their basic needs 
and mitigate their very high levels of risk, but beyond a certain income thresh-
old they begin to specialize (fi gure 6.3). 
The regression work presented in tables 6.1 and 6.2 provides further evi-
dence of a strong relationship between diversifi cation and income. The diversi-
fi cation variable is signifi cantly associated with income among surveyed regions 
in every country (that is, at the nationally aggregated level). Within regions, 
 Figure 6.3 Stylized Representation of the Inverted U Pattern
Source: Authors.
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diversifi cation is also widely signifi cant (17 of the 30 regions, making it the third 
most common signifi cant variable in the regression).
Moreover, at the regional level, the direction of signifi cance of the diversifi -
cation variable (the sign on the regression coeffi cient) tends to match that of the 
nationally aggregated level.12 The two countries in which diversifi cation is nega-
tively associated with income at the nationally aggregated level are Madagascar 
and Mexico, which are, respectively, among the poorest and the richest subsets 
 BOX 6 .1
Challenging the Inverted U Pattern
The surveyed regions in Madagascar challenge the inverted U pattern: fi ve of the eight 
regions whose distributions do not follow this shape are found here. Except for Moron-
dava, they follow a U shape, which means that poor households are already diversifi ed, 
then engage in specialization, and fi nally tend to diversify. 
Households in poorer quintiles in Madagascar are more diversifi ed than in other 
surveyed regions, because some households do not have the resources to survive on 
subsistence agriculture alone. High population densities have resulted in very small 
farm sizes (less than half a hectare) and a sizable group of landless peasants. Conse-
quently, the very poorest must seek off-farm work and fi nd it in agricultural wage labor 
supporting the rice industry (see fi gure 6.1). This is one of the most poorly paid activi-
ties in the entire survey. Households obviously try to exit this situation and reach a point 
at which they can survive on subsistence farming (on-farm activities) alone, which 
is equivalent to a specialization. The situation in Morondava, which is the exception 
among the Malagasy surveyed regions and follows the inverted U shape, is explained 
by lower population density and larger farms. There, the poorest households can sur-
vive on subsistence farming. Also, the region is less specialized in rice, so fewer oppor-
tunities for agricultural wage labor exist. In this region, income improvement means 
accessing additional sources of income and diversifi cation before a possible specializa-
tion in fewer activities. 
The two other surveyed regions that do not follow the inverted U pattern are Kou-
tiala in Mali and El Cuá in Nicaragua. Koutiala, like the regions in Madagascar, displays 
a U shape. Here, the cause is the presence of a cash crop with a guaranteed buyer. 
For poor households, deeper involvement in cotton is the best option, because it ben-
efi ts from a somewhat secure environment. However, the paradoxical limitations in the 
development of the cotton-growing areas (decreasing land availability and fertility—
see box 3.3) mean that cotton can only earn a household so much. Richer households 
are those that engage in diversifi cation activities. 
El Cuá is the only region to display a full downward slope, meaning a trend toward 
specialization across all income levels. The driving force here is also a cash crop with 
easy access to markets. However, returns to coffee farming are much higher than 
returns to cotton farming, so the need to supplement incomes is not as strong.
FROM REGIONAL PATTERNS OF RURAL TRANSFORMATION TO POLICY GUIDELINES  213
of the sample. In Madagascar, this relationship stems from the already highly 
diversifi ed structure of poor households’ incomes (see box 6.1); in Mexico, it 
has to do with farm households’ specialization in maize. 
To conclude, the evidence from the investigation of income structures and 
the regression work indicates that the diversifi cation-income relationship is 
mainly governed by an inverted U pattern, whereby poorer households diver-
sify to mitigate risks while more well-off households tend to specialize. The 
next section introduces an additional perspective that advances the idea of the 
inverted U pattern and relates this observation to broader issues of structural 
transformation.
Household Specialization, Regional Diversifi cation, 
and Structural Transformation
Literature about rural diversifi cation tends to focus on its development and 
how it affects the reshaping of the rural economy. The progressive erosion of 
on-farm activities and the development of new activities feed the process of 
structural transformation (Hazell, Haggblade, and Reardon 2007). However, 
little is said about the difference between diversifi cation/specialization patterns 
at the household level and at the regional level, a comparison that highlights 
important transformation dynamics.
To illustrate the difference between these patterns and how it is related to 
the household’s inverted U shape, consider a hypothetical country in which no 
structural transformation has occurred, with the following stylized historical 
sequencing. At the beginning of the transformation process, all citizens of this 
country are subsistence farmers, and no one is involved in any other type of 
activity. The fi rst tentative steps will involve some people doing things other 
than farming, but it is unlikely that these “early diversifi ers” will risk their food 
supply or give up their plots. Consequently, the diversifi cation observed at this 
fi rst stage of transformation will be largely within the household. As the coun-
try continues to transition and markets become more reliable, early diversifi ers 
may get to the point where they are well established in a nonfarm activity and 
can rely on other sources of income for their food supply. At this point, they 
may stop farming altogether and dedicate most of their time to the new activ-
ity (small business or waged labor). When this switch and progressive special-
ization in off-farm activities begin to occur, diversifi cation within households 
starts to fall across the country, but diversifi cation among households, which 
are now specialized in different activities, continues to grow at the regional and 
national levels. The end result is a country in which many households are spe-
cialized and earn income from only one or a limited number of activities, while 
the regions and the country as a whole have diversifi ed. 
This story makes it clear that a discussion of income levels and diversifi cation/ 
specialization patterns must be more nuanced. Rather than speaking only of 
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absolute diversifi cation or specialization, one must consider the patterns of 
change both within and between households. 
At the beginning of the transformation process, “within households” diver-
sifi cation will be the major trend as households try to diversify from their on-
farm base and the region as a whole remains characterized by the weight of 
agriculture (overall specialization in farming). As the transformation continues, 
patterns of specialization begin to emerge and then dominate at the individual 
household level. Diversifi cation between households increases, and the region 
develops a more diversifi ed economy (fi gure 6.4). 
The RuralStruc survey data illustrate this evolution of diversifi cation/spe-
cialization patterns between the household and regional levels. Additionally, the 
data enable a comparison of different stages of transition within the structural 
transformation process owing to the characteristics of the country sample.
Instead of using the average diversifi cation index of a region presented in the 
previous section, it is possible to more closely investigate this process by using 
the share of household income from off-farm sources as a proxy for diversifi -
cation. In the initial stage of the transformation process, the share of off-farm 
income is low, and both households and regions are specialized in farming. As 
the structural transformation begins, off-farm incomes grow. However, because 
“off-farm” is an aggregate, corresponding to different activities and incomes, an 
increasing off-farm share could imply that households are specializing in differ-
ent off-farm activities, leading to diversifi cation at the regional level. 
One can use the average share of off-farm income to explore this distinction, 
because it can be calculated in two ways: once as a mean of household shares 
and once as a share of regional means (see box 6.2). 
Figure 6.4 Diversification within and between Households and the Inverted U Pattern
Source: Authors.
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Table 6.4 shows that signifi cant differences can exist between the mean of 
household shares (MoHS) and the share of regional means (SoRM). The two dif-
ferent means refer to the two different patterns. Because the MoHS calculates the 
off-farm share at the household level, it refers to patterns within households. The 
SoRM indicator, as a regionwide aggregate, also takes into account patterns occur-
ring between households and expresses the average regional pattern of change. 
The difference between these two means says something about the diver-
sifi cation/specialization pattern in every surveyed region. This pattern can be 
captured and synthesized by computing a diversifi cation gap, defi ned as the 
difference between MoHS and SoRM (box 6.2). 
 BOX 6 .2
From Income Diversifi cation Means to the 
Diversifi cation Gap
Calculating average shares is a simple operation that can produce nuanced results, 
because there are two ways of performing it. 
In the fi rst way, each household’s share of off-farm income to total income is com-
puted, and these shares are averaged at the regional level: This is the mean of house-
hold shares (MoHS). In the second way, the average value of off-farm income is com-
puted for an entire region, then divided by the average of regional households’ total 
income: This is the share of regional means (SoRM). The distinction between these two 
variables is that the MoHS smoothes the effect of outliers while the SoRM does not.
The means correspond to the formulas below:
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In the RuralStruc surveys, the difference between these two means is strongly cor-
related with income (the Pearson correlation is relatively high: 0.60). The value of this 
difference is directly infl uenced by the distribution of households engaged in diversi-
fi cation along the income gradient. A negative sign typically means that the richest 
households diversify while the majority does not. A positive sign means the opposite: 
the poorest households diversify.
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The difference between the two means is the diversifi cation gap.
where:
oi = off-farm income of HH i.
yi = total income of HH i.
n = number of HH in region
216 STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND RURAL CHANGE REVISITEDED
The diversifi cation gap illustrates a region’s stage in the structural trans-
formation process. A negative gap value corresponds to a stage of transition 
in which households are still deeply involved in on-farm activities. They are 
individually testing diversifi cation without giving up their farming plots, and 
their share of off-farm income remains limited. Even if households are engaged 
Table 6.4 Diversification Gap in the Surveyed Regions
Specialization / Diversifi cation
pattern 
Diversifi cation
gap
(MoHS – SoRM)
Average income
$PPP per EqA
Mean of HH
off-farm shares
(MoHS)
Share of regional
off-farm means
(SoRM)
M
al
i
Tominian 0.26 0.30 –0.04 235 
Diéma 0.35 0.51 –0.16 368 
Koutiala 0.12 0.12 0.00 368 
Macina 0.15 0.14 0.01 516 
Se
ne
ga
l
Casamance 0.30 0.28 0.02 439 
Mekhé 1 0.64 0.67 –0.03 527 
Nioro 0.54 0.64 –0.10 484 
Haut Delta 0.41 0.49 –0.08 524 
Mekhé 2 0.54 0.51 0.03 769 
Bas Delta 0.55 0.54 0.01 1,205 
M
ad
ag
as
ca
r
Antsirabe 2 0.36 0.37 –0.01 409 
Alaotra 1 0.42 0.37 0.05 506 
Morondava 0.22 0.23 –0.01 597 
Itasy 0.35 0.31 0.04 622 
Antsirabe 1 0.22 0.18 0.04 744 
Alaotra 2 0.31 0.17 0.14 1,346 
Ke
ny
a
Bungoma 0.37 0.49 –0.12 641 
Nyando 0.58 0.57 0.01 660 
Nakuru N. 0.55 0.65 –0.10 2,258 
M
or
oc
co Chaouia 0.55 0.40 0.15 2,280 
Saiss 0.16 0.11 0.05 3,419 
Souss 0.58 0.31 0.27 4,131 
N
ica
ra
gu
a
Muy Muy 0.41 0.30 0.11 1,417 
Terrabona 0.35 0.40 –0.05 1,458 
El Viejo 0.50 0.31 0.19 2,575 
La Libertad 0.30 0.20 0.10 2,329 
El Cuá 0.09 0.05 0.04 3,610 
M
ex
ico
Sierra SM. 0.65 0.59 0.06 1,824 
T. Bajas 0.55 0.44 0.11 3,144 
Tequis. 0.93 0.89 0.04 2,879 
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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in many off-farm activities, they tend to be low-return coping activities. The 
region as a whole remains specialized in farming, but a limited number of 
households (the richest) have already diversifi ed,13 pulling the regional mean to 
a higher value (which explains why MoHS < SoRM and why the gap value can 
be strongly negative).
On the other hand, a positive value in the diversifi cation gap suggests that 
household shares of off-farm income are growing. Average incomes are increas-
ing, many households are more fully engaged in off-farm activities, and the 
effect of the outliers is reduced (the value of the SoRM weakens). This process 
is strengthened by specialization in different activities corresponding to the 
inverted U: specialization in various off-farm activities for most households and 
in on-farm activities for a few. These “on-farm specializers” (the new outliers on 
this side of the inverted U) are captured more effectively by the SoRM, pulling 
down the mean and pulling up the positive value of the gap.
Thus, the diversifi cation gap, as a single and composite indicator, refl ects the 
complexities of rural income diversifi cation and illustrates the process of rural 
transformation. It explicitly accounts for an inverted U shape, in which patterns 
of household diversifi cation observed at early stages of economic transition 
give way to household-level specialization and emerging patterns of regional 
diversifi cation. 
Figure 6.5 shows the relationship between the diversifi cation gap and 
incomes; it plots each region as a single data point on the income/diversifi ca-
tion gap space. 
Figure 6.5 Relationship between Income and the Diversification Gap
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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 At low levels of income, the gap can take any number of negative values, but 
it is generally not until the gap is positive that incomes begin to grow substan-
tially. The trend line in fi gure 6.5 slopes upward, confi rming a strong positive 
relationship between income and the diversifi cation gap. But there also appears 
to be an exponential component to this relationship: Until a certain level of 
the gap is reached, incomes do not generally rise; beyond that threshold value, 
incomes increase rapidly. Thus, every region that has a diversifi cation gap above 
0.05 has an average income above $1,000 PPP/EqA/year. On the other hand, of 
the regions with a negative value for the diversifi cation gap, all but two have 
incomes below $1,000 PPP.
Beyond the general shape of the distribution, fi gure 6.6 illustrates the posi-
tions of the Sub-Saharan African countries. Every SSA region except Alaotra 2 
has a diversifi cation gap of less than 0.05, and all of these regions except Bas 
Delta and Nakuru North have an average income below $800 PPP/EqA—very 
close to the $2 PPP/day threshold. This means that 16 of the 19 SSA regions 
are characterized by very low incomes and limited regional diversifi cation. In 
these 16 regions, the explanatory power of the diversifi cation gap on income 
is very small. This suggests that households may be encountering a barrier: 
They may be unable to transition from patterns of household diversifi cation to 
patterns of regional diversifi cation (that is, household specialization) because 
Figure 6.6 Income/Diversification Gap Relationship in SSA and Non-SSA Surveyed Regions
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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their incomes are too low and diversifi cation opportunities are too limited. This 
indicates the possible presence of a poverty trap (box 6.3) and touches on the 
idea of transition impasses suggested in the program’s third hypothesis.14 
 The surveyed regions outside Sub-Saharan Africa do not seem to encounter 
any such traps or barriers. With the exception of Terrabona, they are scattered 
generally well above and to the right of the SSA regions on the graph,15 and they 
do not cluster around a specifi c value of the diversifi cation gap. The trend line 
that emerges for the non-SSA regions is nearly twice as steep as that observed 
for SSA regions. So, not only are non-SSA regions richer and more diversi-
fi ed regionally, they also tend to respond more strongly to increasing regional 
diversifi cation.
The probable underlying explanation for these observations is the returns to 
available economic activities. As discussed in chapter 4, in very poor regions of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, a household can be deeply diversifi ed in many low-return 
activities—all EAP household members and often children work at least one 
 BOX 6 .3
The Poverty Trap Pattern
Poverty traps are situations in which households are unable to accumulate assets 
over time and remain mired in poverty. They “can’t get ahead for falling behind” (Bar-
rett and Carter 2001). A vast literature describes the causes, symptoms, and mecha-
nisms of poverty traps, the existence of which depends on “locally increasing returns 
to scale and exclusionary mechanisms that keep some people from enjoying higher 
return livelihoods or technologies” (Barrett and Carter 2004, 15). Locally increasing 
returns often appear when poor households make less-than-optimal allocation deci-
sions because they have to deal with risks. Poverty traps are also accentuated by the 
existence of exclusionary measures, such as lack of credit access or lack of fi nancial 
skills, which prevent households from fi nding any room to maneuver. 
An example would be a household that spends all its resources on seeds and all its 
family labor on staple production, so it will have enough to feed itself. If the household 
were not so food insecure, it might invest in fertilizer, which would greatly increase the 
returns to overall expenditure. Without fertilizer, land degradation can occur rapidly, 
and declining fertility can result in increasingly lower returns each year, while at the 
same time the family might be growing. To try to make up for lost productivity on the 
farm, the household might send members to work in other sectors or areas, not always 
successfully. 
This coping strategy is frequently observed in the RuralStruc data. Regions in which 
many rural households are struggling with poverty traps are often characterized by 
within-household diversifi cation in low-returns activities. This situation is refl ected in 
fi gure 6.6: The surveyed regions seem to be stuck, unable to specialize and unable to 
increase their incomes.
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and sometimes multiple jobs. In this situation, a household may still not earn 
enough to make its income suffi ciently secure so it can begin to specialize. At 
this point, the household is trapped: It cannot earn more, and it consumes 
everything it earns—and sometimes even more if it consumes its assets. This is 
the defi nition of a poverty trap.
Outside of Sub-Saharan Africa, however, the poorest households in every 
region are engaged in activities that earn much higher incomes (see chapters 4 
and 5). Consequently, diversifi cation options provide enough security to even-
tually allow them to begin to specialize. As they begin to specialize, they become 
more productive—which means higher returns—and their incomes increase at 
a faster rate.
The RuralStruc survey’s micro-level data on diversifi cation/specialization 
patterns illustrate a country’s stage in the structural transformation process. 
Most regions in a country follow the same pattern, which suggests that certain 
national characteristics determine the possible alternatives for diversifi cation 
or specialization. These characteristics include assets, market functionality, 
business climate, institutional arrangements, overall governance, and political 
stability. The specifi c alternatives they enable refl ect a country’s stage in the 
economic transition process. 
The trends and characteristics presented here are based on the survey data 
and correspond to the situations of the surveyed households in their respective 
regions. These trends are not deterministic; rather, they suggest where regions 
stand in the diversifi cation/specialization process. They refl ect changes that 
occurred in the past and suggest the causes of observed transition impasses. 
They do not predict future paths, which will depend on the idiosyncrasies of the 
local context and the nature of its interactions with the outside world.
Policy-Making Guidelines
From the previous analyses, it appears that if the determinants of rural house-
hold income and household diversifi cation are mostly micro (household assets, 
portfolio characteristics, managerial skills), the determinants of returns to an 
activity refer broadly to meso and macro conditions. Markets are decisive, 
but the institutional environment is equally critical. The low returns to non-
agricultural activities and the diffi culty of on-farm diversifi cation observed in 
Sub-Saharan Africa are clear reminders of the limitations of the overall context.
Designing adequate public policies to support the process of change is a 
challenge, and there is no silver bullet. The heterogeneity of local situations 
highlighted by the RuralStruc program’s results refl ects the need for a design 
targeted to regional specifi cs: There are no one-size-fi ts-all policies, and tailor-
made approaches must be the rule. It is, however, possible to suggest certain 
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 orientations for action, which refer to policy-making methodologies and pos-
sible building blocks, which are promising.
Methodological Considerations
The standardization of policy responses according to imported “recipes” has 
been a major obstacle to adequate policy design for a long time. A necessary fi rst 
step is to reengage in development strategies as a way to identify and address 
major challenges, and then to defi ne priorities and objectives for public and 
collective action. 
Reengaging in Development Strategy Design. A review of the past two decades 
of development policies provides a well-known shopping list of policy mea-
sures that appear in every good publication related to economic development 
in general and rural development in particular. The main ingredients in the 
recipe for success are provision of public goods (infrastructure, research, infor-
mation, and capacity building); improvement of imperfect markets (sourcing 
inputs, commercializing products, and cutting transaction costs); incentives for 
the development of missing markets (credit, technical support, assurance); and 
risk mitigation mechanisms. The hard part is to mix these ingredients in the 
policy bowl, to devise genuine policies and defi ne their adequate sequencing on 
the basis of prioritization and targeting.
To identify priorities for action, the program’s results suggest the need to 
reengage in development strategies to deal with the critical challenges faced by 
many developing countries. This is particularly the case for Sub-Saharan Africa, 
which must manage its demographic and economic transitions in the context 
of globalization and under the new constraints of global climate change (see 
chapter 2). 
Many countries have neglected overall strategy design, most often since the 
end of the 1970s, a consequence of liberalization policies and state withdrawal, 
policy segmentation, and disinvestment in information systems—the latter 
being major obstacles today to adequate policy design.
A development strategy is more than the articulation of sector policies. It 
is the result of a process leading to a shared vision of the future, refl ecting an 
agreement among stakeholders or constituents that allows a country to make 
choices and establish priorities. As described by Stiglitz (1998), a development 
strategy is a public good and deserves strong public support in its design.
Reengagement in development strategies implies, fi rst and foremost, rein-
vestment in knowledge creation. As illustrated by the country reviews in Phase 
1 of the program, information is missing in general, and necessary information 
about evolving rural economies is notably absent. The survey results show that 
heterogeneity leads to complex rural settings that cannot be understood with-
out effi cient information systems. Statistical systems must be reestablished and 
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redefi ned to allow policy to account for the evolution of rural economies, the 
increasing mobility of people, and new family networks resulting from archi-
pelago models (see chapter 4). Reengagement also implies reinvestment in pro-
cesses. Here, consultation is the key word, because ownership is the determining 
factor of commitment. This approach takes time and must be carefully planned. 
Finally, reengagement in development strategies means an investment and a 
reinvestment in capacity building. Many countries do not have the skills to 
manage information systems, analyze results, monitor processes, and elaborate 
scenarios. The situation is particularly critical in Sub-Saharan Africa, where 
many central governments lost their technical skills in the aftermath of struc-
tural adjustment and state withdrawal in the 1980s; where new local govern-
ment institutions created by decentralization are generally unprepared for this 
kind of approach; and where civil society organizations and think tanks are few.
Prioritizing and Targeting. Often, a critical issue for policy makers is the need 
to do everything at the same time. Of course, this is not possible because of 
limitations on fi nancial and human resources. Choices must be made, and mak-
ing them is diffi cult under the conditions in many developing countries, where 
the means for policy making are limited.
In this setting, prioritization and sequencing are required. They must be 
supported by adequate analyses for which general, sectoral, and regional diag-
noses must be developed to identify existing “binding constraints.” Using the 
program’s perspective on rural transformation, a preliminary step would be 
to identify the regional constraints to agricultural growth—the necessary fi rst 
stage for increasing rural demand and rural diversifi cation.16 
Then, priorities need to be discussed in terms of targets, which can be 
defi ned for groups of economic agents, sectors (types of products), and regions. 
The program does not aim to propose priorities and targets for the various 
countries and surveyed regions, but it is possible to provide an illustration of a 
fi rst step of this kind of fi ne-tuning. This would help identify a set of priorities 
and facilitate the defi nition of possible building blocks that contribute to the 
design of policy instruments. 
A rough identifi cation of target groups, referring to levels of income, was 
tested using the survey results. (This approach is, of course, limited; a classifi ca-
tion based on a more detailed typology—one using households’ assets and their 
local opportunities and constraints—would be necessary.) This rough identifi -
cation is useful in allowing one to consider general options based on the overall 
economic situation of the surveyed households. 
Four groups of households were defi ned according to their levels of total 
income and on-farm income to assess their capacity for investment—a core 
indicator of room to maneuver at the household level, which must be under-
stood to identify appropriate incentives and supports: Better off households 
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(>$4/day); capacity households (>$2/day); and poor and extremely poor house-
holds (<$2/day). The poor group includes households that could exit poverty 
if they were able to double their current on-farm income. The extremely poor 
group refers to households that could not: Even if they were to double their on-
farm income, they would still remain below $2 PPP. Even though the exercise 
is highly theoretical, one can assume that for households above $2 PPP per day, 
basic needs are covered and earnings are no longer fully allocated to consump-
tion but can be used for investment and savings. Above $4 PPP, options for 
income allocation are obviously greater. The situation below $2 PPP is critical: 
All revenues are dedicated to basic needs, and they are still not enough. 
Table 6.5 presents the share of the surveyed households that falls into each 
income group, and Figure 6.7 shows the breakdown at the regional level. 
Together, they show the very diffi cult situations faced by SSA regions, particu-
larly those in Mali and Senegal, and illustrate the earlier discussion of poverty 
traps. They are a reminder of the stark reality faced by most rural households. 
The two “poor” groups—which include the vast majority of households sur-
veyed in Sub-Saharan Africa—face huge challenges. The extremely poor group 
would remain poor even if its on-farm incomes were doubled, and the prospect 
of raising the poor group’s farm revenues by 100 percent seems out of reach in 
most regional situations over the short to medium term. 
The results presented in these fi gures can help in the consideration of pos-
sible policy orientations. It is unrealistic to expect households whose incomes 
are less than $2 PPP/EqA/day and that cannot satisfy their basic needs (the poor 
and extremely poor groups), to engage in any investment on their own. They 
will need local public goods in terms of infrastructure (transportation, water, 
and electricity), land rights, and research. 
Table 6.5 Distribution of Households by Target Group in the RuralStruc Sample
 Target groups
Country Extremely poor Poor Capacity Better off
Mali 69.8 19.7  7.7  2.8
Senegal 58.5 15.6 11.8 14.0
Madagascar 49.9 25.8 13.6 10.8
Kenya 45.7 12.5 12.8 29.0
Morocco 21.9  8.0 13.6 56.5
Nicaragua 24.6 13.8 14.4 47.3
Mexico  7.3  2.6 10.2 79.8
TOTAL 40.2 16.0 12.6 31.1
SSA 53.6 20.2 12.3 13.9
non-SSA 19.8  9.6 13.2 57.4
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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Figure 6.7 Distribution of Households by Target Group and Region 
Source: RuralStruc surveys.
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They will also need more direct support through smart subsidies,17 especially 
to facilitate input access and extension services, as well as very low-interest-rate 
loans, which are the only way to improve the existing farming systems, facilitate 
innovation, and increase productivity.18 Price risks are another major stumbling 
block. The increasing volatility of global markets and the well-known seasonal 
volatility of domestic food markets require actions that the private sector has 
little incentive to carry out. Public support is needed to implement informa-
tion systems—a preliminary and indispensable step—and stabilization instru-
ments must be adapted to local situations, depending on the type of instability 
(endogenous or imported).19
Any support related to provision of public goods and market improvement/
facilitation would benefi t all farm households, including the “capacity” and 
“better-off” groups. These policies would not pit one income group against 
another; they could benefi t all rural households while allowing the poor to catch 
up more rapidly.
However, the extremely poor group’s prospects for escaping poverty by 
remaining completely within agriculture are severely restricted, and additional 
opportunities in terms of activities and incomes will be necessary. Options are 
limited in the short and medium terms, but improvement in skills and capaci-
ties will facilitate diversifi cation. A critical objective for governments related 
to provision of public goods is education. The surveys show that the situa-
tion is heterogeneous among countries but improving: The next generation has 
achieved—at least formally—higher levels of schooling, although a huge push 
is still needed. A higher educational level facilitates mobility in the labor market 
and access to off-farm activities. 
Again, strengthening educational levels will benefi t all rural households. It 
will also help the “on-farm side.” Higher skills mean possible access to new tech-
nical packages and cultivation practices that facilitate greater productivity and 
easier compliance with the stringent demands of modern agricultural markets.
Building Blocks for Rural Transformation
Although this section has focused so far on heterogeneity and the need to reen-
gage in targeted development strategies on a national (or even subnational) 
level, certain trends emerge in the RuralStruc results and common themes 
appear. The program has distilled these results into building blocks for policy, 
keeping in mind the need to be selective. These building blocks are mainly tar-
geted to Sub-Saharan Africa, which faces major transition challenges. They are 
not recommendations in and of themselves but rather frameworks to keep in 
mind in creating targeted development strategies.
Agriculture must remain a fi rm priority. In the agriculture-based countries 
of Sub-Saharan Africa, the major push for structural transformation, and for 
progressively unlocking the poverty traps, has to occur in agriculture. Even if 
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public policies are also needed to facilitate the development of other sectors, 
transformation will depend fi rst on increasing farm incomes and creating a 
more secure economic environment, changes that will foster rural demand and 
facilitate rural diversifi cation.
The evidence gathered over the two phases of the RuralStruc program sug-
gests three main building blocks: (1) supporting family agriculture, (2) pro-
moting staple production and improving staple markets, and (3) strengthening 
rural-urban linkages. 
Supporting Family Farms. The RuralStruc results contribute to the controver-
sial (and often misleading) debate about the optimal size of farm structures, a 
topic of renewed discussion in recent years. This debate was reignited primarily 
as a result of the food price crisis of 2008 and the related trend of increased land 
grabbing (chapter 1); until now, it has been mostly couched in terms of food 
security. Part of the confusion was fostered by the publication of two essays by 
Paul Collier (2008, 2009) that focused on food supply. Some of his provocative 
arguments were used to feed the small versus large-scale debate. 
This debate postulates a false dualism between smallholder and subsistence 
agriculture on one side and large-scale and commercial agriculture on the other. 
In fact, the reality is a continuum of situations shaped by local assets and the 
economic and institutional environment. Family agriculture is still the over-
whelmingly dominant type of agriculture around the world. It covers a large 
spectrum of situations, from micro-farms to larger holdings (sometimes hun-
dreds of hectares) that employ mechanization and wage labor, and are major 
suppliers to world food markets.20 Family agriculture can be subsistence, com-
mercial, or a combination. It has displayed, throughout history and in every 
region of the world, a remarkable capacity for adaptation and an ability to 
respond to growing demand. This is certainly the case in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
where it has done so despite extremely adverse conditions (Mortimer 2003; 
Toulmin and Guèye 2003). 
Advocates of large-scale farming cite the wide and growing gap in output 
per hectare between land farmed by large-scale, mechanized operations and 
land worked by smallholders. They argue that developing countries (notably in 
SSA), by beginning to favor large-scale production and thereby producing more 
food from their own land, could control their growing trade defi cits in food and 
reduce their vulnerability to swings in international food prices.
Proponents of smallholder agriculture also often frame their arguments in 
the language of food security. They point to the well-known lack of economies 
of scale in agriculture and the many failures of previous large-scale agricul-
tural projects.21 They argue that family labor has many benefi ts, such as no 
costs for worker supervision, very high effort levels by workers (who are directly 
interested in the farm’s output), fl exibility and adaptation (to varying labor 
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needs over the year and to varying economic results depending on the crop 
season), and local knowledge that can make the smallholder model effi cient.22 
The recent World Bank study Awakening Africa’s Sleeping Giant (2009b) showed 
that African smallholder agriculture has competitive production costs com-
pared with those of large-scale farms (in this case, those of the Cerrado region 
in the  central-south of Brazil) and is competitive in its domestic markets but is 
disadvantaged in global markets owing to high logistics costs (which relate to a 
country’s economic and institutional environment, not to farm size).23 
Thus, the small versus large-scale debate is an example of the kind raised in 
chapter 1: A discussion about policies that will have long-term effects is being 
driven by a focus on short-term issues (in this case, the consequences of the 
food price crisis). By targeting food production only, the discussion fails to take 
into account the broader role agriculture plays in economic development and 
forgets its contribution to structural transformation. 
In Sub-Saharan Africa, an incipient economic transition and an ongoing 
demographic transition ensure that agriculture will have a role to play over the 
medium term, notably for the absorption of a rapidly growing labor force. The 
195 million rural youth who must be employed between now and 2025 will have 
to work in agriculture or in the rural nonfarm economy. 
Because the majority of rural people are involved in family agriculture and 
because nonfarm activities are both directly and indirectly supported by farm-
ers’ incomes (and will develop with their improvement), the question for rural 
development is what kind of agricultural development model will offer the best 
outcomes in terms of overall revenues, employment, and poverty alleviation. 
If governments were to encourage large managerial farms—which probably 
would mean new technical systems and mechanization—they would risk ham-
pering the development of labor opportunities related to more labor-intensive 
family agriculture. In this light, the recent trend of large land purchases in 
Africa by foreign operators is troubling and paradoxical. As Karen Brooks said 
(2010, 9), “Large numbers of African young people with agricultural experience 
are joining the labor force, [while] the land that could secure their futures may 
pass under long-term rights to foreigners because of constraints on capital and 
property rights.” 
Policy choices must avoid radical positions. Investments in large-scale farm-
ing, including foreign investments, can offer opportunities for growth and 
employment, depending on the local context and the type of production. They 
can help the development of new value chains by facilitating the reach of mini-
mum production thresholds, and they can facilitate agricultural development 
in sparsely populated regions. However, as noted in the Sleeping Giant study 
(World Bank 2009b), these investments could be better oriented toward seg-
ments of the value chain where capital is missing—input supply, marketing, 
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transformation of products—where they would favor the use of the huge small-
holder potential for production.
These arguments have important consequences in terms of policy design. 
Among the many policy ingredients related to public goods provision and 
market improvements, the priority should be to focus on land access and land 
rights. This conclusion was confi rmed by the RuralStruc survey results, which 
show that land access is the most critical determinant of farm income (see the 
fi rst section at the beginning of this chapter). 
In countries that are deeply constrained in terms of land availability, the only 
solution to increase both farm income and farm employment is labor-intensive 
improvements in land productivity. Although input markets are a main stum-
bling block in terms of access and cost, the adoption of technical innovations 
at the farm level offers a wide range of sustainable answers.24 These innovations 
must be coupled with necessary secure land tenure without which the economic 
risk level is unacceptable. 
In countries in which increasing the amount of farmland under cultivation 
is an option, unlocking access to this resource through infrastructure provision, 
adequate regional planning, and land rights can be a powerful way to increase 
farm income and farm labor. This is the case in many parts of Africa, notably 
the Guinea savanna, where only 10 percent of 400 million hectares of potential 
farmland are currently cultivated (World Bank 2009b).25 In these situations, a 
preliminary step is to catalog existing resources, critical information that does 
not exist in most SSA countries.
In addition, the diffi cult and rarely discussed question of land access for 
youth must be raised. Many young people are locked in agrarian systems in 
which land tenure and farm management are under the control of elders. In 
SSA, young household heads often remain dependent on their fathers or grand-
fathers until the elders die, a situation that blocks initiatives and technical inno-
vations that could more easily be adopted by young people. Facilitating access 
of young rural dwellers to farmland, the transmittal of farm assets to young 
family workers, and the standing down of elders are critical issues that must be 
tackled by public policies. Such policies will directly contribute to the economic 
insertion of youth and to agricultural growth.
A fi nal recommendation relates to increasing the economies of scale of fam-
ily farms, which are often hindered by the relatively limited production levels 
of individual farms. This obstacle can be overcome through effective produc-
ers’ organizations, although adequate incentives and supports are required to 
develop these groups. Producers’ organizations can facilitate the marketing of 
products through primary collection and can play a major role in investment 
in storage facilities and equipment for the transformation of products, and in 
organizing profi table input supply. Larger volumes of products can facilitate 
contractualization with downstream economic agents (wholesalers, agribusi-
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nesses, exporters), and the producers’ organizations can use their increased 
bargaining power in contract negotiations.
Promoting Staple Crops. In the RuralStruc sample, staple production is over 
50 percent of gross farm product in 18 of the 30 surveyed zones. In some cases, 
the number is as high as 80 percent. This result refl ects a dual reality. First, it 
highlights the importance of self-consumption. The self-consumption share 
in a household’s gross farm product refl ects risk-management strategies (sup-
ply effect) that households employ to respond to a persistently insecure envi-
ronment (incomplete and imperfect markets and sometimes unstable natural 
conditions that can affect the crop season). Second, it mirrors a potentially 
weak demand owing to poor access to and integration with markets (demand 
effects). The importance of staples refl ects the lack of market opportunities in 
the surveyed zones, as well as regional situations in which new value chains 
and alternatives to traditional commodities are limited. Even though non-SSA 
regions display more on-farm diversifi cation (with the exception of the Mexi-
can regions), the importance of staple markets is a general pattern. It affects 
households at all income levels, as even households in richer quintiles can be 
heavily engaged in staple production and commercialization. 
These results provide evidence-based justifi cation for giving priority to poli-
cies that support staple production and the improvement of staple markets. 
This priority was the mainstay of the structural transformation of Asian econo-
mies, with the clear objectives of alleviating poverty, reducing food costs, and 
managing and slowing the exit from agriculture—it was a way to adjust to the 
pace of the overall structural transformation. 
In general terms, the case for staples is supported by four broad arguments. 
The fi rst argument refers to their inclusiveness, which results from their wide-
spread development: Almost every farm household is engaged in staple pro-
duction (98 percent and 76 percent of the surveyed households in SSA and 
non-SSA regions, respectively), while other agricultural products engage a more 
limited population. The oft-cited high-value exports frequently only affect tens 
of thousands of producers or fewer in a country, out of hundreds of thousands 
or even millions. Thus, targeted policies that promote and support staples can 
affect the overwhelming majority of rural households. 
Generally, staple products are not very valuable compared with other farm 
products, such as horticulture or livestock. They offer a lower return, and it 
is clear that a production increase in staples cannot be the only solution for 
poverty alleviation. However, rising food prices are resulting in progressively 
better returns to staple farming, and the constraint of relatively low earnings 
is offset by the breadth of staple production, which offers major leverage in 
terms of labor, overall income, and growth linkages. By contributing strongly 
to farm incomes (and thus rural incomes) at the aggregated level, staples can 
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play a major role in increasing rural demand and facilitating the emergence of 
other activities. This pro-staple option was a decisive component of the Asian 
Green Revolution, which facilitated the rural transformation of Asian countries 
(Delgado, Hopkins, and Kelly 1998). Also, it is easier for producers to access 
staple markets because they do not have the strict requirements found in the 
markets for higher value products, particularly when these high-value products 
are sold globally.
The second argument is related to the critical role played by staples in risk-
management. Seventy-fi ve percent and 30 percent of surveyed households in 
SSA and non-SSA regions, respectively, are in the two “poor” groups, in which 
the total income per adult equivalent is below $2 PPP a day. These households 
face severe risks, and food insecurity is present for a signifi cant share of them.26 
In such situations, self-consumption and storage (when possible) are the rule, 
and any type of risk related to new crops, new production techniques, new mar-
keting channels, or off-farm diversifi cation is carefully avoided. Consequently, 
any increase in staple production can be a catalyst: It contributes to risk allevia-
tion and can therefore help unlock the potential for innovation and diversifi ca-
tion, both on-farm and off-farm. 
The third argument in favor of staples is the huge growth potential of the 
sector. As a consequence of demographic growth—nationally, regionally, and 
globally—and increasing urbanization, demand for all types of staple products 
will rise steadily over the next decades. Progressive changes in diets related to 
rising incomes will result in the rapid development of meat, dairy, and hor-
ticulture products (Collomb 1999), but staples—especially cereals—will still 
account for the bulk of food demand for years to come. 
In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, staple production has been quite success-
ful in growing to meet rising demand (Bricas, Zoungrana, and Thirion 2009), 
and this incentive will remain in place for some time owing to the demographic 
prospects of the region. The sector already represents three-quarters of total agri-
cultural output.27 Additionally, higher international food prices will reduce the 
competition from low-priced imports and will provide an incentive for increas-
ing regional production. Domestic producers will be better positioned to capture 
some of the current $23 billion in food imports into Sub-Saharan Africa.28 
The fi nal argument for a pro-staples policy involves the huge potential for 
downstream activities related to processing. The initial transformation of staple 
products (typically, shelling and grinding) generally occurs either at the farm 
level for self-consumption or at the village level for local consumption. But 
most sales of staples, especially those directed to urban consumers in large cit-
ies, consist of raw products, and the value added is appropriated by urban eco-
nomic agents. 
Growth in staple production could easily result in more value added locally, 
strengthen the linkages between rural areas and their nearby small towns, and 
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contribute to rural diversifi cation. This evolution would require an improved 
investment climate, but investment needs are not necessarily high. Local trans-
formation can be achieved with small equipment and labor-intensive transfor-
mation units, which can deal with initial processing and engage in secondary 
transformation of products and packaging for urban consumers.
On the basis of the survey results, it is easy to say that policies should focus 
on staples, but developing recommendations for specifi c policies to increase 
staple production risks re-creating the long shopping list related to productivity 
discussed earlier.29 In Sub-Saharan Africa, two major issues must be addressed. 
The fi rst relates to postharvest losses. This is an old theme, promoted after the 
1970s food crises, that is still relevant because of the lack of storage equipment 
in most rural areas. Although estimates are diffi cult, particularly for roots and 
tubers, postharvest grain loss is generally agreed to be between 10 percent and 
20 percent of total output.30 Many actions can be promoted that would affect 
the postharvest process (sorting, drying, pest control, early processing), but 
good storage appears to be a major component and one that can be supported 
by adapted institutional arrangements, such as warehouse receipt systems, 
which can simultaneously ease the cash situation of producers and contribute 
to reducing their level of economic risk (World Bank 2010a).
The second issue relates to regional trade. Sub-Saharan Africa as a whole is a 
huge and rapidly growing market, but it is constrained by the political fragmen-
tation of the continent and the large number of international borders, a situ-
ation highlighted in the WDR09. On average, in the 2000s, only 20 percent of 
SSA’s agricultural exports were oriented toward other SSA countries (Lipchitz, 
Torre, and Chedanne 2010). Important progress occurred over the past two 
decades as a consequence of progressive regional integration and achievements 
of the regional economic communities (RECs). Generally, tariffs on goods were 
removed within regions, but this did not lead to an increase in regional trade 
(Faivre Dupaigre 2007). Diffi culties are related to the nonenforcement of the 
RECs’ rules; persistent nontariff barriers related to standards (on both products 
and inputs); and abnormal practices, mainly related to border crossing (bureau-
cratic hassle is often the rule).31 Political commitment for effective harmoniza-
tion and trade facilitation must be a key part of the solution, along with invest-
ment in transport infrastructure (Ndulu 2006; Foster and Briceño-Garmendia 
2010), which is the target of one of NEPAD’s major programs. 
But although it is important to focus on staples, they should not be the only 
focus. Where other opportunities exist or when they arise, they should be sup-
ported. Traditional commodities or higher value products can offer important 
local alternatives. This is the case for livestock products, which are developed 
in many surveyed regions.32 It is also the case in non-SSA regions, where more 
diversifi ed agricultural sectors and better economic and institutional environ-
ments provide more room to maneuver for agricultural diversifi cation, nota-
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bly access to higher value markets—a conclusion that is consistent with the 
WDR08’s policy recommendations regarding non-agriculture-based countries. 
Strengthening Rural-Urban Linkages for Territorial Development. Rural trans-
formation is all about the diversifi cation/specialization relationship, in which 
regional economies evolve from on-farm specialization to rural diversifi cation. 
This process occurs through risk alleviation and higher returns to on-farm 
activities (resulting from increased agricultural productivity and diminishing 
transaction costs), which translate into growing rural demand for nonagricul-
tural goods and services. Rural demand generates new activities (processing 
of products, trade in and trade out, services) that concentrate in rural bor-
oughs and small towns to benefi t from economies of scale, while agriculture 
is, by nature, an activity scattered in multiple production units throughout the 
countryside. 
The strengthening of linkages between small towns and their surroundings 
is critical for development and has contributed to economic transitions all 
over the world. These links create better local market opportunities, facilitate 
access to services, build community, and contribute to the weaving together of 
a region’s economic and social fabric. The linkages progressively accelerate with 
increasing agricultural output and farm incomes, but changes occur slowly and 
are likely to develop over generations. 
Thus, the question is how to strengthen these connections and reinforce 
the territorial (or regional) dimension of development, despite the fact that 
the growth of strong, localized rural-urban linkages has been challenged over 
the past few decades by the emergence in many developing countries of new 
urbanization patterns characterized by rapid metropolization. As discussed in 
chapter 2, better transportation networks in much of the world allow easier 
access to major cities, which offer more services and superior job prospects. 
This access often results in migration directly from rural to metropolitan areas 
(UNSRID 2010). 
This urbanization pattern can inhibit the development of smaller towns, 
where dense rural-urban and on-farm–off-farm linkages might otherwise occur 
and offer multiplier effects for development. At the same time, it complicates 
urban management in large cities, which are burdened by an infl ux of poor and 
unskilled rural migrants who feed the spongelike informal urban sector. This 
growing population in metropolitan areas presents city planners with diffi cul-
ties in terms of infrastructure, equipment, and services, because poor urban 
dwellers cannot contribute to their own maintenance (Paulais 2010 and forth-
coming). It explains the growing problem of slums in the metropolitan areas of 
developing countries (UN-Habitat 2003).
New evidence on the signifi cance of regional rural-urban dynamics strength-
ens arguments for the critical role of small and intermediary urban centers, and 
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reinforces the need to focus development efforts at the local level. Christiaensen 
and Todo (2009) show that rural migration out of agriculture into what they 
call the “missing middle” (secondary towns and the associated rural nonfarm 
economy) has powerful effects in terms of poverty reduction, but that this is 
not the case with large-scale urbanization in mega-cities—a result that ques-
tions the benefi ts of concentration stressed in the WDR09. Using poverty data 
over a panel of 49 countries, Christiaensen and Todo show that if agglomera-
tion in mega-cities translates into faster general growth, it also leads to higher 
inequality, while diversifi cation into the missing middle smoothes the process 
and results in more inclusive development.
The question of how to support the linkage of small cities with their imme-
diate surroundings is a major one, and it has drawn signifi cant attention from 
academia and development practitioners over the past decades, although no 
defi nitive recipe has emerged.33 As with general economic development and 
economic transition, there is no silver bullet for territorial development. How-
ever, policy makers can be guided by what is known about methodology, local 
institutions, and the strengthening of the economic functions of small cities, for 
which inclusive family farm development, staple markets, and local transforma-
tion of local products are key.
A territorial approach that strives to understand local strengths and weak-
nesses and binding constraints can help promote rural and local development.34 
It requires a careful diagnostic, created jointly by local stakeholders, that enables 
effi cient prioritizing, sequencing, and targeting. Such a process parallels the 
development of local institutions and local governance. Decentralization and 
the strengthening of civil society organizations offer opportunities to make 
local policy choices; however, local governance bodies are often weak, and 
decentralization often precedes the development of the information systems 
and local analytical capacities necessary for effective governance—a clear fi eld 
for external support. 
Strengthening the economic functions of small cities has to do with their 
connection to markets and the type and level of services they provide. Although 
transportation infrastructure may be key (conventional wisdom in the develop-
ment debate), it is not enough. An important result of the RuralStruc surveys is 
that well-connected rural areas with easy access to major urban centers are not 
necessarily better off than more remote areas, as exemplifi ed by the situation 
of rural households in western Kenya or in the bassin arachidier in Senegal (see 
chapter 3). This discussion strengthens the debate about the missing middle, 
which is about the quality of urbanization, not just about avoiding excessive 
metropolization. 
The characteristics of urbanization in West Africa are a clear reminder 
that metropolization does not necessarily prevent the development of small 
and medium-size cities, and that such cities are not necessarily the recipe for 
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regional growth. As shown by the Africapolis study (Denis and Moriconi-Ebrard 
2009), the number of urban centers with populations over 10,000 has grown 
rapidly in West Africa and has resulted in shorter distances to cities and a new 
geography of the region (Bossard 2009). However, the question here is the level 
of public goods provision and the quality of infrastructure and services. These 
are absolute necessities for a city to assume its economic role; without them, 
urban growth is characterized by an agglomeration of poor people. In many 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, public funds are exhausted in servicing a dom-
inant capital city, preventing the wider provision of infrastructure and services 
that would facilitate a positive urbanization process (see box 3.2).
Thus, what appears to be critical at the regional level is the adequate provi-
sion of public goods (related to local administration, health, education, and 
communication infrastructure—not only roads) and of basic factors such as 
water and electricity, which cannot easily be provided by the private sector in 
the fi rst stages of development. These public goods are indispensable to facili-
tate private investment and improve the living conditions of urban dwellers—a 
condition necessary to minimize rural depopulation toward metropolitan areas. 
They correspond to spatially targeted public interventions, which should more 
often be the rule rather than an individual response to a very specifi c situation.35 
Public goods provision can usefully be accompanied by fi scal incentives aimed 
at helping local service providers and entrepreneurs. 
These kinds of public investments and supports have had positive effects on 
regional growth, the development of nonfarm employment, and the strengthen-
ing of rural-urban links (Fan 2008). They can directly contribute to promoting 
territorial development that makes use of local assets and resources, eases value 
addition to local products, and facilitates the provision of environmental ser-
vices.36 Agroclusters that take advantage of local knowledge, local networks, and 
specifi c geographical denominations of local products can be powerful engines.37
This perspective acknowledges the multifunctionality of agriculture and the 
fact that it can be a driving force for rural and regional development. It can 
serve as the foundation for a “new rural-urban compact” (Gutman 2007) based 
on a new type of regional governance, which would reconcile “urbanists” and 
“ruralists” and allow for an effective process of structural transformation that 
reconnects cities with their regional surroundings. 
Notes
 1. For a full explanation of the regression work and descriptions of the variables, see 
annex 5 in the appendix posted at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ruralstruc.
 2. Every effort was made to run the same regression in all 30 surveyed zones. This was 
not always possible, as certain pieces of information were available in some regions 
and not in others, and some variables were locally irrelevant (for example, irriga-
tion). However, in general, the specifi cation in each region is very similar.
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 3. The diffi cultly of capturing migrant incomes is addressed in chapter 4.
 4. There also seem to be important level effects but not necessarily “certifi cate effects.” 
The most signifi cant difference in incomes is associated with the jump from having 
completed primary education to having some secondary education.
 5. The survey did not conduct a detailed review of intensifi cation practices. The techni-
cal package variable represents access to fertilizer and improved seeds only.
 6. These fi ve regions are Bas Delta (Senegal), the two Antsirabe zones (Madagascar), El 
Cuá (Nicaragua), and Tequisquiapan (Mexico). The results are not straightforward 
to interpret but make a point about the relative importance of physical distance to 
a city and quality of roads. Where the transportation quality variable is negatively 
signifi cant, physical proximity to a city matters a lot; where it is positively signifi cant, 
it is better to have a good road network than to be close to a city (see annex 5 in the 
appendix posted at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ruralstruc).
 7. The fi gure shows the shares of regional means by income sources and regional quin-
tiles. The different types of average calculation are discussed later in this chapter.
 8. The diversifi cation index (1-HHi) is defi ned as the opposite of the Herfi ndahl-
Hirschman Index (HHi). 
  The defi nition of the index is the following: 
1 1
1
1
1
2
1– –
–
–
HHi
P
n
n
i
i
n
=
=
∑
  where i represents the different income sources (on-farm, agricultural wages, non-
agricultural wages, self-employment, public transfers, private transfers, rents), n the 
number of income sources, and P the share of every income source in the total 
income. Because the HHi squares the shares, it strengthens the main pattern of the 
household. 
 9. As the diversifi cation index is based on seven types of income (on-farm and six off-
farm incomes), the presence or absence of one of these types can have a large effect 
on a household’s overall score. One of the seven types is public transfers, which exist 
in every quintile in every region in Mexico and nowhere else in the survey. This 
signifi cantly raises the diversifi cation index in Mexico relative to other countries. 
Tequisquiapan’s index is not raised in this way because although public transfers 
are present, only 27 percent of households have on-farm incomes, so the weight of 
subsidies related to agriculture (Procampo) is lower.
10.   The following regions exhibit this pattern: Casamance, Mekhé 1 and 2, and Bas 
Delta in Senegal; Chaouia and Souss in Morocco; El Viejo, La Libertad, and El Cuá 
in Nicaragua; and Tierras Bajas and Sierra Santa Marta in Mexico.
11.   This inverted U shape holds even when the households with the highest incomes are 
eliminated, those that heavily affect the 5th quintile’s averages. The only exception 
is Saiss, Morocco, where excluding the fi ve richest households leads to a different 
regression result and a U shape instead of an inverted U (see chapter 4 for a discus-
sion of high incomes in Morocco related to rents).
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12.   For example, diversifi cation is positively associated with income in Senegal and posi-
tively signifi cant in fi ve out of six regions in the regional level regression. The diver-
sifi cation variable is not signifi cant in Haut Delta because of the high specialization 
in tomato production (see chapter 5).
13.   Some of these households are engaged in services (health, education, local adminis-
tration, or trade and transportation) that have higher returns.
14.   The three SSA regional outliers—Nakuru North, Alaotra 2, and Bas Delta—have the 
highest regional average incomes in the SSA sample and are the richest regions in 
their countries. In Nakuru North, the negative gap value suggests that the regional 
income is pulled by a few richer households that are deeply engaged in off-farm 
activities. In Alaotra 2, the positive gap value illustrates a situation in which the 
richest households are deeply specialized in on-farm activities (rice), pulling down 
the off-farm regional average. The neutral position of Bas Delta, near the thresholds, 
refl ects the higher returns to the activities of the richest households.
15.   In Terrabona, one of the two poorest regions in Nicaragua, households are mainly 
engaged in on-farm activities with low-return off-farm diversifi cation. The richest 
households have access to better paid jobs in maquiladoras.
16.   The growth diagnostics method developed by Hausmann, Rodrik, and Velasco 
(2005) and its concept of “binding constraints” is a major reference and could be 
adapted to a regional approach.
17.   The topic of subsidies is very sensitive, but positions have changed over the past 
few years (World Bank 2007). It is now acknowledged that smart subsidies can help 
unlock access to input markets for producers and provide incentives to provid-
ers. Voucher systems are a positive development that have been somewhat widely 
adopted , as they facilitate targeting of farmers’ groups and regions. The major issue 
is the adequate management of this type of system and the ability to scale down.
18.   On the basis of long-term review and modeling, Fuglie (2009) demonstrated that 
total factor productivity levels in Sub-Saharan Africa have grown at a very slow pace 
over the past 45 years, in contrast to other developing countries.
19.  The price stabilization systems that developed worldwide between the two World 
Wars (and were implemented by the colonial powers in their former colonies) 
were all dismantled during the liberalization wave of the 1980s, with a few excep-
tions, such as the Ghana Cocoa Marketing Board. Many attempts have been made 
to implement market instruments (options, futures) and safety nets for the most 
vulnerable households, but the results have been very limited and uneven. The need 
for government involvement in market management is more widely accepted today, 
especially since the 2008 food price crisis. However, structural options for instability 
reduction and management are still highly debated. They include keeping high pro-
ductivity growth through investment and maintaining coping instruments for crisis 
response (for example, individual country reserves, price bands). See Byerlee, Jayne, 
and Myers (2005), Poulton et al. (2006), World Bank (2007), Galtier (2009), and 
Timmer (2010). The dominant role played by global fi rms in agricultural markets 
since state withdrawal from supply management is a major issue. Many proposed 
solutions depend heavily on cooperation among fi rms; however, their willingness to 
cooperate is subject to some debate (Losch 2007).
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20.   As noted in chapter 4, family agriculture is defi ned by the strong link between house-
hold structure and farming activity in terms of assets and management. Its oppo-
site is managerial or capitalist agriculture based entirely on a waged labor force 
and on shareholding. This type of agriculture targets returns to capital investment, 
while family agriculture mainly targets returns to labor (Lamarche 1991; Losch and 
Fréguin-Gresh forthcoming). 
21.   In the case of Africa, see Poulton et al. (2008), who also show that the few apparent 
successes in eastern and southern Africa were nurtured by strong public support.
22.   See Hazell et al. (2007b), Wiggins (2009), and Binswanger-Mkhize, McCalla, and 
Patel (2009). There are few exceptions to the lack of economies of scale in agricul-
ture, mostly related to the transformation and packaging of perishable products. 
Byerlee and Deninger (2010) also show that new computer-related technologies for 
farm management and technical operations could challenge this historical advan-
tage of small farms.
23.   The study confi rmed economies of scale for some specifi c products (oil palm, hor-
ticulture) and noted the advantages of scale for meeting high quality requirements.
24.   Most of these technical innovations are agro-ecological practices that have been 
fully endorsed by the International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science 
and Technology for Development (IAASTD 2009). They include improved cultiva-
tion practices and plot management, such as erosion control through terracing and 
ground cover, agroforestry, and integrated crop-livestock systems. 
25.   In the RuralStruc countries, this is the case in Mali (the broad savanna zone near 
the Guinean border in western Mali and the inland Niger delta), in Madagascar (the 
western and northeastern parts of the country), and in Nicaragua (the Caribbean 
coast). See RS 1 Country reports.
26.   In 11 of the 19 SSA surveyed regions and in 2 regions in Nicaragua, more than 10 
percent of households are food insecure (see chapter 3).
27.   See World Bank (2008a). The overall value of staples also weights heavily compared 
with total agricultural exports: According to Diao et al. (2007), the estimated market 
value in 2003 was $50 billion, compared with $16.6 billion for exports.
28.   WITS/Comtrade (SITC Revison 3), year 2008, product groups 0 (food and live ani-
mals) and 4 (animal and vegetable oils and fats). Imports of cereals (product group 
04) represent 39 percent of total imports ($9 billion).
29.   Irrigation, seeds, and fertilizer were the main ingredients of the Asian Green Revolu-
tion. They were complemented by massive government investments in infrastruc-
ture, research, and extension, and by strong price protection and support for both 
inputs and products.
30.   In eastern and southern Africa only, the estimated value of these losses is nearly $2 
billion a year (World Bank 2008b), compared with $9 billion in SSA cereal imports.
31.   For a detailed analysis of prevailing trade policies and practices in West Africa (Eco-
nomic Community of West African States and West African Economic and Mon-
etary Union), see Rolland and Alpha 2010.
32.   In 6 of 19 SSA regions, livestock product share is more than 20 percent of the gross 
farm product. All regions in Morocco and all but two in Nicaragua are above this 
threshold.
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33.   See, among others, Davis et al. (2002), Satterthwaite and Tacoli (2003), and De Fer-
randi et al. (2005). 
34.   Regarding territorial development, a major international example is the European 
Union rural development policy and its fl agship program, LEADER, which pro-
vides regional structural funding. A number of promising and successful territorial 
development initiatives have occurred or are under way in Latin America. See, for 
instance, the debates related to the nueva ruralidad (new rurality) and the Rural 
Territorial Dynamics Program managed by the Latin American Center for Rural 
Development (RIMISP). On nueva ruralidad see, among others, Pérez et al. (2008). 
For a comparison of nueva ruralidad and the European multifunctionality approach, 
see Bonnal et al. (2004).
35.   The latter is a recommendation of the WDR09, which favors more spatially blind 
interventions and limits spatially targeted interventions to the most disadvantaged 
situations (see box 3.1).
36.   Gutman (2007) says that supplying environmental services could boost rural devel-
opment and inaugurate a new type of rural-urban relationship, which he calls a 
“new rural-urban compact.” How to pay for these services is the major issue and will 
necessitate an evolution of the policy debate.
37.   The agrocluster approach has been successfully developed in several Latin American 
countries and has facilitated the development of local agrifood systems based on 
the promotion of local assets. “Geographical indications,” which refer to the unique 
geographical origins of a product (based on specifi c natural or human factors), are 
increasingly mentioned in the development debate and are now strongly challenged 
by trade liberalization policies. They are a major topic of WTO’s TRIPS discussions 
(trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights). On local agrifood systems, see 
Muchnik et al. (2007). On geographical indications, see Giovannucci et al. (2009).
For more information on the surveyed regions, see annex 3 in the appendix 
posted at http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ruralstruc
Appendix: Country Maps
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Many late developing countries face tremendous challenges: They have to deal 
simultaneously with their economic and demographic transitions in the context of 
globalization and under the constraints of climate change. Based on new evidence 
from an in-depth survey that included 8,000 rural households in 7 developing 
countries, Structural Transformation and Rural Change Revisited addresses the 
unique situation of regions that remain deeply engaged in agriculture. It explores 
the reality of their integration into global markets and the nature of the rural 
nonfarm economy. It then shows the paths through which agricultural economies 
diversify, and ﬁ nally proposes a set of policy orientations that could facilitate the 
process of rural change. These include a clear need to engage in targeted develop-
ment strategies at the regional level, to focus on staples and family agriculture, 
and to pursue a policy of “territorial development” that promotes strong rural-
urban linkages at the level of rural localities, towns, and districts.
“The value of this book is in reminding us of the importance of structural change 
and the role played by agriculture, as well as alerting us to the risks we face if we 
deny the realities of demographics, of the marginalization of small producers, and 
of the lack of inclusiveness of public policies. For Africa, the immediate future will 
be stable only if we ﬁ ght against the political expropriation of the rural majority 
and if we can take economic advantage of the current strength of its population: 
its youth. Structural Transformation and Rural Change Revisited helps us to think 
about these issues and therefore to act intelligently.”
  — Ibrahim Assane Mayaki, CEO, The New Partnership for Africa’s Development
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